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ABSTRACT
REMOVING THE RUST:
COMPARATIVE POST-INDUSTRIAL REVITALIZATION IN BUFFALO,
CLEVELAND, AND PITTSBURGH
Scott Nicholas Duryea
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. David Earnest

This study seeks to understand the differences in post-industrial redevelopment
among the cities o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Part o f the so-called “rust belt,”
these three cities experienced industrial decline from the 1960s through the 1980s, largely
as a result o f the economic globalization o f heavy industry. Intensive manufacturing and
output had come to a screeching halt, unemployment skyrocketed, outmigration ensued,
and each metropolitan area faced formidable challenges to convert to service-oriented
industries. Over the past twenty years, these cities, and the regions that encompass them,
have begun to redevelop, although unevenly. At a glance, the Pittsburgh region appears
to be regenerating better than Cleveland and Buffalo. How well has each city post
industrialized? Why are there differences?
I hypothesize that differences in the dependent variable— post-industrialization—
can be partly explained by three independent variables— regulatory burden, size of
service sector prior to deindustrialization, and capital accumulation. These three
hypotheses are tested using a comparative and qualitative research design informed by
the liberal institutionalist school o f thought. The findings have implications for global
deindustrialized cities struggling to post-industrialize.
Ultimately, I find that Pittsburgh has economically outperformed its rust belt
counterparts because of its lower regulatory burden, more robust service sector prior to

deindustrialization, which insulated the region from the shock o f the rapid decline o f steel,
and higher availability o f venture capital.

© 2015 Scott Nicholas Duryea. All rights reserved.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation project seeks to understand the differences in post-industrial
redevelopment among the cities o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Part o f the socalled “rust belt,” these three cities experienced industrial decline from the 1960s through
the 1980s, largely as a result o f the economic globalization o f heavy industry. Intensive
manufacturing and output had come to a screeching halt, unemployment skyrocketed,
outmigration ensued, and each metropolitan area faced formidable challenges to convert
to service-oriented industries. Over the past twenty years, these cities, and the regions
that encompass them have begun to redevelop, although unevenly. At a glance, the
Pittsburgh region appears to be regenerating better than Cleveland and Buffalo. Why are
there differences? In this study, I test the influences o f three variables on post-industrial
revitalization: regulatory burden, service-sector path dependence, and capital
accumulation. Ultimately, these variables correlate with post-industrial revitalization and
partly explain why Pittsburgh is ahead o f the game. This introduction gives a statement
o f purpose, a brief background o f the decline o f American manufacturing and the rise o f
the tertiary sector, and an outline o f the study. The next two chapters offer a literature
review and an explanation o f the research design.

PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
This study is important for two reasons. First, the reasons for the differences in
post-industrial redevelopment have pragmatic value. The 1970s and 1980s saw massive
unemployment in and labor outmigration from these three cities. On a personal level,
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individuals who were affected by industrial downfall can begin to understand why painful
economic events occur and how to rise above them. Second, governments tend to learn
from examples o f success stories o f urban regeneration. These three cities are certainly
not the only cases o f industrial decline. Cities such as Detroit, Michigan; Newcastle,
Australia; and Sheffield, England have faced similar economic havoc, and the cases o f
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Buffalo can serve as examples for other domestic and
international governments and urban planners. This study reveals elements o f success
and failure for post-industrial redevelopment in these cities and offer insights for
replication in cases that are similar in context. The personal practicality and public
policy implications make this dissertation project a meaningful endeavor.

DECLINE IN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING
Industrial manufacturing in the United States saw a steady decline in the latter
half o f the twentieth century, with a sharp drop in the 1980s. In the immediate aftermath
o f World War II, one-third o f all jobs in the United States were in manufacturing. By the
early 1990s, that number dropped to 16%. From 1981 to 1991, 1.8 million manufacturing
jobs disappeared, a loss o f nine percent.1 The vanishing o f manufacturing employment
included layoffs, unemployment, declining incomes, relocation, and early retirement.
Much o f the decline in American manufacturing came a result o f the business
decisions o f American transnational corporations (TNCs). By the 1980s, the United
States’ largest TNCs did not dominate the world economy as they had done in the 1960s.
The height o f TNC growth came in 1968, and since then the rate o f subsidiary formation
1 Brian Phillips, Global Production and Domestic Decay: Plant Closings in the U.S.
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), xxii.

consistently declined. Domestic activities o f American TNCs slowed in the 1970s and
1980s in favor o f greater transnationality to compete with new and rising smaller- and
medium-sized American TNCs.2 During this time, and without adding subsidiary
formation, large American TNCs expanded their existing operations and restructured
their foreign networks. Between 1960 and 1988, American overseas direct investment in
manufacturing increased by nearly $120 billion.3
The redirection of investment abroad led to an increase in overseas employment.
In the 21-year period between 1966 and 1987, overall employment in the foreign
affiliates o f American TNCs grew from 2.4 million to 4.07 million, a 68.2% increase.4
Among developed countries, Spain, Ireland, and Japan saw the quickest increases in
employment rates. But, the highest rates o f employment growth occurred in developing
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan.
Employment in these countries grew five-fold over that o f developed countries. As a
result, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom declined in relative
importance for investment.
By focusing abroad, large American TNCs saw their American plants as less
profitable. Several industries closed manufacturing plants throughout the 1980s.
Between 1983 and 1989, layoffs caused the unemployment o f 10 million workers.5

2 Ibid., 15.
3 Rodger Doyle, "Deindustrialization: Why Manufacturing Continues to Decline,"
Scientific American May 2002, 30.
4 Peter Dicken, Global Shift (New York: Guilford Press, 1992), 65.
5 John Portz, The Politics o f Plant Closings (Lawrence: University o f Kansas Press,
1990), viii.
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These losses were most pronounced in the industries o f steel, electronics, rubber, and
automobiles.
The persistent decline o f manufacturing employment in the United States since
World War II can be seen in Table 1.1 below. Looking at the ten-year intervals, a steady
decline in the percentage o f manufacturing employment to total employment began in
1949 at 30.7 percent, continued through the end o f the twentieth century at 14.2 percent,
and fell to 9.3% in 2013. Figure 1.1 gives a graphical presentation o f the share of
manufacturing employment trend.
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Table 1.1: Manufacturing Employment per Thousand
Year

Mfg. Employment

Total Employment

Share

1929

10,428

35,286

29.6%

1939

9,967

35,857

27.8%

1949

14,368

46,769

30.7%

1959

16,060

55,574

28.9%

1969

19,789

71,718

27.6%

1979

20,611

87,302

23.6%

1989

18,954

102,755

18.4%

1999

17,051

120,328

14.2%

2009

11,528

121,201

9.5%

2013

11,749

125,980

9.3%

(Source; U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f Economic Analysis. National
Income and Product Accounts, tables 6.5A-6.5D)
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Figure 1.1: Share of Manufacturing Employment to Total Employment
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The rise o f manufacturing occurred in cities because o f the benefits o f
agglomeration and spillover effects. This interconnectedness o f production processes felt
the ripple effects o f the decline o f manufacturing. Accordingly, the effects o f industrial
decline were not even across the country. Rather, they were concentrated in cities. The
next section will look at the sectors o f the manufacturing industry most affected by plant
closings and describe the domino effect o f steel’s downfall in the United States.
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Steel Industry
At the turn o f the twentieth century, the output and technology o f American steel
mills outpaced those o f the rest o f the world. Foreign competition from England and
Germany led American steel companies to organize the United States Steel Corporation,
a large holding company o f over 200 subsidiaries which governed the production o f 65%
o f American steel output. Because o f the large share o f total steel production held by US
Steel, there was no need for technological improvement and modernization in steel
making. For over sixty years, this business model was successful.6
But the late 1950s saw the rise o f Japanese steel competition, which took
advantage o f inexpensive Venezuelan iron ore and invested in high-technology modem
steel furnaces. American steel began to decline, and, by the late 1960s, companies in the
United States began fighting labor unions in desperate attempts to lower production
costs.7 The 1970s and 1980s saw American companies demand the federal government
to impose import restrictions as a protectionist measure, while simultaneously move
assets out o f steel-making and into more profitable enterprises, such as plastics,
chemicals, shopping malls, and hotels.8 Other steel ventures often included partnering
with their international competitors. U.S. Steel explored the possibility o f signing
contracts with Japanese steel manufacturers in a bid to update and modernize existing
steel facilities. National Steel, the forth largest American steel producer, sold half o f its

6 David Bensman and Roberta Lynch, Rusted Dreams (Berkeley: University o f California
Press, 1989), 80-88.
7 Ibid.
g

Gilda Haas, Plant Closures: Myths, Realities, and Responsibilities (Detroit: South End
Press, 1986), 23.

shares to Nippon Kokkan, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh, the ninth largest American steel
company, created a joint subsidiary w ithN isshin Steel.9 U.S. Steel Corporation
Chairman M. Roderick stated in 1979 that the corporation was in the business o f making
profits, not necessarily making steel. Later that year, U.S. Steel closed thirteen steel mills,
laying off more than 13,000 workers.10 American steel was quickly fading.
In 1981, U.S. Steel saw a slight gain in profits, but it was offset by the
diversification purchase o f Marathon Oil and later Texas Oil for a total o f $9 billion.
From 1978 to 1985, U.S. Steel revenues from steelmaking dropped from 73% to 33% o f
total revenue, and oil and gas revenues made up 53% by the middle o f the 1980s."
Accordingly, American steel companies shut down more than 20% o f their productive
capacity between 1979 and 1984, which left 150,000 workers unemployed.12 And, by the
end o f the decade, U.S. Steel alone shut down 150 plants. American steel was unable to
recover.

Electronics Industry
The electronics industry also faced challenges from abroad. Transnationalization
and the increased division o f the stages o f production enabled capital to be increasingly
mobile to Taiwan and South Korea. In addition, lower labor costs, fewer tariff burdens,

9 Bertrand Bellon and Jorge Niosi, The Decline o f the American Economy (Montreal:
Black Rose Books, 1988), 54.
10 Scott Camp, Workers Response to Plant Closings: Steelworkers in Johnstown and
Youngstown (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), 92.
11 Portz, The Politics o f Plant Closings, 91.
12 Bensman and Lynch, Rusted Dreams, 91.
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and weaker union structures opened the gates to internationalization for electronics
companies. While American sales o f televisions, radios, semiconductors, and other
electronic products doubled between 1966 and 1975, offshore production increased
tenfold. In the same period, the American radio and television manufacturing industry
laid off nearly 250,000 workers.13 Perrucci et al. noted, “The experiences o f this
industrial sector provides a model o f the change in the American economy that bears
directly on plant closings and unemployment.” 14 Even though consumers o f electronic
products benefited from less expensive goods, it came at the expense o f American
manufacturing employment.

Rubber Industry
Both internationalization and domestic reorganization affected the rubber industry.
The primary product o f rubber manufacturing is and had been tires. At one time, Akron,
Ohio, which was known as America’s rubber city, contained 65 rubber plants through
which two-thirds o f the country’s tires had been produced. By 1986, the rubber
industry’s employment dwindled to 3,600, down from 37,000 in 1950. Several plants
closed, thousands o f unionized workers lost their jobs, and tire production had come to a
halt by 1988.15

13 Phillips, Global Production and Domestic Decay: Plant Closings in the U.S., 53.
14 Carolyn C. Perrucci et al., Plant Closings: International Context and Social Costs
(New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1988), 29.
15 Charles Jeszeck, "Decline o f Tire Manufacturing in Akron," in Grand Designs: The
Impact o f Corporate Strategies on Workers, Unions, and Communities, eds. Charles
Craypo and Bruce Nissen (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1993), 18-44.
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The rubber industry’s decline came as a result o f asset acquisition by foreign
firms and the relocation o f production to greenfield sites in the southern and southwestern
United States where employees were less unionized and labor costs were minimized. But,
it was not that union wages were too high. The shift in ownership and location in the
rubber industry occurred because o f the unwillingness o f corporate managers to invest in
upgrading worker skills and technology, the failure to react to various market shifts, and
simply the desire to escape the legalities and impediments that came with a unionized
workforce.16 Production increased, but so too did unemployment in the Midwest rubber
industry.

Automobile Industry
One o f the more notable industrial declines came in the automobile industry. In
the post-World War II period, General Motors and Ford were the prime automobile
producers in the world. In the 1960s, American automobile output equaled about half o f
the world’s production.17 By 1992, that number fell to only 20% ,18 but substantial
profits were still being made. General Motors, for instance, made a record $4.9 billion
profit in 1994.19
Unlike other industries, however, diversification in the automobile industry did
not account for most of the profits. Ford, in the 1990s, derived 84% o f its sales from car,
16 Ibid.
17 Dicken, Global Shift, 272.
18 Standard and Poors, Industrial Surveys, Vol. 1 (October 1994), A79.
19 James Bennet, "G.M.'s Profits a Record in Quarter and Year," New York Times,
February 1, 1995.
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truck, automobile parts, and glass operations, and General Motors derived 80% from
automobile production. These profits, however, have come as a result o f overseas
production and co-production and contracting agreements with foreign producers. By the
late 1980s and early 1990s, Ford produced nearly 60% o f its cars outside o f the United
States.20 And, in 1993, General Motors derived more than 90% o f its net profits from its
foreign operations.21 These included 29 plants operating in Mexico. Further, General
Motors made foreign production agreements with firms in South Korea, a country known
for suppressing trade union influence.

yy

American workers felt the impact o f the international expansion o f General
Motors and Ford. Employment in the automobile industry dropped 25% between 1978
and 1989 as a result o f a trend o f operational restructuring. In addition, General Motors
cut its American hourly workforce by more than 45% from 1980 to the early 1990s.23
Like the other industries which have internationalized, American workers were forced to
reevaluate their labor skills and find work elsewhere.

RISE OF THE TERTIARY SECTOR
As the American manufacturing sector began to internationalize its industries and
operations, the service, or tertiary sector, gained ground in the United States. The tertiary
sector includes teachers, civil servants, hotel workers, lawyers, doctors, journalists,

20 Dicken, Global Shift, 290.
21 James Zajac, "Getting the Welcome Carpet," Forbes July 18, 1993, 276.
yy
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Marc Baldwin, "Disastrous Job Losses in Michigan," Dissent (Spring 1987): 152.

23 Dicken, Global Shift, 306.
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scientists, and workers in the leisure industry, especially actors, artists, and athletes.
Hughes and Cain attribute the rise o f the tertiary sector to increased productivity among
developed nations. “ {T]he typical pattern o f industrial development among the advanced
nations has been characterized by rising productivity that leads to a reduction in the
number o f persons employed in the primary sector and a tapering off o f the proportion o f
the labor force employed in the secondary sector,” they argue. “In some sense, these jobs
have been replaced by a massive expansion o f the tertiary sector.”24 These service sector
jobs may not completely replace manufacturing jobs, as many o f them offer lower pay
and fewer benefits. And, it is important to remember in this study that service sector jobs
range from highly specialized experts in the fields o f medical technology to housemaids
and valet services. The Bureau o f Economic Analysis and U.S. Census Bureau has only
recently begun to differentiate the categories o f service sector employment.
Notwithstanding, Table 1.2 details the sectoral division o f the civilian labor force from
1900 to 2013. There is a steady increase in tertiary employment and a continual decline
in the primary sector, those industries involved in extraction and the lower stages of
production. The secondary sector includes manufacturing employment, which decreased
from 1950 onward. This data defines the tertiary sector in a way that only includes the
civilian labor force. Therefore, it excludes unskilled labor, all transport workers, all
construction workers, and the military forces. The data show the doubling o f the tertiary
sector in the twentieth century. Real per capita income increased fourfold from 1900 to
1990, and industrial production and agricultural output rose the same.

But, employment

24 Jonathan Hughes and Louis P. Cain, American Economic History (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley, 1998), 536.
25 Ibid., 542.
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in primary and secondary production declined from around 70% to less than 30% o f the
entire labor force. Had transport and construction workers been added to the data,
tertiary employment would be above 75% o f the entire labor force. Figure 1.2 below
gives a graphical representation o f the employment trends.

Table 1.2: Sectoral Division of the Civilian Labor Force as Percentage of Total
Employment
Year

Primary

Secondary

Tertiary

1900

37.5

35.8

23.6

1910

30.9

38.2

28.5

1920

27.0

40.2

31.1

1930

21.2

39.6

39.2

1940

17.4

39.8

42.8

1950

11.9

41.0

47.1

1960

6.4

39.5

54.1

1970

3.1

36.6

60.3

1980

2.8

31.7

65.6

1990

2.6

26.5

70.9

2000

2.4

23.4

74.2

2010

2.2

19.1

78.7

2013

2.1

18.4

79.5

{Source: Historical Statistics o f the United States, series D 233-682; Statistical Abstract
o f the United States, 1995, Table 652.)
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Figure 1.2: Sectoral Division of the Civilian Labor Force
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As the largest manufacturing firms in the United States diversified, internationalized, and
closed plants in the United States, unemployed workers gradually turned to employment
in the service sector. This pattern o f industrial decline and slow tertiary sector growth
largely occurred in a specific region o f the United States, in which Buffalo, Cleveland,
and Pittsburgh are located: the “rust belt.”

15
THE RUST BELT
The rust belt, a term which gained popularity in the 1980s, describes the region
that experienced industrial prosperity in the nineteenth and first half o f the twentieth
centuries in the mid-Atlantic and Great Lakes region. This region bore the brunt o f
deindustrialization in the United States in the second half o f the twentieth centuries,
culminating in the 1980s and 1990s. Cities in the rust belt experienced economic decline,
population loss, and urban decay as a result o f plant closings and stagnant economic
activity.26
This area had been known as the industrial heartland o f the United States, or the
“manufacturing belt,” where local economies specialized in large-scale manufacturing o f
medium and heavy industrial and consumer goods.27 The abundance o f paved roads, an
extensive railroad network, and waterways such as the Great Lakes, tributaries to the
Mississippi River, and canals made the rust belt region fertile for the growth o f industry
in the nineteenth century. Iron ore from northern Minnesota and upper Michigan was
linked with coal from the Appalachian region by an extensive transportation network. As
a result, cities such as Chicago, Buffalo, Detroit, Milwaukee, Gary, Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Toledo, Akron, Youngstown, and Pittsburgh developed. And they continued
to thrive as cheap labor immigrated from south and eastern Europe.

Economic boom

26 Robert W. Crandall, The Continuing Decline o f Manufacturing in the Rust Belt
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 4.
27 David R. Meyer, "Midwestern Industrialization and the American Manufacturing Belt
in the Nineteenth Century," Journal o f Economic History 49, no. 4 (1989).
28 Ted McClelland, N othin’ But Blue Skies: The Heyday, Hard Times, and Hopes o f
America's Industrial Heartland (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).
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periods in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries further fueled industrial
growth in the rust belt region.
But, as unfavorable economic and social conditions developed in the latter part o f
the twentieth century, rust belt cities found it difficult to adapt. A general decline in the
steel and iron industry; movement o f manufacturing to southeastern states with lower
labor costs; greater innovation and a decreased need for labor in steelmaking;
internationalization o f American business; and liberalization o f trade policies as a result
of globalization sabotaged the urban prosperity that rust belt cities enjoyed. They
experienced population loss, brain drain, a vast reduction in local tax revenues, high
unemployment, increased crime, declining municipal credit ratings, and deficit spending
to attempt to regenerate economic activity and continue to supply public goods.29 These
cities became ghost towns o f their former selves. Their capital machinery and mills had,
in a sense, turned to “rust.”
The first part o f this chapter has discussed the general decline o f manufacturing in
the United States and the rust belt region. To form a proper foundation for the study, the
following summaries briefly explain the rise and fall o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh.

Buffalo, New York
The rise o f Buffalo as an industrial giant at the end o f the nineteenth and
beginning o f the twentieth centuries had much to do with its location at the convergence
o f Lake Erie, the Niagara River, and the Buffalo River. These water sources gave
•}Q

See Patricia E. Beeson, "Sources of the Decline of Manufacturing in Large
Metropolitan Areas," Journal o f Urban Economics 28, no. 1 (1990).
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Buffalo a network for trade, and Niagara Falls, situated only 30 miles away, later
provided hydroelectric power to the metropolitan area. The construction o f the Erie
Canal in 1825 connected Buffalo to the Hudson River in eastern New York and New
York City. This network enabled raw materials to come to Buffalo for processing or to
be manufactured into finished products and then to be sent to the Atlantic Ocean and
beyond.30
Early, Buffalo’s commercial orientation was as a clearinghouse for raw products
o f the Midwest. Different agricultural goods, mostly grain, flowed through Buffalo to the
east, the south, and Europe. By 1910, Buffalo had become the largest grain port in the
world. The grain trade evolved into a burgeoning brewing industry, which, at the turn o f
the twentieth century, claimed 19 independently owned breweries in the city, producing
over 750,000 barrels o f beer per year.31 Railroads bolstered the brewing industry. As the
second largest railroad depot in the United States at the beginning o f the twentieth
century, Buffalo had seven direct lines which connected the city to six east coast cities,
six direct lines to the west to Chicago, Kansas City, Omaha, and St. Louis, and two direct
lines to Pittsburgh, the steel giant. Also by 1910, Buffalo emerged as one o f the largest
transshipment cities in the country. The discovery o f large deposits o f iron ore on the
shores o f Lake Superior led to the building o f larger ships and the widening o f the Sault

30 Diana Dillaway, Power Failure: Politics, Patronage, and the Economic Future o f
Buffalo, New York (Amherst: Prometheus, 2006), 25.
31 Mark Goldman, City on the Edge: Buffalo, New York (Amherst: Prometheus Books,
2007), 38.
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Sainte Marie canal to accommodate the increased flow o f material to Buffalo. In the
early 1900s, Buffalo had a diversified and healthy economy.32
Because o f the confluence o f raw materials at Buffalo, specifically iron and coal,
a steel and manufacturing industry developed that soon rivaled that o f Pittsburgh. In
1910, more than 10,000 people worked in over 150 iron and steel factories in Buffalo.
Most o f these were small plants scattered throughout the neighborhoods. The exception
was the Lackawanna plant, which had 6,000 workers. There were an additional 3,600
workers in the automobile industry, 3,400 railroad car manufacturing and repair, and
1,800 in copper manufacturing, which was a primary material in beer barrels.
Manufacturing output was high, and unemployment was low.33
The steel and manufacturing industry in Buffalo owed much o f its success to the
power generated by Niagara Falls. With Nikola Tesla’s design, George Westinghouse
created an illumination system for the city o f Niagara Falls in 1883. Within a decade and
a half, Buffalo became part o f the power grid, lighting up city streets and keeping mills
open throughout the night.34
The decline o f industry in Buffalo occurred after World War II. The military’s
need for steel during the two world wars created an artificially high demand that abruptly
came to an end in the late 1940s and 1950s. By the early 1960s, signals o f decline
became evident. In the two decades between 1960 and 1980, the rate o f growth in overall

32 Dillaway, Power Failure: Politics, Patronage, and the Economic Future o f Buffalo,
New York, 26.
33 Goldman, City on the Edge: Buffalo, New York, 37.
34 Ibid.
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employment in the two-county metropolitan statistical area o f Buffalo (Erie and Niagara
counties) was only 1.3%, with a 21% loss in manufacturing jobs.35
While most observers blame the decline on the opening o f the St. Lawrence
Seaway in 1959 and the loss o f the steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s, historian Diana
Dillaway attributes the decay to three additional developments: the loss o f home-owned
industries and corporate headquarters; militant labor demands and high wages; and the
destructive effects o f leading political and economic organizations’ fight for power in the
city.36
The diversification that characterized early twentieth century Buffalo transformed
into an economy heavily concentrated in steel and related industries by the middle o f the
century. By the 1940s, the economy in Buffalo was susceptible to changes in the steel
industry. The aging plants and equipment that ran Buffalo’s mills encountered
competition from international firms, which used new and more efficient technologies.
In 1971, Bethlehem Steel laid off 9,000 workers, half o f its employees. Seven years later,
the company cut an additional 3,300 jobs. In 1980, the Bethlehem Steel Foundry closed,
and a year later, Bethlehem closed its 12-inch bar mill and lime plant. The final blow
was the closing o f Bethlehem’s basic steelmaking plant, leaving only 1,500 workers still
with jobs to keep the bar and galvanizing mills and coke factory running. Republic Steel
quickly followed, closing its South Park plant, leaving 2,500 workers unemployed. From
1970 to 1984, Buffalo lost nearly 70,000 jobs in steel and related industries.37

35 Dillaway, Power Failure: Politics, Patronage, and the Economic Future o f Buffalo,
New York, 26, 58.
36 Ibid., 26-27.
37 Ibid., 33.

20
Manufacturing declined by 40.6% and the service sector gained by 58.8% in the same
time period.

Cleveland, Ohio
Like Buffalo, Cleveland owed its industrial development to its advantageous
geographical location. Located at the mouth o f the Cuyahoga River on Lake Erie, the
city served as a Great Lakes port as well as the northern transportation depot between the
lake and the Ohio River. The American Civil War gave Cleveland its first production
exercise, as war material was in high demand and the city was isolated from the
TO

battlegrounds yet connected to the North by rail.

War blockade o f the Mississippi River

redirected trade to the Great Lakes, and higher taxes and the increased cost o f raw
materials from abroad made iron-ore from Lake Superior more attractive. Employment
in the iron industry in Cleveland grew six-fold between the beginning and the end o f the
Civil War.39 And, the city also produced other material to aid the war effort such as
knitted goods, uniforms, meat, and produce. Civil War demand jumpstarted an industrial
economy in Cleveland.
Industrial prominence came between 1870 and the late 1920s, when industrial
entrepreneurs capitalized on the region’s natural resource endowments and locational
advantage for transportation. In 1870, the city had 92,000 residents and was ranked
fifteenth in population o f American cities. Iron manufacturing and petroleum processing
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Carol Poh Miller and Robert A. Wheeler, "Cleveland: The Making and Remaking o f an
American City," in Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader, eds. W. Dennis Keating, Norman
Krumholz, and David C. Perry (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1995), 31, 36.
39 Ibid., 36.
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became the center o f the industrial economy. Fourteen rolling mills produced 400 tons o f
finished iron daily, and the petroleum industry was fed by plants making sulfuric acid,
hydrochloric acid, soda ash, and other chemicals. In 1870, thanks to the completion o f a
pipeline linking Cleveland to oil fields in Pennsylvania, the city refined two million
barrels o f petroleum. John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company and other refining
firms sprung up across the city. Further diversifying the Cleveland economy were
industries such as lumber and woodworking, railroad machinery and repair, wire,
clothing, engines, paper, and shipbuilding, which expanded rapidly in the 1880s and
rivaled only Philadelphia in the industry.40
The turn o f the twentieth century saw Cleveland as one o f the world’s leading
manufacturing centers. Population growth fueled the growth o f iron and steel mills,
foundries and machine shops, meat packing plants, and automobile, clothing, and paint
and varnish factories. Largely as a result o f immigration from southern and eastern
Europe, the city’s population nearly doubled in the decade between 1900 and 1910, from
381,768 to 560,663.41 And until 1930, the increased population helped the automobile
industry blossom.
By 1930, Cleveland had become the sixth largest urban area in the United
States 42 But the year marked the beginning o f the end o f Cleveland industry. The onset
o f the Great Depression forced Cleveland’s economy into a fight for survival. In just
40 Edward W. Hill, "The Cleveland Economy: A Case Study o f Economic Restructuring,"
in Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader, eds. W. Dennis Keating, Norman Krumholz, and
David C. Perry (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1995), 37, 39; Miller and Wheeler,
"Cleveland: The Making and Remaking o f an American City," 56.
41 Miller and Wheeler, "Cleveland," 40.
42 Hill, "The Cleveland Economy," 56.
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over a year, the hurting economy left over 100,000 workers without jobs. Tax revenues
dried, and individuals demanded simple goods such as food, clothing, and shelter. World
War II gave the declining economy a temporary respite. Factories found use in making
planes, tanks, trucks, artillery, bombs, binoculars, and telescopes for the war effort. The
region also enjoyed a renewed diversification in the production o f machine tools,
electrical goods, and metal products. Economic conditions seemed to be rebounding.43
It was not long after the war ended, though, that the region’s economy would
continue on its declining path. The central business district and city neighborhoods were
crumbling and crime was worsening. Residents began moving out o f the city in favor o f
the suburbs. The exodus would continue consistently for another half century. Between
1960 and 1970, the city lost more than 125,000 people. The early 1970s saw a yearly
drop o f over 20,000 residents. With the population went economic activity. Nearly
130,000 jobs left the city from 1958 to 1977, most o f them manufacturing in heavy
industry44 Wartime industrial activity faded into an exodus o f both residents and
sustainable production.
The economic slide culminated in the city government’s default on its debts. On
December 15, 1978, Cleveland became the first city in the country since the Great
Depression to default, when it was unable to repay $14 million in short-term notes.45
Persistent and large-scale unemployment coupled with the loss o f city residents shrunk
the tax base, and prior efforts to increase taxes failed. The default became the beacon for

43 Hill, "The Cleveland Economy," 57; Miller and Wheeler, "Cleveland," 40, 42.
44 Miller and Wheeler, "Cleveland," 43-45.
45 Ibid., 45.
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the industrial decay that swept through the area in the following decade. W estinghouse’s
plant, which opened in 1890, closed in 1979, and all lighting manufacturing in Cleveland
halted in 1982. General Electric moved much o f its operations offshore, closing six
factories in the region. The Midland-Ross Company, which produced automobile
chassis, ran 19 divisions, consisting o f 57 plants in 1969. The company was sold in 1986,
and, the next year, its headquarters relocated. The Harris Corporation, a
telecommunications equipment manufacturer, moved its headquarters to Florida, ending
an 85 year connection with Cleveland. And, USX closed its Cleveland plant, and LTV
made significant layoffs. The prominent plants and factories that kept Cleveland workers
employed and created wealth for the region shut down or were relocated.46

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Like Buffalo and Cleveland, Pittsburgh owed its industrial beginnings to its
geographical location. Pittsburgh’s three rivers, the Allegheny, Monongahela, and Ohio,
provided a network o f transportation routes and a natural assembly line, where mills
could be place strategically at different points on the rivers. The region’s natural factor
endowments in iron ore, limestone, and, especially, coal made Pittsburgh a fertile
location for a budding steel industry to thrive. Even though other steel cities such as
Chicago lay closer to the iron ore fields o f Lake Superior, the low-sulfur coal necessary
to keep Illinois mills running had to be shipped from the coke region in Pennsylvania. It
was cheaper for Pittsburgh to import iron ore than for Chicago to ship coal.47

46 Hill, "The Cleveland Economy," 58, 60.
47 John P. Hoerr, A nd the W olf Finally Came: The Decline o f the American Steel Industry
(Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 84-85.
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But, factor endowments and transportation advantages do not in themselves
translate into industrial growth. It took Andrew Carnegie and the men around him to
transform Pittsburgh into the workshop o f the world. By the 1870s, small mills had been
in operation on the rivers in Pittsburgh, producing various iron products. And, Andrew
Carnegie had already become a successful entrepreneur, owning iron furnaces and rolling
mills. When he realized he might lose his railroad customers to producers o f steel rails,
he joined other businessmen in building the Edgar Thomson Works, about eight miles
south o f Pittsburgh on the Monongahela River. From there, Carnegie continued to
expand, both internally and through buying out competitors. By building two blast
furnaces at Edgar Thomson in the late 1870s, he was able to integrate iron and
steelmaking processes under one roof. In 1883, Carnegie bought a small plant, two miles
down the Monongahela River from Pittsburgh, in Homestead. The Homestead Works
would eventually become the largest plant in the “Mon Valley.”48
Molten iron was supplied to the Homestead furnaces by several blast furnaces
across the Monongahela at the Carrie Furnaces. Carnegie bought out a competing firm
and acquired the newly built Duquesne Works to relieve competitive pressure on the river.
By 1890, Carnegie had a steel chain lining the Monongahela, with Edgar Thompson,
Homestead, the Duquesne Works, and the Carrie and Lucy Furnaces serving as the core
of his holdings. Together with Henry Clay Frick, Carnegie eventually took greater
advantage o f the coal fields that lay in southwestern Pennsylvania, connecting the rich

48 Jonathan Rees, "Homestead in Context: Andrew Carnegie and the Decline o f the
Amalgamated Association o f Iron and Steel Workers," Pennsylvania History 64, no. 4
(Autumn 1997): 514-19.
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coal supply via railroad and rivers to the largest concentration o f steel mills in the
world.49
Through horizontal as well as vertical integration, Carnegie and Frick created a
monolith that made Pittsburgh the most prominent manufacturing center in the United
States. By 1911, Pittsburgh possessed an expansive railroad network, over 27 miles o f
harbor, intensive river traffic in excess o f nine million tons per year, and a significant
bulk o f American industrial output: 24% o f pig iron; 34% o f Bessemer steel; 44% o f
open-hearth steel; 53% o f crucible steel; 24% o f steel rails; and 59% o f structural
shapes.50 The height o f U.S. Steel came in the late 1940s, when the corporation
employed nearly 60,000 workers. Including Jones and Laughlin, Pittsburgh Steel, and
other companies’ workers, over 80,000 people in the Monongahela River valley made
their income directly from steelmaking. Forty years later, that number would dwindle to
a mere 4,000.51
In Pittsburgh’s Golden Age, the years between 1870 and 1920, the city’s
population grew nearly sevenfold. The growth had much to do with large-scale
immigration from southern and eastern Europe. Immigrants sought work in the factories,
mills, and mines, bringing with them their traditions, languages, and cultures. Densely
inhabited ethnic neighborhoods sprang up on hillsides and in valleys. Like Buffalo and

49 Les Standiford, Meet You in Hell: Andrew Carnegie, Henry Clay Frick, and the Bitter
Partnership That Transformed America (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), 52.
50 “Pittsburg,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, Eleventh Edition, 1911.
51 Hoerr, A nd the W olf Finally Came, 91.
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Cleveland, a cheap labor force ensured the viability o f industry in the early years o f the
twentieth century.
Also similar to the Buffalo and Cleveland cases, the world wars created
temporary demands for steel, which kept the mills running through the 1940s. Pittsburgh
produced 95 million tons o f steel for the Allies during World War II.53 After the war,
Mayor David L. Lawrence teamed with banking leader Richard King Mellon to clean up
the smoke-filled skies, eradicate environmental degradation, and organize the industrial
jungle o f railroads and factories that had become downtown Pittsburgh.54 The Pittsburgh
Renaissance, as it was called, cleared the skies and made the city a more livable place to
reside. But, as soon as the paint dried on the massive urban renewal program, the steel
industry faced serious decline. Mayor Lawrence left office in 1959, the same year that
the first crack in the industrial shell appeared. It came in the form o f a 116-day,
industry-wide, steel strike, during which imported steel found its way onto American
markets. Foreign steel would continue to undermine American manufacturing until
Pittsburgh steel collapsed, bankrupting 29 companies.55

52 John Bodnar, "Immigration, Kinship, and the Rise o f the Working-Class Realism in
Industrial America," Journal o f Social History 14, no. 1 (Autumn 1980): 45.
53 Beverly S. Bunch and Robert P. Strauss, "Municipal Consolidation: An Analysis o f the
Financial Benefits for Fiscally Distressed Small Municipalities," Urban Affairs Review
27, no. 4 (June 1992): 616.
54 Sabina Detrick, "The Post Industrial Revitalization o f Pittsburgh: Myths and
Evidence," Community Development Journal 34, no. 1 (1999): 6.
55 William S. Dietrich, "A Very Brief History o f Pittburgh: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth o f
the City That Built America," Pittsburgh Quarterly (Fall 2008), at
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Pittsburgh’s mills kept producing steel after the 1959 strike, and some Pittsburghbased companies were even expanding capacity. But in the 1960s and 1970s, the most
important market was light sheet steel for appliances and automobiles. Expansion was
better served in the Midwest rather in the Pittsburgh area. Steel fell off in the 1980s,
when over 75% of the steel-making capacity o f Pittsburgh was shut down. In the
Pittsburgh area, 60,000 jobs were lost in primary metals, with another 50,000 in other
manufacturing. In the years between 1980 and 1986, the nation lost six percent o f
manufacturing jobs. Pittsburgh lost 44%.56 After 1984, most o f the damage had been
done, but manufacturing job losses continued. The crack from the 1959 steel strike had
broken wide open.
The reasons for deindustrialization in the Pittsburgh area are many the same as
those for Buffalo and Cleveland: foreign competition, high labor costs, poor management,
and the overall reduction in the demand for steel as a result o f technological advance in
plastics and other materials. The steel industry in the United States developed almost
entirely as a domestic industry and continued to strengthen throughout the world wars
and in export markets in reconstructing postwar Europe. Steel production increased by
45% in the 1940s, 15% more than global production. And in 1950, almost half o f the
world’s steel output came from the United States.57 Even though wages in the United
States were high, intense worker productivity guaranteed a low price for steel and

56 Dale A. Hathaway, Can Workers Have a Voice? The Politics o f Deindustrialization in
Pittsburgh (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 27.
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impressive returns. Further, the relationship between steel management and the United
Steelworkers o f America solidified over a trade between periodic wage increases and a
no-strike clause. Management kept the mills running while steel workers were able to
enjoy a middle-class lifestyle.58
The late 1960s changed this pattern. American manufacturing, the steel industry
in particular, gave way to internationalization and lost its hold on global markets.
Foreign steel revealed the problems associated with the high cost o f American labor. In
1985, labor made up 25% o f the cost o f American steelmaking, where as in Japan, South
Korea, and Brazil, costs were 11.7%, 5.5%, and 8.0%, respectively.59 Part o f the
difference in steelmaking costs were offset by high worker productivity in the United
States and the cost o f shipping. But, they did not offset the costs completely, which
resulted in cheaper steel from abroad.
Added to the burden o f high labor costs was poor management o f domestic
manufacturing firms. The steel industry was built around a few very large companies,
which were able to influence the price o f steel in the absence o f foreign competition. The
absence o f competition allowed corporations to be less than perfect in management
decisions. But, the American oligopoly could not prevent competition from placing
downward pressure on prices. Until foreign competitors entered the market, steel leaders
placed little value in modernizing manufacturing facilities. Meanwhile, foreign firms
were building new and high-tech plants. Not until the 1970s did American companies
realize how far behind in the modernization o f production facilities they were. By 1975,

58 Hathaway, Can Workers Have a Voice?, 31.
59 Ibid., 34.
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the United States still produced about 20% o f its steel in open-hearth furnaces, which
were significantly less efficient than energy-efficient continuous casters. At the same
time, Japan was only producing 1.1% o f its steel through the open-hearth method.60
Pittsburgh steel factories began to modernize too late and were never able to compete
effectively.
The final significant reason for steel’s downfall was changes in demand. The
energy crisis o f the early 1970s and new federal regulations sent automobile
manufacturers to seek innovative, lighter, and alternative materials for making cars more
fuel-efficient. Cars were designed smaller and steel was largely replaced with plastic or
fiberglass.61 And the increased popularity in foreign automobiles shifted the demand for
domestic steel to steel made in foreign, automobile-manufacturing, countries.
Furthermore, small changes such as the shift from steel to aluminum cans and plastic
bottles made large impressions on the demand for steel. Steel consumption as a
percentage o f GDP declined 45% between 1970 and 1985. Steel simply was not as
intensively used as it had been.

(s')

The three rust belt cities experienced similar rises and declines in industrial
prowess, ultimately met by struggles to post-industrialize. The similarities in historical
experiences make the differences in economic recovery surprising. Evaluating and
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comparing these post-industrial transformations provides insights into the changing
nature o f cities, how regional economies evolve, and the local effects o f economic
globalization.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
This study contains eight chapters, inclusive of this introduction. Chapter two
reviews the relevant literature on post-industrialism and globalization; local and regional
development; economic geography; endogenous growth and entrepreneurship; and
institutions and economic growth.
Chapter three explains the research design o f analyzing the three cases and
comparing them. This study follows the theoretical framework o f liberal institutionalism,
which posits that production is the driver o f economic expansion. This is possible
through liberal institutions and a free market economy. In addition, liberal institutions
value the importance o f private property protection.
Chapter four evaluates to what extent the cases have fulfilled the characteristics of
the post-industrial economy. These are: change from a goods-producing to service
economy; the growing importance o f human capital; decline in importance o f blue-collar
work and increase in importance o f professional labor; and the centrality o f ideas in
economic growth. Numerous indicators are examined for each characteristic, ultimately
revealing that Pittsburgh has performed best in most areas o f analysis, and Buffalo has
performed worst in most.
Chapters five, six, and seven test my three hypotheses, respectively. The first
hypothesizes a negative correlation between the level of post-industrial redevelopment
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and regulatory burden. The second hypothesizes a positive correlation between the level
o f post-industrial redevelopment and the robustness o f the service sector prior to
deindustrialization. The third hypothesizes a positive correlation between post-industrial
redevelopment and capital accumulation. Ultimately, the data show positive correlations
between all three independent variables and the dependent variable, post-industrial
revitalization.
Chapter eight concludes the study with a review o f the findings and implications
for similar post-industrial cities such as Sheffield, England; Newcastle, New South Wales,
Australia; and Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. The conclusions drawn from this study imply
that regulatory burden, size o f service sector, and capital accumulation have played
significant roles in the post-industrialization o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh and
likely will have the same effect outside the United States.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION
To understand the relevance o f this study and put it in its proper context, a review
o f the literature is necessary. Because o f the interdisciplinary nature o f comparative
studies, there is a wide range o f themes that interconnect while exploring post
industrialism in cities and regions. The following overview will address the key
empirical investigations and theoretical discourses o f the market-driven phenomena o f
post-industrialism and globalization; local and regional development; economic
geography; endogenous growth and entrepreneurship; and institutions and economic
growth. Following these economic processes are studies on public policy and the role of
local governments in urban development.

DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, POST-INDUSTRIALISM, AND GLOBALIZATION
Observing the process o f post-industrialization in western economies forms the
foundation for understanding development and regeneration. Understanding post
industrialization is difficult without knowledge o f deindustrialization. Rowthom (1986)1
posits three explanations for deindustrialization in Britain: the Maturity Thesis, the Trade
Specialization Thesis, and the Failure Thesis. The Maturity Thesis involves both the
processes o f production and patterns o f consumption. Technological advance and
increased expertise in production management have bolstered manufacturing productivity
1 Bob Rowthom, "De-industrialization in Britain," in The Geography o f
Deindustrialisation, eds. Ron L. Martin and Bob Rowthom (London: Macmillan, 1986).
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since the 1960s. Conversely, services have seen little productivity gain apart from
domestic technology. Purchased services remain highly labor intensive, and, in some
sectors, particularly in biomedicine, technological advance can lead to greater labor
intensity. Technological development in health care is especially uneven. Bio-analyses
can now be performed by a semi-skilled technician with the help o f electronic equipment,
instead o f skilled labor. Nursing, however, has become more complex in the areas o f
intensive care and mental health. Consumption patterns reinforce the service industries.
With greater disposable income comes the ability to spend more on services as opposed
to food, shelter, and manufactured goods.
The Maturity Thesis describes developed economies as evolving as a result o f
their success. Rowthom and Ramaswamy (1997) offer a description:
deindustrialization is primarily a feature o f successful economic
development an d .. .North South trade has very little to do with it.
Measured in real terms, the share o f domestic expenditure on
manufactured goods has been comparatively stable over the last two
decades. Consequently, deindustrialization is principally the result o f
higher productivity in manufacturing than in services. The pattern o f trade
specialization among the advanced economies explains why some
countries deindustrialize faster than others.2
The Trade Specialization Thesis derives from the Ricardian model o f comparative
advantage. The market forms an economic equilibrium from the spatial ordering o f
productive processes. The “invisible hand,”3 in Smith’s terminology, creates situations in
which deindustrialization occurs in one area because o f increased specialization and
efficiency in another. Rowthom and Ramaswamy continue: “deindustrialization
2 Robert Rowthom and Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization - Its Causes and
Implications (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997), 1-2.
3 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1976).
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manifestly has not occurred in a social or spatial vacuum. It is not simply a mono-causal
economic mechanism with undifferentiated social and geographical consequences, but
rather a diverse set o f complex processes affecting different localities in different
w ays...
Closely related to the Trade Specialization Thesis is the Failure Thesis. Rowthom
defined the Failure Thesis for the United Kingdom in terms o f weak relative performance
o f the manufacturing industry against international competition from the 1960s to the
1980s. These failures include poor manufacturing management as well as governmental
mishandling o f the macroeconomy. British deindustrialization o f the early 1980s
coincided with an artificial overvaluation o f the pound, discouraging exports and
encouraging imports, especially in the textile industry. These accounts o f failure,
however, speak to localized events and not to general tendencies in the international
economy.5
The term “post-industrial” indicates a change in the nature o f employment.
“Industrial” refers to traditional forms o f wage-labor conducted in the factory system:
namely, producing material goods.6 Although first used by Indian cultural reformer A.K.
Coomaraswamy,7 the term “post-industrial” became popularized by Daniel Bell in 1973.8

4 Rowthom, "De-industrialization in Britain," vii.
5 Ibid., viii.
6 David Byrne, Understanding the Urban (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 28.
7 Douglas V. Shaw, "The Post-Industrial City," in Handbook o f Urban Studies, ed. Ronan
Paddison (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001), 285.
8 Daniel Bell, The Coming o f the Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting
(New York: Basic Books, 1973).
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Post-industrialism to Bell included five elements: the change from a goods-producing to
service economy; the predominance o f the professional and technical class; the centrality
o f theoretical knowledge as the source o f innovation and policy formulation; the planning
and control o f technology and technological growth; and the creation o f a new
“intellectual technology.”9 The year 1956 was pivotal for Bell. “For the first time in the
history o f industrial civilization,” he noted, the number o f white collar workers had
exceeded the number of blue collar workers. He also observed that the largest growth in
white collar workers was in professional and technical fields, which required at least
some post-secondary education. Behind this group were scientists and engineers, which
bolster the new knowledge-based society that Bell posited. Bell defined the difference
between industrial and post-industrial societies: “Industrial society is the coordination o f
machines and men for the production o f goods. Post-industrial society is organized
around knowledge, for the purpose o f social control and the directing o f innovation and
change; and this in turn gives rise to new social relationships and new structures, which
have to be managed politically.” 10 Bell’s formulation o f the post-industrial society
introduced a new concept to social scientific inquiry.
While many economies began to post-industrialize, the world economy underwent
a series o f changes that had lasting effects on cities that were capable o f benefiting from a
more internationalized economic order. The late twentieth century saw a growth of
multinational corporations, freer flow o f capital between countries and regions, new
investment instruments for facilitating this capital flow, and the movement o f

9 Ibid., 14.
10 Ibid., 20.
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manufacturing from developed nations to lesser developed and peripheral areas o f the
world, which provided lower manufacturing costs." These changes resulted in the
expansion of economic relations beyond national borders and the reduction o f the power
o f national governments to direct their internal economies and shape the manner in which
domestic economies interact with each other.12
These new global patterns o f trade and investment have affected urban networks.
Many cities faced deindustrialization in the 1970s, but those who were positioned to take
advantage o f the emerging global economic order grew in commercial importance and
economic power. These successful urban centers, termed “global cities” by Sassen
(1991),13 are locations in which decisions are made that affect economic and
technological developments in far-reaching areas o f the world. The “spatially dispersed,
yet globally integrated,” world economy that Sassen observed demanded specialized
producer services in the fields o f law, banking, and finance.14 In four ways, cities play a
major role in the provision o f these services: “first, as highly concentrated command
points in the organization o f the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and
for specialized service firms, which have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic
sectors; third, as sites o f production, including the production o f innovations, in these
leading industries; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations produced.” 15

11 Shaw, "The Post-Industrial City," 286.
12 Ibid.
13 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1991).
14 Ibid., 3.
15 Ibid., 3-4.
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Only a limited number o f urban centers were able to provide consistent work that
a large quantity o f highly trained and highly paid specialists demanded. The post
industrial economy increasingly demanded specialized services at “command points”
such as New York City, London, Paris, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. These cities and their
metropolitan areas experienced expansion in both corporate headquarters employment
and in services that multinational corporations required to expand their global reach.16
Sassen posited that the global cities o f New York City, London, and Tokyo constituted a
new form o f post-industrial urban development. She predicted that cities that could adapt
to the demands o f a new age o f service-oriented industry would develop in similar ways
and could run counter to the domestic and international interests o f home states. These
three cities, Sassen observed, were home to an increasing concentration o f financial
services. These cities would only grow in importance as the global economy became
increasingly integrated and the demand for specialized services expanded.
Sassen added that the post-industrial economy has rearranged the distribution o f
opportunity and income in global cities. Industrial cities saw middle class wages being
paid to factory laborers, who have since been pushed into lower paying service jobs or
completely out o f the workforce. Service professionals, on the other hand, earn lucrative
salaries, annual bonuses, and benefits. The middle class is eroding while the income gap
widens between the well-paid and the working poor. Sassen describes this post-industrial
urban environment as a dual city, in which the rich and poor are driven apart spatially and

16 Ibid., 19-34.
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economically. For Sassen, then, the post-industrial city contains the seeds o f social
decay.17
Whereas Sassen postulated that optimal productivity came from the shift from
goods to services, Castells (1996)18 points to information processes. Cities like Paris and
Tokyo will not follow the same paths as New York in London because the information
economy does not incorporate the concept o f the service economy. For Castells, the
development o f technology explains the changes in the organization o f production
management and its effect on state institutions. The rapid development o f information
technology coincides with the development o f the network society, consisting o f
interconnected nodes. His network society is constructed around a large network of
global capital flows. Sassen’s “global cities” can only be identified in Castells’ analysis
as central junctions in networks.
Castells’ technological approach distinguishes between modes o f production and
modes o f development when relating to sources o f new social forms and processes.19
The accumulation o f knowledge and technological development are at the core o f the
development o f information, which differs from industrialization. Industrialization
concerns itself mostly with maximizing output. Castells posits three characteristics o f
new information technology: production output is information-based, the most important
innovations are process-related rather than product-related, and the process-related

17 Ibid., 3-167.
1fi

Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1: The Rise
o f the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
19 Manuel Castells, The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic
Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
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approach causes a shift in social relations because o f greater flexibility in the
organization o f production. This information age has coupled itself with modem
capitalism to form a network society.
Aside from the interplay o f Sassen and Castells is Lovering’s (1997)20
explanation o f the Simple Story, where the global determines everything. According to
the Simple Story,
the problems o f the great industrial cities are rooted in Britain’s century
long decline from being ‘the workshop o f the world.’ Industries have
disappeared into oblivion under the impact o f technological change.. .or
moved to cheaper workforces elsewhere...Newly industrializing countries,
with cheaper labour and new factories, will continue to take over the
production o f consumer goods, moving up-market from low-to-high-tech
products. The global mobility o f capital, including the growth o f multi
national corporations, has increased this likelihood, making it easier to
transfer work to cheaper labour areas abroad. Britain’s cities have ceased
to be centres o f production. The more fortunate amongst them have
become instead centres o f consumption and administration. Out with
factories, in with offices, shopping malls and clubland.21
Lovering explains post-industrialism as a transnational and spatial organization o f
capitalist interests in cheap areas to maximize profits. Massey (1984)22 added that large
corporations go beyond merely seeking the best locations for production. They
systematically locate their supply chain at separate and particular places. Global cities
are often part o f this network in which to hold the headquarters. Design engineering can
be in another location. And mass production will be in others.

20 John Lovering, "Global Restructuring and Local Impact," in Britain's Cities, ed.
Michael Paccione (London: Routledge, 1997).
21 Ibid., 68.
Doreen Massey, Spatial Divisions o f Labour (London: Edward Arnold, 1984).
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Ravetz (2000)

lists a number o f transitions that characterize the post-industrial

environment. The first is globalization: there exists greater integration o f investment,
production, trade, and consumption. The second is connectivity: global networks are
achieved through information and communication technology, the media, and
international travel. The third is post-Fordism: earlier and more stable economic, social,
and political structures are dissolving. And the fourth is exclusion: new patterns o f
polarization, unemployment, and dependency affect large sections o f the population.
These patterns are in a state o f continuous unraveling, making cities always in a state o f
becoming.
Prager and Thisse (2012)24 describe post-industrialism as the “entrepreneurial
knowledge-based economy.” Even though manufacturing is still important, business
services are the main drivers o f OECD economies, accounting for 60-80% o f value added.
Prager and Thisse look to high value-added services, such as banking, which no longer
require local contact with the customer base. Instead, greater standardization is appearing,
and these services can often be provided remotely. They add that, while economies are
becoming more globalized, knowledge production is becoming decentralized and
scattered among specialized entities such as firms and universities. How knowledge is
produced, disseminated, and utilized has become increasingly scattered, and global
knowledge networks have emerged, spreading ideas and the capital investment necessary
to support the development o f them. Simultaneously, Prager and Thisse add, firms have
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Joe Ravetz, City Region 2020: Integrated Planning fo r a Sustainable Environment
(London: Earthscan Publications, 2000).
24 Jean-Claude Prager and Jacques-Francois Thisse, Economic Geography and the
Unequal Development o f Regions (New York: Routledge, 2012), 54.
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intensified intellectual property competition between each other. Some firms build up
patent portfolios in order to eventually produce high-technology consumer goods, which
often require cross-licensing. Dominating a particular market or industry does not simply
imply becoming the biggest producer. It also entails gaining control o f intangible assets
and knowledge.
The above review focused on elements o f post-industrialism and globalization as
eras in the evolution o f western economic development. These theories form an
important context for the case studies: Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Each
experienced industrial decline, partly as a result o f globalization., and all exemplify the
above characterization o f post-industrialism. The next section addresses the relevance o f
space, place, and economic geography.

SPACE, PLACE, AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
Localities and regions have been historically well-placed to serve as nodal points
in the movement o f goods and services. Port cities such as Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam,
London, Boston, Philadelphia, New York City, Tokyo, and Singapore have been channels
through which international trade and human migration have increased the wealth o f
regions and countries. Optimal geographic location has played a large role in economic
development because o f agglomeration mechanisms complemented by effective
institutions and favorable human capital.25

25 Ibid., 45.
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At its most basic level, economic geography deals with concepts o f space and
place. Castells (1973)26 defined space in an urban context. “Space,” he observed,
is a material product, in relation with other material elements - among
others, men, who themselves enter into particular social relations, which
give to space (and to the other elements o f the combination) a form, a
function, a social signification. It is not, therefore, a mere occasion for the
deployment o f the social structure, but a concrete expression o f each
historical ensemble in which a society is specified.27
Castells adds that space is not merely a “reflection o f society,” as many argue.28 It is at
the core o f social relationships. Space is also inherently linked to social changes and
processes. “Cities, like all social reality,” Castells argues, “are historical products, not
only in their physical materiality but in their cultural meaning, in the role they play in the
social organization and in peoples’ lives... Urban is the social meaning assigned to a
particular social form by a historically defined society.”29 Unlike Castells’ more abstract
notions o f space and place, Lapple (1992)30 refers to place as part o f global space but not
completely included within it. At the local level, place is the actual operations, specific
conditions, and location o f specific social processes in a particular area. Space, then, has
social relevance and thus economic importance.
Economic activity occurs in space. And, a branch o f economics deals specifically
with the question o f how economies organize their use o f space: economic geography. In

Manuel Castells, La Question Urbaine (Pans: Maspero, 1973).
27 Ibid., 302.
28 Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots (London: Edward Arnold, 1983), 311.
29 Ibid., 302.
30 Dieter Lapple, "Essay iiber den Raum," in Stadt und Raum, eds. Hartmut Haufiermann,
Detlev Ipsen, and Thomas Kramer-Badoni (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1992).
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1826, Von Thiinen (1966)31 pioneered this branch with his imagined model o f an isolated
town supplied by farmers in the surrounding countryside. Two assumptions
characterized the farms: crops differ in both their yield per acre and their transportation
costs, and crops were produced at different intensities o f cultivation. His questions, then,
were how should the land around the town be allocated to minimize the combined costs
o f producing and transporting a given supply o f food to the town, and how will the land
be allocated if there is an unplanned competition among self-interested farmers and
landowners?
Von Thiinen concluded that land rent would be higher at closer proximities to the
town and lower at farther proximities. At farther proximities, however, transportation
costs increase. Thus, there is a trade-off between land rents and transportation costs. He
showed that a pattern o f concentric circles o f farms around the town would result because
transportation costs and yields differ among crops. The equilibrium point in von
Thiinen4s model is thus where demand meets the supply o f crops produced. The model
reveals that, even if no farmer knows what any other farmer is going to grow, the result is
spatially and economically efficient. With each farmer seeking to maximize income, the
unplanned competition minimizes transportation and production costs. Von Thiinen’s
model reappeared in the 1960s in Alonso’s (1964)32 work on modem cities, substituting
commuters for farmers and a central business district for the isolated town. He reached
the same conclusion as von Thiinen, and Alonso’s “monocentric city model” remains an

31 Johann Heinrich von Thiinen, Der Isolierte Staat in Beziehung a u f Landtschaft und
Nationaldkonomie (von Thiinen's Isolated State), trans. Carla M. Wartenberg (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1966 [1826]).
32 William Alonso, Location and Land Use (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
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important theoretical framework. Even though the models are clear about land
distribution, von Thiinen and Alonso simply assume prior existence o f a town or business
district. Their models have limited use, however, for determining the endogeneity and
agglomeration o f towns or cities themselves.
Theories o f agglomeration find their roots in the concept o f external economies,
first introduced by Marshall (1920).33 Marshall argued that producing in an industrial
district was advantageous for three reasons: first, a geographically concentrated industry
could support specialized local providers o f inputs; second, a concentration o f firms
employing the workers o f the same type would homogenize the labor market, making it
easier for laborers to find employment and employers to find laborers; and third,
geographic proximity would promote the spread o f information. Marshall’s approach
outlines the efficiency o f industrial concentration. Krugman (1998)34 agrees that
geographic proximity is crucial to transmit knowledge. “It would not be surprising,” he
explained,
if it turns out that the market-size effects emphasized by the current
generation of new geography models are a less important source o f
agglomeration, at least at the level o f urban areas, than other kinds o f
external economies. It is, for example, a well-documented empirical
regularity that both plants and firms in large cities tend to be smaller than
those in small cities; this suggests that big cities may be sustained by
increasing returns that are due to thick labor markets, or to localized
knowledge spillovers, rather than those that emerge from the interaction o f
transport costs and scale economies at the plant level.35
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Alfred Marshall, Principles o f Economics, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1920).
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(1998).
35 Ibid., 172.
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Henderson (1974)36 has constructed a model o f the urban system as a collection o f
cities, seeking to explain the sizes and types o f urban areas. Expanding upon the work o f
Mills (1967),37 which discussed the tension between the benefits o f geographic
concentration o f industry within a city and the costs o f commuting in and around a large
city, Henderson assumed that cities would be o f optimum size to reflect the equilibrium
o f concentration of industry and transportation costs. He adds, hypothetically, that if a
city were too large or there were not enough cities, a profit-making opportunity would
present itself for entrepreneurs to begin to build a new one in a different location.
Henderson also explains the differing sizes o f cities. He notes that while external
economies tend to be specific to particular industries, diseconomies o f scale are largely
dependent on the size o f a city. There are two consequences to these tendencies. First,
the diseconomies o f city size make it less advantageous to put industries without mutual
spillovers in the same city. Henderson contends, then, that each city should specialize in
a limited number o f industries which generate external economies o f scale. And second,
particular industries create varying levels o f external economies, making the size o f each
city dependent on its role. For Henderson, cities find their optimal sizes by the extent to
which they create external economies o f scale for a particular industry.
Henderson’s analysis speaks to the concepts o f competitive advantage and
clusters as postulated by Porter (1990; 1998).
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He posits that competitive advantage in

36 John Vernon Henderson, "The Sizes and Types o f Cities," American Economic Review
64(1974).
37 Edwin S. Mills, "An Aggregative Model o f Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan
Area," American Economic Review 57 (1967).
38 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage o f Nations (New York: Free Press,
1990); Michael E. Porter, On Competition (Cambridge: Harvard Business School, 1998).
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sophisticated industries is rarely dependent upon a single variable. If a nation, region, or
city gains advantages in more than one determinant, self-reinforcing conditions arise in
which firms can succeed internationally or intra-nationally. This success often occurs
because o f clustering. Clusters are “geographic concentrations o f interconnected
companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and
associated institutions (for example, universities, standards agencies, and trade
associations) in particular fields that compete but also cooperate.”39 Firms outside o f
clusters fail to take advantage o f spillover effects, which allow firms to more rapidly
understand buyer needs, new technology, transportation innovation, and actions o f other
firms. These flows of information within the cluster help to grow business and thus the
economy by increasing productivity, spurring innovation, and strengthening the cluster.
Clusters do not necessarily need to be in close physical proximity, but they tend to be.
Porter adds, “Anything that can be efficiently sourced from a distance, however, has been
essentially nullified as a competitive advantage in advanced economies. Information and
relationships that can be accessed and maintained via fax or email are available to
anyone... Paradoxically, then, the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy
are often heavily local.”40
In a similar light, Storper (1995)41 sought to explain the reasons that firms and
economic activity are located in certain places over others. He argued that there was

39 Porter, On Competition, 197-98.
40 Ibid., 236-37.
41 Michael Storper, "The Resurgence o f Regional Economies, Ten Years Later: The
Region as a Nexus o f Untraded Inter-dependencies," European Urban and Regional
Studies 2 (1995).
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more to the story than just reduced transaction costs through agglomeration. This new
era o f value-added and knowledge-driven capitalism requires innovation and information
to adapt to new consumption patterns. Fordism produced mass quantities for mass
consumption. Knowledge capitalism involves myriad choices o f brands, colors, sizes,
and personalities o f consumer products. Storper observes that the specialists in science,
marketing, production engineering, finance, and human resources drive innovation. The
knowledge that these innovators possess is often gathered from various channels inside
and outside the firm, rather than being traded or bought formally. It is territorialized in
local worlds o f production. These untraded interdependencies among firms and
innovators, for Storper, are more important than reduced transaction costs. The end
product must meet the specific designs and demands o f the consumer. Florida (1995)42
calls these areas o f knowledge creation and sharing “learning regions.” These are where
knowledge and ideas concentrate and form the foundation for regional economic and
technological organization. Regional competitiveness in the post-Fordist economic era,
thus, is reliant on knowledge and innovation.
Porter (1980)43 examined the ways firms in cities use this knowledge to compete.
Specifically, he sought to understand the varying profitability o f different industries and
discovered that industry structure determines the competitive nature o f the industry. The
industry structure comes down to five forces: threat o f new entrants; intensity o f rivalry
among existing competitors; threat o f substitute products; bargaining power o f buyers;
and bargaining power o f suppliers. He also sought to understand how variations in
42 Richard Florida, "Toward the Learning Region," Futures 27, no. 5 (1995): 257.
43 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques fo r Analyzing Industries and
Competition (New York: Free Press, 1980).

48
profitability within industries come about. His answer is that firms have different ways
o f assessing the sources o f the five forces and thus have different defenses against them.
Three general strategies set firms apart from the rest: cost leadership, product
differentiation, and focus. Porter (1985)44 determined that firms put these strategies into
practice by creating a unique value to the consumer. For instance, if a firm provides a
cost leadership strategy, then the value to the consumer is a lower price. And, for
differentiation, a unique product is the value. The challenge for the firm is discovering
the value to the consumer that the firm wants to achieve and relaying this value to the
consumer. These are the ways in which knowledge, and the transfer o f it, plays a key
role in economic activity.
Further, Scott (1988)45 outlined three types o f New Industrial Spaces that typify
modem economic growth. First, New Industrial Districts are dense agglomerations o f
specialized small- and medium-sized firms. Second, High Technology (sunbelt) Areas
are Silicon Valley-type complexes that house a diverse range o f technologies and firms.
Third, Flexible Production Enclaves are distinct areas o f economic productivity that have
replaced old industrial areas, such as the film industry o f Los Angeles and the fashion
industry o f Paris. These three areas have developed, according to Scott, because o f the
re-agglomeration o f production. Flexibility and customization o f products is now driving
geographic economies o f scale. Producers must continually seek to improve products,
processes, and methods in developing high value goods in what he labeled the

44 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior
Performance (New York: Free Press, 1985).
45 Allen J. Scott, New Industrial Spaces: Flexible Production Organisation and Regional
Development in North America and Western Europe (London: Pion, 1988).
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“transaction costs thesis.” Rather than firms attempting to meet the demands o f
continuous innovation “in-house,” Scott observed that many firms work together by
expanding their input-output activities. The relationships with other firms must be in
close proximity: “The greater the spatial dispersion o f producers,” Scott explained,
the more onerous these costs will be. The immediate consequence is that
selected sets o f producers with particularly elevated intragroup interaction
costs will tend to converge around their own geographical centre o f
gravity and thus to engender definite nodes o f economic activity on the
landscape... Hence, via the play o f centripetal locational adjustment,
external economies o f scale (a non-spatial phenomenon) are eventually
transmuted into and consumed in the specifically spatial form o f
agglomeration economies.46
As a result o f this process, New Industrial Spaces, as economic nodes o f
production, appear within the globalizing production system.
Universities also play a role in the interactive learning and innovation process in
these types o f industrial spaces. Brinkhoff, Suwala, and Kulke (2012)47 examine the
significance o f proximity in the character o f science parks. They offer examples o f the
relevance o f geographical proximity between universities and business. They find that
geographical location alone is not sufficient to institute strong interdependencies between
universities and businesses. There are four dimensions o f proximity that are important:
First, personal relationships between entrepreneurs and scientists are
fundamental (social proximity). Second research and training at the
universities must correspond to the businesses’ activities (cognitive
proximity). Third, the universities have to embody their role as
“entrepreneurial universities” by adapting to the private sector’s work
46 Ibid., 177.
47 Sascha Brinkhoff, Lech Suwala, and Elmar Kulke, '"What Do You Offer?':
Interlinkages o f Universities and High-Technology Companies in Science and
Technology Parks in Berlin and Seville," in Universities, Cities and Regions: Loci fo r
Knowledge and Innovation Creation, eds. Roberta Capello, Agnieszka Olechnicka, and
Grzegorz Gorzelak (New York: Routledge, 2012).
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culture (institutional proximity). Finally, support schemes and
intermediaries also spur the inter-organizational knowledge transfer
(organization proximity).48
To fulfill these dimensions, the authors recommend that universities adapt their
work culture, research, and training to their designated entrepreneurial role, as
well as ensure the convergence o f university research and industry clusters.
Location has played an important role in the economies o f Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. The strategic geographic proximity to waterways
made industrial development successful. These cities must determine the future
role o f their respective locations and how space and place play into post
industrialism. The next section will outline the roles o f knowledge, innovation,
and entrepreneurship in spurring development and economic expansion.

THE ROLES OF KNOWLEDGE, INNOVATION, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Knowledge and innovation play key roles in urban development. And,
endogenous growth theory, which argues that economic growth primarily occurs as a
result o f endogenous rather than external forces, is a prominent explanation for this
development. Investment in human capital, innovation, and knowledge play a role in
economic growth by producing positive externalities and knowledge spillover effects.
Endogenous growth theory goes beyond neoclassical growth theories by accounting for
technological change in its models. Schmookler (1966)49 explained that the pace and
direction o f industrial innovation is largely determined by the expected profitability o f
48 Ibid., 140.
49 Jacob Schmookler, Inventions and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1966).
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inventive activity. Thus, modeling technological progress is exceedingly useful. Romer
(1990)50 pointed out, however, that endogenous models are deficient in their assumption
that the entire stock o f technological knowledge is a public good. He observed in simple
daily empirical evidence that new technological knowledge can become partially
excludable through patenting. Only until Judd (1985)51 was modeling economic growth
within imperfect competition possible. Romer built off o f Judd, which was based on the
Dixit-Stiglitz model o f monopolistic competition,52 in formulating the first model o f
endogenously determined technical change with imperfectly competing firms. Firms that
develop new technological knowledge have market power and earn monopoly profits
through innovation. Romer’s analysis was central to the establishment o f the “new
theory o f economic growth.”
The new growth theory perceived technological knowledge as a non-rival,
partially excludable good,53 which deviated from the neoclassical interpretation as an
entirely public good. Knowledge is characterized as non-rival, because its use by one
agent does not limit its use by another. In this way, knowledge differs from capital
equipment, which can only be used in one place at a time. The excludability o f
knowledge speaks to the technological and legal implications o f its use. Patenting
particular designs or simply keeping secrets limits the use o f knowledge. Arrow (1962),
50 Paul M. Romer, "Endogenous Technical Change," Journal o f Political Economy 98
(1990).
51 Kenneth Judd, "On the Performance o f Patents," Econometrica 53 (1985).
52
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Product Diversity," American Economic Review 67 (1977).
53 Buchanan called non-rivalrous, but excludable goods “club goods.” See James M.
Buchanan, "An Economic Theory o f Clubs," Economica 32, no. 125 (1965).
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however, explained, “With suitable legal measures, information may become an
appropriable commodity. Then the monopoly power can indeed be exerted. However,
no amount o f legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity o f
something so intangible as information. The very use o f information in any productive
way is bound to reveal it, at least in part.”54 But, if knowledge is only partially
excludable, research and development produces at least some technological spillover.
According to Grossman and Helpman (1991), spillovers occur when “firms can acquire
information created by others without paying for that information in a market transaction,
and the creators or current owners o f the information have no effective recourse, under
prevailing laws, if other firms utilize information so acquired.”55 Spillovers can occur
between highly skilled personnel in different firms or through open labor markets, which
incite entrepreneurship and innovation. They also tend to occur in the areas that are
absent o f bureaucratic constraints. In these ways, knowledge is a partially non
excludable good, which can be both transferred and protected in concentrated commercial
areas such as cities.
Even if knowledge was an entirely public good, it would be difficult for
individuals to access it, even in cities. Hayek (1945)56 formulated a model o f the market
economy as naturally imperfect. No two individuals share the same knowledge or

54 Kenneth Arrow, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation o f Resources for Invention," in
The Rate and Direction o f Inventive Activity, ed. Richard Nelson (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962), 615.
55 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 16.
56 F.A. Hayek, "The Use o f Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review 35
(1945).
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information about the economy at any single point in time. This fact ensures that
knowledge is diffused throughout the economy and is not available to everyone. It is the
limitability of knowledge that makes profit making opportunities possible and which
form the basis o f prices as signaling devices. Two entrepreneurial insights can be gained
from Hayek’s findings: first, opportunities for the production o f goods and services in the
future is only possible because o f the dispersion o f information. Second, this same
dispersion presents difficulties for taking advantage o f the profit-making opportunity.
Shane and Vekataraman (2000) explain, accordingly, that the study o f entrepreneurship
“seeks to understand how opportunities to bring into existence ‘future’ goods and
services are discovered created, and exploited, by whom and with what consequences.”57
Cities, especially, provide opportunities for profit-making and are fertile locations
for entrepreneurs. These opportunities are always available, whether entrepreneurs are
aware of them or not, because markets are generally inefficient. These inefficiencies are
always in need o f improvement. Kirzner (1973)58 articulated this point. He recognized
that entrepreneurial insights are profit-making opportunities that had previously gone
unnoticed. The consumer is the ultimate beneficiary because the economy becomes more
productive and individuals’ wants and needs are met more efficiently. Another
interpretation o f these opportunities comes from Schumpeter (1942),59 who described a
situation where innovation makes previous methods o f production more efficient. This
57 Scott Shane and S. Venkataraman, "The Promise o f Entrepreneurship as a Field o f
Research," Academy o f Management Review 25, no. 1 (2000): 218.
Israel M. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, 1973).
59 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper
Collins, 1942).
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most commonly applies to computer technology replacing manual labor in the production
process. Machines create short-term unemployment, which frees up labor to contribute to
the ongoing innovation process by creating more products that consumers want and need.
This “creative destruction” helps to expand the economy.
Entrepreneurial activity is based on the assumption that change is a fact o f life.
With this change comes a continuous supply o f profit-making opportunities and
individuals seeking them. Acs (2002)60 identifies four classes o f entrepreneurial
opportunities: first, imperfect and asymmetric information; second, the emergence o f
changes in social, political, demographic, and economic forces; third, developments in
the accumulation o f knowledge in society; and fourth, inventions and discoveries which
produce new knowledge. Acs further points out, “opportunity discovery is a function o f
the distribution o f knowledge in society. Opportunities rarely present themselves in neat
packages. They almost always have to be discovered and packaged. Thus, the nexus o f
opportunity and enterprising individuals is crucial to understanding entrepreneurship.”61
Entrepreneurial opportunities exist, but individuals must discover where they are, and
how to capitalize on them.
Entrepreneurship implies risk-taking. Entrepreneurs make investments in the short
term in hopes o f reaping rewards in the long term. The task o f venture capitalists, for
example, is to discover new economic knowledge to create future goods and services.
Venkataraman (1997) explained,

60 Zoltan J. Acs, Innovation and the Growth o f Cities (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar,
2002), 12.
61 Ibid.
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The significant point is that despite the existence o f adverse selection and
moral hazard problems, some individuals are able to successfully
overcome these hurdles and achieve success. Thus, the ability to
overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems varies among
individuals, and these differences matter for explaining successful
enterprises. The interesting issue is not that such problems exist, but that
in spite o f them, some individuals are able to secure resources from
different resource controllers, often at very favorable terms, whereby
considerable risk is shifted from the entrepreneur to other stakeholders.62
Especially in the post-industrial city, innovation is crucial to redevelopment. And,
the firm is the starting point for most theories o f innovation. The firm is assumed to be
exogenous, and its role in technological advance is assumed to be endogenous because o f
methods o f research and development. Griliches (1979)63 formulated the knowledge
production function, where an exogenous firm pursues new knowledge as an input into
the process o f innovation. Knight (1921)64 pointed out that asymmetries in economic
knowledge exist across agents both between and within firms. Because information is
uncertain, Knight argues, the main task o f the firm is to process imperfect information to
reach a decision. Moreover, Audretsch (1995) underscored the role o f asymmetric
information:
Combined with the bureaucratic organization o f incumbent firms to make
a decision, the asymmetry o f knowledge leads to a host o f agency
problems, spanning incentive structures, monitoring and transaction costs.
It is the existence o f such agency costs, combined with asymmetric
information that not only provides an incentive for agents with new ideas
to start their own firms, but also at a rate that varies from industry to

62 S. Venkataraman, "The Distinctive Domain o f Entrepreneurship Research, In
Advances in Entrepreneurship," Firm Emergence and Growth 3 (1997): 126.
63 Zvi Griliches, "Issues in Assessing the Contribution o f R&D to Productivity Growth,"
Bell Journal o f Economics 10 (1979).
64 Frank H. Knight, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (Chicago: University o f
Chicago Press, 1921).
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industry, depending upon the underlying knowledge conditions o f the
industry.65
Asymmetric information is thus at the core o f entrepreneurial opportunity for the
individual as well as the firm.
Firms and individuals generate technological progress in two ways. First,
incremental innovation is a learning process which occurs in the manufacturing chain,
depending on the existing industrial structure, human capital, and the stock o f knowledge
already incorporated in the supply chain. Second, radical innovation are more prevalent
among individual entrepreneurs. This type is not often seen in areas where long-standing
business activity exists, since it is difficult for large firms to adjust to swift technical
progress. These two types of technological progress bring attention to the economic
structure and diversity o f regions. To accommodate both types o f innovation in the
entrepreneurial knowledge-based economy, regions must diversify. Cross-fertilization of
ideas from different technological and scientific fields increases adaptive capacity and
raises long-term growth prospects.66
Advances in human capital can be achieved through the presence o f universities.
Human capital can be defined as “the sum o f the personal skills and knowledge
accumulated by individuals.”67 Education, on-the-job experience, and continuing
education and training are ways to generate human capital. Greater human capital

65 David B. Audretsch, Innovation and Industry Evolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995),
50.
66 Prager and Thisse, Economic Geography and the Unequal Development o f Regions, 64.
67 Ibid., 56.
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generally produces better performance at work. Glaeser (2004)68 has demonstrated that
abundant human capital results in the emergence o f new ideas, entrepreneurship, and
innovation, making it central to productivity growth. Further, Barro (2001) has found,
“an additional year o f schooling (roughly a one-standard-deviation change) raises the
growth rate on impact by 0.44% per year. A possible interpretation o f this effect is that a
workforce educated at the secondary and higher levels facilitates the absorption o f
technologies from more advanced foreign countries.”69 Universities and the presence o f
higher education plays into the accumulation o f human capital and development.
Human capital is important in what Florida (2002)70 calls the “rise o f the creative
class.” This creative class can be broken into two categories: a super-creative core of
highly educated professionals in fields such as science, engineering, research, and such
creative industries as arts, design, and media; and, creative professionals in healthcare,
business, finance, law, and education. Successful cities in the coming years will only be
successful if they attract individuals from the creative class. These individuals are
interested in places that possess the three Ts: talent, tolerance, and technology. Talented
people are highly mobile and in high demand. They also want to live in interesting
places. Cities, thus, must focus on urban assets that are unique to the city.

68 Edward L. Glaeser and Albert Saiz, "The Rise of the Skilled City," Brookings-Wharton
Papers on Urban Affairs 5 (2004).
69 Robert J. Barro, "Education and Economic Growth," in The Contribution o f Human
and Social Capital to Sustained Economic Growth and Well-Being, ed. John Helliwell
(Paris: OECD, 2001), 21.
70 Richard Florida, The Rise o f the Creative Class: A nd How It's Transforming Work,
Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
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This section has outlined how individuals, firms, and entrepreneurs use
knowledge in society. In the macroeconomy and urban economy alike, the use of
knowledge conveys information throughout the market that is crucial for the allocation o f
resources. Entrepreneurs in post-industrial cities must recreate value in depleted regions.
The next will look at the relationships among agglomeration, technological advance, and
the patterns o f path dependence within urban and regional economies.

PATH DEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
By its nature, economic development is rooted in history. The historic paths
economies follow have influences on future developmental success. Likewise, path
dependence seeks to understand the “long-term historical development o f distinctive
patterns o f technological and industrial forms, and how, once established, particular
trajectories o f technological and industrial development become self-reinforcing via
various forms o f externalities and increasing returns effects.”71 This section will use the
definition provided by Martin and Sunley (2006).72 Path dependence is
a probabilistic and contingent process: at each moment in time the suite of
possible future evolutionary trajectories (paths) o f a technology, firm or
industry is conditioned by (contingent on) both the past and the current
states o f the system in question. The past thus sets the possibilities while
the present controls what possibility is to be explored.73

71 James Simmie, "Path Dependence and New Technological Path Creation in the
Economic Landscape," in Re-framing Regional Development: Evolution, Innovation and
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Cities, as locations o f economies o f scale, assume cumulative and circular
developmental trajectories. Hirschman (1958)74 observed a recursive pattern o f
development in production locations. The process unfolds as follows: new capital
investment follows increasing returns, employment increases, the increased availability
o f local labor attracts even more capital investment, and the intensification o f increasing
returns initiates a new round o f capital investment. This process continues in round after
round o f path dependent urban expansion.
Expansion in the postindustrial economy particularly focuses on technological
innovation. Traditional path dependence theory posits that new technologies alter the
nature o f economies through windows o f locational opportunity (WLO), spinouts,
localization economies, and technological enclaves. Windows o f locational opportunity
finds its roots in the California School o f economic geography in the late 1980s, with
Scott and Storper (1987)75 and Storper and Walker (1989).76 New industries, they argue,
could theoretically take root in numerous similar geographic locations with equal chances
of success. They contend that the locations chosen by firms for their new upstarts are
based on chance. Thus, random historical events often decide the locations o f industries
which create increasing returns.

74 Albert Otto Hirschman, The Strategy o f Economic Development (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1958).
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Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper, "High Technology Industry and Regional
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Journal 112 (1987).
76 Michael Storper and Richard Walker, The Capitalist Imperative, Territory, Technology
and Industrial Growth (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
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Later, in the 1990s, Arthur (1994)77 formulated two models to explain why firms
pick particular locations for their industries. The first was the spinoff model, and the
second focused on localization, or agglomeration, economies. The spinoff model details
an entrepreneur who began in one firm in the same industry and “spins o f f ’ into creating
a new firm with new ideas and technology. Arthur sought to explain the creation o f new
industries or firms in close proximity to other industries. His second model assumes that
firms do not spinoff from existing firms, but start up independently. Rather than the new
firm being located in close proximity to the parent company, the new firm ’s location is
decided by the entrepreneur based on personal preference. This model does not, however,
identify causal or contextual processes that determine the entrepreneurial choice o f
location.
Arthur (1994)78 then argued that technological innovation has a path dependent
nature because of increasing returns. In other words, the greater the productivity, the
greater the profits, and the greater the ability for firms to gain a competitive advantage
over other firms. Those who adopt new technologies first have an advantage in
developing increasing returns for four reasons: large setup costs serve as barriers to entry
and imply that average costs decrease when production increases; learning effects from
gaining experience in working with new technology; positive network externalities from
the use o f the same technology; and, adaptive expectations, or self-fulfilling expectations
that widespread technologies will generate coordination effects.
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More recently, a second wave o f theories have improved A rthur’s models by
introducing the concepts o f product life cycles and related variety. Klepper (2001,
2002)

79

combined Arthur’s concept of spatial concentration as a result o f spinoffs with

the product life cycle model. Klepper argues that spinoffs are more likely to succeed if
they inherit the routines o f more successful parent companies. The new firms can select
the routines from successful enterprises that are most likely to be effective. Since
spinoffs tend to be located near parent companies, the distinctive knowledge and routines
are diffused locally, giving each region productive capacities that differ slightly from
others. Klepper combines a path dependency concept with a Darwinian economic
evolutionary approach o f the survival o f the fittest.
Boschma and Frenken (2003, 2006)80 further develop this Darwinian approach.
They assume that firms practice routine forms o f behavior, which represent the collective
knowledge bases o f the firms. They argue that a key determinant o f the economic
pathways within regions is the intensity o f knowledge spillovers among firms.
Knowledge spillovers are more likely to be more intense when the technologies
employed by firms are similar. This results from the cognitive proximity o f related
knowledge, as opposed to unrelated. From this knowledge spillover, branching may
occur, where, “A new sector may grow out o f an old sector... [or] A new sector may be

79 Steven Klepper, "The Capabilities o f New Firms and the Evolution o f the US
Automobile Industry," Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (2001); Steven Klepper,
"Evolution o f the US Automobile Industry and Detroit as its Capital," in 9th Congress o f
the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society (Gainsville, FloridaMarch 2002).
80 Ron A. Boschma and Koen Frenken, "Evolutionary Economics and Industry Location,"
Review o f Regional Research 23 (2003); Ron A. Boschma and Koen Frenken, "Why is
Economic Geography not an Evolutionary Science?," Journal o f Economic Geography 6
(2006).
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the outcome o f a recombination o f competences coming from different sectors.”81
Routines are often passed from generation to generation o f firms at the regional level,
because knowledge transfer mechanisms have a local bias. The Boschma and Frenken
branching thesis attempts to take into account new path creation from preexisting
industries. It does not however explain how entirely new pathways emerge.
Other researchers have sought to find the source o f new pathways. Kline and
Rosenberg’s (1986)82 chain-linked model argues that innovation is the source o f new
pathways. Innovation, for Kline and Rosenberg, is the result o f iterative processes which
involve research, knowledge generation, and iterations between potential markets and
inventors. Further, Garud and Karnoe (2001)83 argue that new theories o f path creation
should consider the role o f entrepreneurial “mindful deviation” from established paths.
Entrepreneurs do not simply follow the locked-in developmental trajectories already
established. They are creative and knowledgeable individuals who seek ways to defy
social rules and technological paradigms to innovate.84 Puffert (2000)85 goes further,
arguing that deviation from traditional pathways is symptomatic o f entrepreneurial
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activity. The very nature o f entrepreneurship is to seek alternative and innovative ways
o f production. In this way, new pathways develop.
This section has explored path dependence in agglomeration and technological
innovation. In many ways, path dependence processes helped Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh industrialize. Similar processes are at work in their post-industrial forms. The
next section will take a look at the role o f institutions, formal and informal, in economic
development, paying particular attention to public-private partnerships, universities, and
heritage policy.

INSTITUTIONS AND REDEVELOPMENT
Institutions are the full range o f political, economic, and social rules o f a society.
Socioeconomic factors, market operating rules, property rights, contract guarantees,
political institutions, and social and cultural traditions fit into this realm. Institutions
provide structure, stability, and incentives to economic agents, making them particularly
relevant to regional development. For example, entrepreneurs generally benefit from
better protection o f intellectual property rights, thus spurring innovation. Conversely,
regions and countries with unstable institutions tend to dissuade entrepreneurs and
innovation and attract rent-seeking activity. It is easier for these detrimental policies to
occur in larger cities with larger bureaucracies than in smaller cities with smaller, and
more accountable, governments.86 Thus, healthy institutions, both formal and informal,
are important.

86 Prager and Thisse, Economic Geography and the Unequal Development o f Regions, 60.
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Cities that have undergone deindustrialization have previously experienced
development and are struggling to redevelop or regenerate. Roberts (2000) defines
sustainable urban regeneration as a “comprehensive and integrated vision and action
which leads to the resolution o f urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting
improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition o f an area
that has been subject to change.”87 The phrase “lasting improvement” is particularly
important since short-term advances do not provide increases in standards o f living.
Sustainability is at the heart o f regeneration goals.
Two opposing views suggest the roles o f government in development processes.
The first prescribes government intervention to remedy so-called “market failures.” This
welfare-economics view assumes that governments are knowledgeable, benevolent, and
effective at organizing economic activity in a way that enhances the social welfare o f
individuals in a way that the market is unable to accomplish. Socialism is the most
extreme form of this viewpoint, while milder forms are prominent in countries such as
France, Italy, and Germany and to a lesser extent the United States and United Kingdom.
Some o f these government interventions include:
provision o f resources for domestic investment and making the region
attractive to international investment; investment in education and
continuing training; direct or indirect financing o f research and
development; the design o f legal and tax environments favorable to
entrepreneurship; financial aids to investment as well as venture capital
support; supplying technological infrastructure, such as science parks,
business incubators, and technology centers; connecting economic agents
in order to intensify knowledge and business interactions; establishing
public agencies or service brokers to assist spinoff firms in universities
and/or private firms’ research centers; [and] aids to innovation, notably via
87 Peter Roberts, "The Evolution, Definition and Purpose o f Urban Regeneration," in
Urban Regeneration: A Handbook, eds. Peter Roberts and Hugh Sykes (London: Sage,
2000), 17.
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advice for small and medium enterprises, and to local diffusion o f
knowledge and transfer knowledge from higher education institutions.88
If local government can be advantageous in the development process, there are
innumerable ways intervention can proceed.
The second perspective argues that governments are inherently unable to shape
QQ

economic activities in beneficial ways. Hayek (1945)

demonstrated that governments

do not possess the localized information that individuals operating in their own subjective
and self-interested ways do. This is a fundamental problem regarding the state, which
often attempts to undermine individual initiative and uses force to enact social policies.
Proponents o f this school o f thought urge governments to confine themselves to enacting
policies that allow the market to operate on its own, and “incentives should not be
provided for activities that depend on agglomeration economies or international market
access.”90 According to Savitch (1998),
The immensely decentralized composition and flexibility o f global forces
stand in marked contrast to hierarchical and fixed behavior o f government
institutions. Particularly acute are the contrasting modes o f operation
between markets and governmental institutions. Markets are flexible,
prolific, and immensely responsive to mass demands, whereas government
institutions are steeped in formalism and routine.91

88 Prager and Thisse, Economic Geography and the Unequal Development o f Regions,
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This approach to development, therefore, encourages market solutions, rejects the notion
o f “market failures,” and encourages governments to focus on improving political
institutions instead o f engaging in economic intervention.
Local governments are assumed to be the main provider o f public goods. Castells
(1977)92 introduced the term “collective consumption” to describe the way in which local
government provided resources and systems that reproduced labor power under
capitalism. Workers must be fed, clothed, and housed for labor productivity to continue
and for a new workforce to be reproduced— children, for example. Castells called on the
government to intervene to attempt to abrogate negative externalities. Berlin (1968)93
observed that local governments provide services to legitimate the social order o f
democratic capitalism. They accomplish this through installing positive liberties such as
rights to health, education, and a living wage.
Others such as Mises (1944)94 argued that local government must restrain itself
from attempting to provide too many services and to attempt to direct the economy.
Certain bureaucratic structures, for Mises, are necessary for the protection o f individual
and property rights, even if they are inefficiently done. This inefficiency does not derive
from personnel incompetence or overt corruption. Rather, the very structure o f
bureaucracy makes it incapable o f efficiently allocating resources. While private
enterprises are managed on the basis o f the profit motive and thus make calculations
based on maximizing revenue and minimizing cost, bureaucracies and government

92 Manuel Castells, The Urban Question (London: Edward Arnold, 1977).
93 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
94 Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1944).

67
agencies have no signal for the efficient allocation o f resources. Profit and loss are
foreign concepts to bureaucrats because performance cannot be measured in monetary
terms. A business that does not make profits will be deemed a failure by the market. But,
governments have no mechanism for understanding success and failure. They will
continue to operate with more or less little regard for efficiency. Their main limitation,
however, is the taxing capacity o f the local government. Mises’s deduction reveals that
bureaucracies, by their very nature, are poor allocators o f valuable resources and
providers o f goods and services.
If government intervention can be beneficial, Prager and Thisse (2012)95 offer
recommendations for local and regional governments for redevelopment in post
industrial societies. First, agglomeration should be encouraged because o f positive
spillover effects. Second, spatial policies should mitigate congestion effects that
characterize large cities and provide a minimum level o f public services. And third,
policies aiming at developing a comparative advantage should avoid spatial or sectoral
targeting and focus instead on allowing market forces to choose the most dynamic
regions and their economic specializations. Prager and Thisse advocate a mixedeconomy approach between spatial neutrality and excessive interventionism. They warn
that most policies, in general, have consequences for the location o f economic activity.
The task o f local governments, for Prager and Thisse, is to determine the location for
establishing infrastructure in a large scale economy.96

95 Prager and Thisse, Economic Geography and the Unequal Development o f Regions.
96 Ibid., 73-74.
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Opp and Osgood (2013)97 described waves o f strategies for local economic
development. For Opp and Osgood, wave one strategies were unsustainable, as they
engaged in profit-making practices at the expense o f the surrounding physical
environment. Local governments often contributed to environmental degradation by
enticing businesses to choose particular locations for expansion or relocation and provide
incentives to attract other businesses to the area. Wave two strategies involved providing
incentives to existing businesses in regional spaces to retain jobs. Competition among
cities saw jobs relocating to other cities. Instead o f attracting capital from the outside, the
focus was on assisting growth o f existing enterprises. Wave three strategies focus on
quality o f life aspects o f a community and the relationship it has with economic
development. Rather than providing strictly economic incentives for businesses, regions
seek to attract and retain businesses by having a desirable locale. This third wave seeks
to erase the seeming positive relationship between economic development and
environmental degradation and inequality. Social justice programs are common in this
strategy wave.
Opp and Osgood observe all three waves o f local economic development in cities
in the United States. The use o f different tools o f economic development depends largely
on macroeconomic conditions as well as the maturity o f the local economy. In
recessionary times, cities tend to shift policies toward first wave strategies to resolve
unemployment and declining tax revenue. Cooke (2013)98 shares this policy prescription.

97 Susan M. Opp and Jeffery L. Osgood, Jr., Local Economic Development and the
Environment: Finding Common Ground (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013).
98 Philip Cooke, ed. Re-framing Regional Development: Evolution, Innovation and
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He adds that, in returning to first wave manufacturing in times o f distress, industries
should seek greener and more environmentally friendly forms, so as to be more
sustainable and attractive. Moreover, in more advanced economies, third wave strategies
are often employed to increase the attractiveness o f the locale. This three wave
framework is useful because o f its metaphor for local development evolution. Cities
employing higher waves are typically more advanced and able to adapt to shocks to the
economy, such as the downfall o f traditional industry or macroeconomic downturns in
the macroeconomic business cycle."
The evolution o f cities is dependent on internal as well as external forces. Hall
( 1 9 9 7 )i00 j^g argued that regeneration policies tend to focus on resolving internal
problems and ignoring external ones. One reason for this tendency is that, instead o f
being complementary, inward-looking and outward-looking policies are sometimes
mutually conflictual. Political, economic, and planning problems often arise. Areatargeted approaches often conflict with other interests within the city, which reveal the
deficiencies in gaining city-wide support for local initiatives. Economic strategies often
have unintended consequences, such as the inability o f economic resources reaching their
intended beneficiaries. And, when attracting investment and planning strategically, city
planners must not formulate outward- and inward-looking policies separately. They must
be planned in tandem so as to avoid conflicting policies.

" Opp and Osgood, Jr., Local Economic Development and the Environment.
100 Peter Hall, "Regeneration Policies for Peripheral Housing Estates: Inward- and
Outward-looking Approaches," Urban Studies 34, no. 5-6 (1997).
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Stouten’s (2010)101 empirical example o f Rotterdam is a case o f regeneration
practices at work. In explaining the modem process o f urban renewal, Stouten argued,
“sustainable urban renewal requires close integration o f the physical response with the
social and economic challenges.” 102 In Rotterdam, between 1975 and 1993, a tandem
effort involving tenant groups and local authorities combated urban decay through a
“building for the neighborhood” approach, where “tenants at the time got priority with
regard to improvement o f their housing and living conditions and were not moved out o f
the neighbourhood.” 103 This plan flew in the face o f calls for privatization and marketdriven policies, instead focusing on a socialized mode o f consumption, welfare statism,
and institutionalized forms o f tenant participation. The Rotterdam case presents a model
o f government intervention to direct the local economy into paths it sees fit.
Local governments often attempt to partner with private enterprises in providing
goods and services and expanding the local economy. Through building, contract, and
leasing agreements, public-private partnerships (PPP) aim to support economic
development and sustainability. These partnerships have the advantage o f generating
faster results than traditional public works, reducing the amount o f funding needed for
projects, and increasing the focus on outcomes and performance-based management o f
the projects.104 However, PPPs have two significant disadvantages. First, projects
instituted by local governments often do not reflect actual demands o f the public.
101 Paul Stouten, Changing Contexts in Urban Regeneration: 30 Years o f Modernisation
in Rotterdam (Amsterdam: Techne Press, 2010).
102 Ibid., 11.
103 Ibid., 16.
104 Opp and Osgood, Jr., Local Economic Development and the Environment, 132-34.
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Allocating money to useful endeavors is difficult for an organization with no profit and
loss feedback mechanism. Second, PPP contracts often rely on political favoritism,
which artificially favors some firms over others, even if they are not the most efficient or
profitable. While these partnerships can provide more efficient alternatives to pure
government planning, they still create unintended consequences.
Partnerships can also take place between governments and local universities in the
form o f so-called “collaborations.” 105 These relationships involve medical, business,
education, and public policy schools, and they often take the forms o f university-school
district partnerships, service-learning opportunities, literacy outreach programs,
neighborhood and community development projects, and workforce development
initiatives. These collaborations differ from PPPs in that universities and communities
continue to coexist with each other, giving each side a vested interest in creating
beneficial results from the project. These are also more about weaving universities into
the fabric o f the community, rather than being defined by contracts and legal
responsibilities. These relationships, then, have a more colloquial nature to them than
public-private partnerships.
These collaborations can also be useful because universities are key figures in
knowledge creation and discovery. At least some social utility is sought when natural
and social scientists undergo research. But, channels must be generated which move
scientific knowledge from the university to society. In various ways, knowledge and
discovery reach the market. These include traditional routes o f the academic disciplines
such as field-based conferences, peer-reviewed publications, and student graduation.

105 Ibid., 154.
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These methods, however, tend to be slower than knowledge transfers via student
graduation and their subsequent entrance into the economy. Mars (2011) explains,
The underlying expectation is that such knowledge transfer effectively
occurs when graduates apply their newly acquired expertise as
professionals within business and industry environments... In the context
o f economic development, the value o f graduates to local and regional
economies is at least partially dependent on emergent experts not
relocating to other regions.106
This advance in human capital increases the productivity o f both the workers who acquire
the college education and the workers around them. Through traditional academic
channels and student graduation with subsequent employment, universities contribute to
local economic development, triggering local governments to take active roles in creating
relationships with them.
Apart from collaborations, attracting the “creative class” to cities involves the
transformation o f physical space. Optimal use o f land is o f prime concern for urban
developers, especially transforming physical landscapes in post-industrial cities.
Gospodini (2006)107 argues that post-industrial economic activities, in tandem with
modem public policy strategies, tend to rearrange the landscapes o f urban areas. High
level financial services, technology-intensive firms, knowledge-based institutions, and
creative urban islands are situated in the inner city, where ‘“ signifying epicentres’...
introduce a ‘glocalised’ landscape o f built heritage and innovative designs o f buildings

106 Matthew M. Mars, "An Innovative Vision for Economic Development in Higher
Education: An Essay on Balancing Community Growth and Global Competitiveness," in
Entrepreneurship and Global Competitiveness in Regional Economies: Determinants and
Policy Implications, eds. Gary D. Libecap and Sherry Hoskinson (Bingley, UK: Emerald,
2011 ), 222 .
107 Aspa Gospodini, "Portraying, Classifying and Understanding the Emerging
Landscapes in the Post-Industrial City," Cities 23, no. 5 (2006).
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and public open spaces. Compact and dense landscapes in the inner city are combined
with new landscapes o f ‘diffused urbanity’ in urban fringes.” 108 Thus, the inner city is
being transformed by specialized services in light o f post-industrial change and industrial
heritage.
Helbrecht and Dirksmeier (2012)109 notice a similar change in cities. They see a
new type o f urbanity that consists o f the “new downtown.” The new downtown has four
characteristics: first, it can be deliberately planned and designed; second, it is designed in
a way that seeks to stand out from traditional visions o f the old downtown; third, it seeks
to advance old forms o f the old downtown and represents the new performative urbanity;
and fourth, it is based on a new form o f centralization.110 Helbrecht and Dirksmeier
argue that new downtowns are forming because the city center is no longer necessarily in
high demand. World society continues to establish urban spaces and combine the global
and the local, but centrality no longer automatically derives from the social order.
Younger areas o f development are often situated near old city centers and attract
businesses, planners, residents, and researchers because o f their historical conditions.
“Very near, sometimes just a stone’s throw from the old city centre,” the authors explain,
“an extraordinary process takes place on the remains o f the industrial society and in the
former warehouse districts and ports: inner-city expansion is taking place in inner-city

108 Ibid., 311.
109 Ilse Helbrecht and Peter Dirksmeier, "New Downtowns: A New Form o f Centrality
and Urbanity in World Society," in New Urbanism: Life, Work, and Space in the New
Downtown, eds. Ilse Helbrecht and Peter Dirksmeier (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2012).
110 Ibid., 1-2.
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locations using existing spaces. This is urban development under growth conditions.” 111
The new downtowns seek to remain near to old centers, but represent new trends and new
industrial centralization.
Many cities also seek to capitalize on urban heritage. Heritage as an asset has its
theoretical basis in capital theory, which indicates that certain cultural goods can be
recognized as capital assets. As such, heritage assets can contribute to the further
production o f cultural goods and services, job creation, and the general well-being o f
local constituents. The valuation o f heritage capital has a close relationship to
environmental economics, which distinguishes between use and non-use values.
Licciardi (2012) lists five valuation methods for heritage valuation:
The first method is compensation, which seeks to evaluate the cost and
benefits derived from changes in the availability or quality o f a heritage
asset. The second method is social cost-benefit analysis, which captures
the benefits o f an investment with large spill-over effects. The third
method is stated preference, which is rooted in behavioral economies, and
aims to uncover what individuals are willing to pay or accept when the
availability o f a public good changes. There are also revealed preference
methods, which include travel cost (fourth method) and hedonic price
(fifth method). Travel cost is based on calculating the financial sacrifice
that a visitor makes to travel to a city or a site o f cultural significance, but
it has some limits, especially due to attribution and opportunity cost. The
hedonic price m ethod... can help gain a better understanding the value o f
heritage assets by leveraging databases having detailed information on
transactions in the real estate market.112
Tangible forms o f heritage such as buildings, historic city centers, or open public spaces,
and intangible forms such as festivals, dances, and rituals capture some heritage value
which can help provide employment, attract the creative class, improve overall well111 Ibid., 4.
112 Guido Licciardi and Rana Amirtahmasebi, eds., The Economics o f Uniqueness:
Investing in Historic City Cores and Cultural Heritage Assets fo r Sustainable
Development (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,2012), xxi.
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being, and expand the local economy.113 Heritage, then, can give advantages to cities and
regions over others as attractive places to live and work.
Institutions attempt to coordinate the actions and interests o f economic actors in
redevelopment. It is important, however, that formal institutions do not interfere with
market forces to hamper post-industrial revitalization in these rust belt cities. Local
governments must restrain themselves to the provision o f public goods and creating a
business atmosphere conducive to economic expansion.

CONCLUSION
This review has visited the relevant literature on post-industrialism and
globalization, local and regional development, economic geography, knowledge and
innovation, path dependence, and institutions and economic growth. All o f these topics
play into analyzing the successes and failures o f post-industrial redevelopment o f urban
areas in the rust belt. Now that the historical patterns that describe these processes have
been introduced, I will explain how I will go about researching these topics. Accordingly,
the next section will discuss the research design.

113 David Throsby, "Heritage Economics: A Conceptual Framework," in The Economics
o f Uniqueness: Investing in Historic City Cores and Cultural Heritage Assets fo r
Sustainable Development, eds. Guido Licciardi and Rana Amirtahmasebi (Washington,
D.C.: The World Bank, 2012), 48.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation takes a liberal institutionalist approach to political economy.
Production, ultimately, is the driver o f economic expansion, but only if it correctly
reflects consumer desires. Prices and production are distorted by coercive intervention
into the market economy: the price signals which tell producers what to produce and how
much o f it become distorted, inefficiencies result, and some groups o f individuals benefit
at the expense o f others. This framework concludes that growth is a phenomenon that is
driven by individuals acting in their own subjective interest. It occurs in an environment
free o f government interference, yet with protection o f private property. Thus, the cases
o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, which were chosen because o f their similarities in
historical experience and differences in economic recovery, will be overlaid with this
model o f political economy to determine the empirical processes at work and the
deficiencies or advantages that each case possesses. This study will be beneficial to the
fields o f urban studies, post-industrialism, and economic development.

QUALITATIVE VS. QUANTITATIVE
For two important reasons, this dissertation employs a qualitative case study.
First, I seek to explain causes rather than effects: namely, the causes o f the differences in
post-industrial redevelopment. This “causes-of-effects” approach explains the specific
outcome o f particular cases, rather than the quantitative “effects-of-causes” approach,
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which, according to Mahoney and Goertz (2006), “seeks to estimate the average effect o f
one or more causes across a population o f cases.” 1
Second, nuance is important. The aim o f this study is to give a detailed
comparison o f cases o f post-industrialism. Ambiguities in historical cases necessarily
require explanations which statistical models cannot provide. Although descriptive
statistics will be used, the emphasis lies in describing patterns o f employment and
population trends. Including other post-industrial cities from around the world to
generate a larger sample for multiple regression analysis is plausible, but each city
possesses its own historical circumstance, rendering explanation o f causal forces useless.
Quantitative methods in this study must, then, be relegated to describing historical
situations and trends, rather than creating a general science o f post-industrial
development.

CASE SELECTION
The focus on cities reflects the growing importance o f urban centers around the
world. Cities have become increasingly integrated into the world system o f finance and
trade, and thus serve as loci for global governance and international decisionmaking. The
economic, political, social, and culture activities within cities have important
ramifications for global interaction o f individuals, governments, firms, and other
institutions.
These three cities were chosen because they form an important core o f the rust
belt region, which had once driven the American, and arguably the global, economy.
1 James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, "A Tale o f Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative
and Qualitative Research," Political Analysis 14 (2006): 230.
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They have differing levels o f economic redevelopment yet are similar in several respects.
First, their heavy industrial bases began to see a steady decline after World War II, which
coincided with population drain. The cities began the process o f deindustrialization at
roughly the same height o f industrial prominence and reached the bottom o f economic
contraction at reasonably the same time. These similarities reflect similar rises and
declines in industrial development, yet they experience divergent results in post-industrial
renewal. Second, their proximities to water resources and resource endowments helped
them industrialize, but their geographic locations are not as important as they once were.
Third, they have similar European immigrant backgrounds, which weigh heavily on their
local cultures. And fourth, one o f the most beneficial aspects o f these three cities is
institutional and governmental uniformity. While they have different municipal
ordinances and state laws, they are all subject to federal laws and are, for the most part,
equally affected by national legislation or monetary changes. While their respective
histories are not uniform, their similarities help identify the general patterns o f post
industrial redevelopment. It is more difficult to analyze cities that have completely
divergent historical paths. By choosing more similar cities that face similar problems, yet
with differing economic results, it is easier to identify causal factors without having to
control for cultural or institutional differences. Thus, I am able to control for certain
variables.
Conversely, international cities introduce more variables without a substantive
return in results. Even though similarities found in such cities as Sheffield, England,
Newcastle, New South Wales, and Hamilton, Ontario can be important, the institutional,
cultural, and governmental differences in the cities make it more difficult to reach
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meaningful conclusions about historical trends and effective policies. The findings o f the
rust belt comparison can then be extrapolated to fit international cases o f post-industrial
redevelopment.
That the three cities are medium-sized cities is also significant. The global cities
literature tends to focus exclusively on large cities such as Tokyo, New York, Paris, and
London. There is a presumption that only large cities play significant roles in
international governance and provide useful cases for the study o f political economy. But,
large cities do not provide the appropriate historical cases for post-industrial studies that
small- and medium-sized cities do. Whereas larger cities such as Chicago have gone
through a post-industrial transition, its commercial diversification insulated the region
from the devastating effects o f deindustrialization that were experienced in Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, which had been reliant on heavy industry alone. Medium
sized cities are more representative in character, size, and population o f the average city
around the world, as well. Best practices for post-industrial redevelopment can only be
discovered, then, through the cases o f these types o f metropolitan areas. In this sense,
these cities became “global” because o f the examples they provide for international cases
with similar economic histories as well as serving as examples o f economic dislocation
caused by globalization.

MEASUREMENT AND INDICATORS OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM
The most common way economists measure an economy’s expansion is by
changes in the gross domestic product or gross national product. Applied to cities, the
GDP can measure the total output produced within a city’s metropolitan statistical area
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(MSA). While GDP will be employed to partly describe patterns o f growth in the three
cities, it is necessary to understand an important limitation as an indicator o f economic
well-being. The GDP measurement looks at the value o f final goods and services
produced during a particular time interval within a geographic area, usually a country.
The underlying assumption is that spending, in general, drives economic growth, rather
than savings and production. Production can only be possible if individuals save before
they can consume, and that savings is driven by individual actions, given their time
preferences. Individuals make decisions based on their ex ante utility expectations. So, it
is necessarily misguided to assume that government spending or investment is the same
as individual spending or investment. Rothbard points this out in a methodological note
in his study on the Great Depression:
The critical assumption is the challenge to the orthodox postulate that
government spending, ipso fa cto, represents a net addition to the national
product. This is a clearly distorted view. Spending only measures value
o f output in the private economy because that spending is voluntary for
services rendered. In government, the situation is entirely different:
government acquires its money by coercion, and it spending has no
necessary relation to the services that it might be providing to the private
sector. There is no way, in fact, to gauge these services. Furthermore,
every government-conscripted dollar deprives the citizen o f expenditures
he would rather have made. It is therefore far more realistic to make the
opposite assumption... that all government spending is a clear depredation
upon, rather than an addition to, private product and private output.2
Thus, GDP does not distinguish between the production goods that individuals desire and
those that are produced as a result o f government intervention and stimulus. The
implication is that actual economic growth is aggregated with unsustainable growth in
one measure which does not reflect consumer desires.

2 Italics are original. Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Auburn: Ludwig
von Mises Institute, 2000 [1963]), 339.
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This limitation does not render GDP useless. But, what this means for this study
is that it is difficult to measure economic expansion with a single indicator. Accordingly,
to measure the patterns o f change in the MS As o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, I
will use a range o f quantitative and qualitative indicators that paint a larger picture o f
post-industrialism. These will be indicators that measure the extent to which the cities
have fulfilled the characteristics o f a post-industrial society:
1. Change from a goods-producing to service economy
Indicators: Types o f employment
Source: Census data; American Community Survey
2. Growing importance o f human capital
Indicators: Educational attainment o f total population; percentage o f total
population enrolled in school; percentage o f total population enrolled in
college and graduate/professional school; employment-based health insurance
as percentage o f total population
Source: Census data; American Community Survey
3. Decline in importance o f blue-collar, unionized work and growth in
importance o f professional labor
Indicators: Blue-collar workforce as percentage o f total; Number o f STEM
degrees awarded (science, technology, engineering, mathematics)
Source: Census data; Bureau o f Labor Statistics
4. Centrality of ideas in economic growth
Indicators: Number o f patents
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office data
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These indicators, evaluated annually from 1950 to the most recent year in the available
data, describe each city in their respective post-industrial evolutions.

HYPOTHESES
Through these statistics I am able to compare and contrast the differences in post
industrial revitalization. But, identifying the causes o f the differences among the three
cities requires explanatory variables. While there are more than a few variables
explaining post-industrialization in these three cities, I can at least test three hypotheses
which may explain differences in revitalization. These following hypotheses are tested:

Hypothesis 1; There is a negative correlation between the level of post-industrial
redevelopment and regulatory burden.
Differences in post-industrial revitalization can be explained by favorable policies that
attract firms and allow them to thrive. A more developed post-industrial city will have a
better reputation for ease o f doing business.

Hypothesis 2: There is a positive correlation between the level of post-industrial
redevelopment and the robustness of the service sector prior to deindustrialization.
If a region had a substantial service sector before the decline o f heavy industry, the brunt
o f deindustrialization would not be as devastating and the foundation for post
industrialization had already been laid. The larger the service sector is in an economy,
the easier it is to recover from industrial decline.
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Hypothesis 3: There is a positive correlation between post-industrial redevelopment
and capital accumulation.
Capital is necessary for production, which must precede consumption. Increased levels
o f capital accumulation lead to more complex production processes and economic
expansion.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD
Through this comparative study, I hope to contribute to the fields o f urban
development studies as well as post-industrial economic revitalization. Ultimately the
conclusions I reach will not only be useful for American cities, they will also be
applicable for any region experiencing redevelopment from industrial decline. Until now,
there have been few extensive studies, if any, on the problems o f post-industrial
economic regeneration, especially with regard to cities. Additionally, while local
newspapers and think tanks provide preliminary reports on rust belt cities, scholarly
attempts that analyze the situations in a comparative way are not to be found. Attention
tends to be focused on underdeveloped countries and larger regions. This dissertation
will provide a foundation for further study on post-industrial cities and rust belt recovery
from industrial decline.

CHAPTER IV
THE STATE OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM IN BUFFALO, CLEVELAND, AND
PITTSBURGH

INTRODUCTION
To varying degrees, the Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh metropolitan
economies have gone from economies reliant on heavy industry to the post-industrial
economy. This chapter examines the degree o f post-industrial transformation each
metropolitan area has experienced. This is done by comparing the cities in each o f the
four characteristics o f post-industrialism: change from a goods-producing to service
economy; the growing importance o f human capital; decline in importance o f blue-collar
work and increase in importance o f professional labor; and the centrality o f ideas in
economic growth. Numerous indicators are examined for each characteristic, ultimately
revealing that the Pittsburgh area performs best in most areas o f analysis, and Buffalo
performs worst in most. In addition, the Pittsburgh area shows the healthiest economy
when looking at standard economic indicators, and Buffalo shows the worst. Before the
post-industrial characteristics are analyzed, this chapter provides brief summaries o f each
metropolitan area’s post-industrial economy.

POST-INDUSTRIALIZATION IN BUFFALO, CLEVELAND, AND PITTSBURGH
In attempting to revitalize their respective regional economies, the cities have
largely adopted the “meds and eds” model. Both top-down and organically, the cities
focus on medical research and development coupled with higher education to
successfully and sustainably revitalize the urban core. In addition, urban planners
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developed public works projects to restore formerly industrial waterfronts. These
strategies are designed to attract high-skilled labor to the respective regions.

Buffalo
Buffalo places emphasis on its Buffalo Niagara Medical Campus (BNMC), a
health care, life sciences research, and medical education institution covering 120 acres
o f downtown Buffalo. A consortium that includes the State University o f New York at
Buffalo (SUNY Buffalo) and the Roswell Park Cancer Institute initiated the project in
2001 as one o f the city’s “Strategic Investment Areas” for urban redevelopment. By
2017, the project is expected to yield 17,000 jobs, which nearly replaces those lost in the
Bethlehem Steel plant closing.1 Together with Kaleida Health, the largest health care
provider in western New York, Buffalo at least has a foothold on state-of-the-art medical
technology and comprehensive healthcare services in hopes o f greater investment and
jobs in the immediate future.2
The BNMC was made possible by a partnership between SUNY Buffalo and
health partners Roswell and Hauptman-Woodward Medical Research Institute as part o f
the university’s UB2020 strategic plan. The project enables technological knowledge
transfer from the university to the private sector by renovating, revamping, restoring, and
developing high-technology facilities. In addition, the 21 colleges and universities in the

1 Associated Press, "Buffalo Reborn? Long-Suffering Upstate NY City Sees Hope in
Biggest Building Boom in 50 Years," Fox Business (June 22, 2014), at
http://www.foxbusiness.eom/markets/2014/06/22/buffalo-rebom-long-suffering-upstateny-city-sees-hope-in-biggest-building/.
2 "Leading Businesses and Brands," Buffalo Niagara Enterprise (2014), at
http://buffaloniagara.org/Doing_Business/TopBusinesses.
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Buffalo area educate 113,000 students and contribute ten percent o f the regional
economy.3
Besides education and medical care, major contributors to Buffalo’s economy
include banking, information technology, and other research and development. M&T
Bank has its headquarters in Buffalo, and HSBC USA has a strong presence in the region.
Further, IBM will soon bring about 500 jobs to the city with its new software research
facility. Even though the State o f New York is contributing $15 million to purchase a
portion o f a vacant downtown high-rise, building it out for IBM, and spending another
$40 million for equipment and software purchases— public officials hope the structure
will have agglomeration effects. In addition, the motion control design firm Moog, Inc.
and a transportation depot o f FedEx are located in Buffalo.4
To attempt to bolster these projects and attract investment, planners undertook
various waterfront development projects, including RiverBend and Canalside. Riverbend
is a clean energy, 200-acre brownfield reclamation site on the former grounds o f the
Republic Steel and Donner Hanna Coke facilities. The sustainable energy firm Soraa and
solar cell company Silevo each invested $750 million on top o f New York State’s
contribution o f $225 million for the recreation and economic project.5 Another project,
Canalside, combines public access with private development at the mouth o f the former
Erie Canal. Replica canals, a wharf, restaurants, a museum, and pedestrian bridges have
3 Ibid.
4 "500 New IBM Jobs to Call Nearly Vacant Key Center Building Home," The Buffalo
News (June 4, 2014), at http://www.buffalonews.com/business/real-estate/500-new-ibmjobs-to-call-nearly-vacant-key-center-building-home-20140604.
5 "RiverBend Master Plan," Buffalo Urban Development Corporation (2014), at
http ://www. ecidany.com/budc-proj ects-riverbend-de velopment-plan.
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been built with the $250 million that already has been leveraged in private development.6
These medical and high-technology steps toward development coupled with attempts to
revitalize formerly industrial areas have so far been steps for the future rather than
success in practice.

Cleveland
Cleveland’s economy follows a similar pattern. The Cleveland Clinic, one o f the
country’s best and most renowned hospital systems, is the region’s largest private
employer, providing over 37,000 jobs. In addition, University Hospitals o f Cleveland
and Rainbow Babies & Children’s Hospital are leaders in cancer treatment and neonatal
care, respectively.7 Furthermore, partnerships between these hospitals and Case Western
Reserve University focus on biotechnology and fuel cell research. Nearly 30 other
colleges and universities in northeast Ohio, which award 26,000 bachelor’s degrees
annually, contribute to the talent pool.
Other industries in the Cleveland metropolitan area include health insurance,
high-technology, engineering, banking, and headquarters for manufacturing firms.
Insurance firms Progressive and Medical Mutual o f Ohio, private equity firms The
Riverside Company, Kirtland Capital Partners, Resilience Capital Partners, Primus
Capital, and KeyCorp bank all are based in the area. Other firms include Parker Hannifin
Corporation (motion and control technologies), Sherwin-Williams paints, Travel Centers

6 Presentation by Buffalo Comptroller Mark J.F. Schroeder on March 17, 2014 to the
Municipal Analysts Group o f New York, “Buffalo: Reinventing a City.”
7 "Anchor Institutions," Rethink Cleveland (2014), at
http://rethinkcleveland.org/Strategic-Advantages/Key-Assets/Anchor-Institutions.aspx.
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o f America, Cliffs Natural Resources, Aleris International (aluminum engineered
products), RPM International holding company (specialty coatings, sealants, and building
materials), PolyOne Corporation (polymer materials), Lincoln Electric (welding
products), Hyster-Yale Materials (materials handling), and Applied Industrial
Technologies (industrial machinery and parts). Many o f these provide engineering,
technological expertise, and capital for manufacturing processes.8

Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh shares the focus on health care, higher education, and professional
services. The top two employers in Pittsburgh are the UPMC health system and the
University o f Pittsburgh, both leaders in medical technology and innovation. Allegheny
Health System, Highmark, and Carnegie Mellon University, known for its robotics
engineering research and development, are also top ten employers. Between Pitt and
CMU, $1 billion in sponsored research enters the region, with Carnegie Mellon
producing over 200 spinoff companies in the past 20 years. These two universities join
the nearly 40 colleges and universities in the region which contribute to the knowledge
transfer between university and private sector.9
Pittsburgh has long been a center o f banking and finance and has significant
operations in research and development. BNY Mellon has a strong presence in the city,
as Mellon Bank had been headquartered in Pittsburgh until its merger in 2007. Similarly,

8 Ibid.
9 Justin Hopper, "Pittsburgh's Stealth Renaissance," Pittsburgh Quarterly (Winter 2010),
at http://www.pittsburghquarterly.com/index.php/Region/pittsburghs-stealthrenaissance.html.
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PNC Financial Services was founded in Pittsburgh and has expanded into other regions
o f the country. Together, the two financial institutions employ over 17,000 people.
Research and development firms in Pittsburgh include Google, Apple, Intel,
Westinghouse, Bechtel Marine Propulsion, and RAND. Major innovations also come out
o f the Pittsburgh Technology Center, Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, and Pittsburgh
LAN Coalition. And the information technology firms Petrosoft, Guru.com, and
Songwhale are based in Pittsburgh.
Pittsburgh also places emphasis on developing waterfront areas. Each county in
the seven that make up the Pittsburgh metropolitan area has a plan for land use and
growth. Allegheny County adopted its plan in November 2008, which serves as a
blueprint for brownfield transformation, promotion o f greenways, and a diversified
economy.10 Pittsburgh has a relatively strong tradition in waterfront access. The 1960s
and 1970s saw Pittsburgh Renaissance I and II, which were urban regeneration and
environmental cleanup projects that created Point State Park and began the precedent for
situating multi-use stadiums along the north side o f the Allegheny and Ohio Rivers."
Pittsburgh has built on those foundations and transformed formerly industrial sites, such
as the Homestead Works and the LTV steel mills, into open-air retail and office
complexes. In this way, waterfront property are not simply public works projects as
much as they are profit-making enterprises.
The three cities seemingly accepted their post-industrial fate and pursued projects
10 See "Allegheny Places: The Allegheny County Comprehensive Plan," Allegheny
County Department o f Economic Development (2013), at
http://www.alleghenyplaces.com/comprehensive_plan/comprehensive_plan.aspx.
11 Roy Lubove, Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh: The Post-Steel Era, vol. 2 (Pittsburgh:
University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1996), vii.
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that reflect strengths, such as university investment, health services, and waterfront
development. The next section looks at the elements and indicators o f post-industrialism
to determine the greatest and least post-industrial metropolitan area o f the three.

THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM
Post-industrialization can be represented by four characteristics: a change from a
goods-producing to service economy; the growing importance o f human capital; a decline
in importance o f blue-collar, unionized work and growth in importance o f professional
labor; and, centrality of ideas in economic growth. The remainder o f this chapter
compares the three cities in each category o f post-industrialization and evaluates the
extent to which each case represents a post-industrial economic model.

1. Change From a Goods-Producing to Service Economy
The first, and perhaps the most recognized, indicator o f post-industrialism is the
change from a goods-producing to service economy. It has been demonstrated that all
three o f the cities have undergone deindustrialization from primarily goods-producing
economies. To evaluate the service economy in each case, I trace the pattern o f types o f
employment within each metropolitan statistical area between 1950 and 2012, the most
recent year in the available data. The expected pattern is a simple one: divergent paths o f
secondary and tertiary sector jobs.
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Buffalo
From 1950 to 2012, Buffalo saw significant change in all three sectors. Table 4.1
lists the change o f employment in different sectors between 1950 and 2012 for the
Buffalo-Niagara Falls Metropolitan Statistical Area. In agriculture and mining, there was
a 73% fall in employment from 8,969 to 2,494 jobs. From 1960, the year after which
manufacturing declined, to 2012, manufacturing work declined 66.5% from 181,166 to
60,688 jobs. In the tertiary sector, two industries saw massive growth: finance, insurance,
and real estate and general services. In 1950, 12,968 jobs existed in finance, insurance,
and real estate compared to 38,208, a 195% increase. In the same time frame, general
services rose nearly 300% from 67,888 to 270,322 jobs. General trade increased
moderately. Wholesale trade remained relatively stable while retail trade decreased 17%.
Total employment peaked in 1990 at 542,686, experienced a two percent drop in 2000
and has climbed back to 535,074 in 2012.

Table 4.1: Buffalo-Niagara Falls MSA: Change of Employment in Different Sectors, 1950-2012

PRIMARY

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2012

8,969

5,886

5,073

4,762

5,545

2,418

2,555

2,494

Construction

21,353

27,388

22,048

18,991

25,981

24,236

25,205

24,752

Manufacturing
Transportation,
Communications, and
Other Public Utilities

171,198 181,166 170,458 142,596 101,947

83,296

62,538

60,688

40,044

35,915

33,585

35,873

36,588

40,134

36,804

35,542

Wholesale Trade

14,495

15,419

21,495

22,413

22,915

22,138

15,868

14,572

Retail Trade
Finance/Insurance/Real
Estate

76,540

69,628

85,334

90,855

101,203

63,824

63,144

63,759

12,968

16,849

20,621

26,570

35,370

33,285

38,884

38,208

Services

67,888

106,197 151,175 174,285 189,703 238,174 263,844 270,322

Total Employment

423,769 458,448 509,789 516,345 542,686 531,984 532,140 535,074

Agriculture and Mining

SECONDARY

TERTIARY

(Source: "Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics," 1950-2010; American Community Survey,
"Selected Characteristics: ACS 1-Year Estimates," U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
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Table 4.2 gives the sectoral distribution o f jobs as a percentage o f total
employment. Primary sector, extraction jobs, which were already miniscule in 1950 at
2.1%, made up 0.5% in 2012. Secondary employment dropped nearly 30% in the same
period, from 45.4 to 16%. And tertiary jobs made up half o f all employment in 1950 and
rose to almost 79% in 2012.

Table 4.2: Buffalo-Niagara Falls MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage of Total
Employment, 1950-2012
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2012

Primary

2.1

1.3

1.0

0.9

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.5

Secondary

45.4

45.5

37.8

31.3

23.6

20.2

16.5

16.0

Tertiary

50.0

53.2

61.2

67.8

71.1

74.7

78.7

78.9

(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)

The graphical representation o f sectoral distribution o f employment is shown in Figure
4.1 below. There is a clear and wide divergence in the secondary and tertiary sectors
over the 62-year period.
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Figure 4.1: Buffalo-Niagara Falls MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage Change
from 1950 Value, 1950-2012
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(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)

Given the divergence in sectoral employment from industrial to post-industrial Buffalo, it
is evident that Buffalo has gone from a primarily goods-producing to service-based
economy.
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Cleveland
Like Buffalo, Cleveland’s economy witnessed sharp declines in primary and
secondary sector employment and large gains in the tertiary sector. Table 4.3 below lists
the change o f employment in industries between 1950 and 2012 for the Cleveland
Metropolitan Statistical Area. Agriculture and mining jobs saw a 78.3% decrease from
20,432 to 4,426, outpacing Buffalo. Construction jobs rose 77.3% from 1950 to 2000
but sharply declined to 45,959 in 2012. The peak o f manufacturing employment in the
Cleveland area was in 1970, when over one-third o f all workers engaged in it. After 1970,
however, manufacturing employment dropped 57.5% from 333,772 workers to 141,825.
Jobs in transportation, communications, and other public utilities dropped precipitously
from 1950 to 1960 and remained relatively stable since, at nearly 60% o f its 1950 level.
General services rose steadily from 1950 to 2012 from 108,529 jobs to 464,328, a 328%
rise. In addition, total employment in the Cleveland area peaked in 2000 after rising
57.9% from its 1950 level. Since 2000, total employment has declined 8.9% to 963,681.

Table 4.3: Cleveland-Elyria MSA: Change of Employment in Different Sectors, 1950-2012

PRIMARY

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2012

Agriculture and Mining

20,432

9,517

9,771

6,955

9,544

4,962

3,991

4,426

Construction

33,198

36,072

42,425

34,104

39,251

58,875

49,520

45,959

SECONDARY

TERTIARY

Manufacturing
Transportation,
Communications, and
Other Public Utilities

258,446 324,533 333,772 255,974

184,763

202,637

104,080

56,554

60,703

59,075

57,560

76,385

65,010

60,565

Wholesale Trade

24,449

28,756

41,344

40,539

44,699

39,652

32,432

29,843

Retail Trade

97,850

112,118

137,858

132,554 134,993

118,555

104,570

104,430

Finance/Insurance/Real
Estate

23,162

31,833

42,425

49,085

79,743

78,340

73,273

Services

108,529 149,997 215,950 234,972 279,309

T otal E m ploym ent

670,146 811,598 923,970 843,748 839,049 1,058,402 981,485 963,681

58,158

436,897

149,106 141,825

460,180 464,328

(Source: "Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics," 1950-2010; American Community Survey,
"Selected Characteristics: ACS 1-Year Estimates," U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
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Table 4.4 below gives the sectoral distribution as a percentage o f total
employment. Primary sector employment dropped 2.5% from three percent in 1950 to
0.5 in 2012. Secondary sector employment fell 24% in the same period to 19.5% o f total
employment in 2012. The tertiary sector shows nearly the same difference with almost a
24% increase in employment.

Table 4.4: Cleveland-Elyria MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage of Total
Employment, 1950-2012
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2012

3.0

1.2

1.1

0.8

1.1

0.5

0.4

0.5

Secondary

43.5

44.4

40.7

34.4

26.7

24.7

20.2

19.5

Tertiary

53.4

46.7

53.9

61.2

68.5

71.0

75.5

76.0

Primary

{Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)

Figure 4.2 below graphs the sectoral distribution o f employment as a percentage
o f the total. After a decrease in the tertiary sector and a slight increase o f the secondary
sector, the two sectors diverged since 1960. Cleveland, however, has a lower proportion
o f tertiary sector employment than Buffalo: 76% versus 78.9%, respectively.
Accordingly, secondary sector employment is greater in Cleveland than Buffalo: 19.5%
versus 16%, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Cleveland-Elyria MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage Change
from 1950 Value, 1950-2012
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(Source: “Census of Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)

That the emphasis o f sectoral employment is increasingly placed on the tertiary
sector qualifies the Cleveland area as meeting this first characteristic o f a post-industrial
economy.
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Pittsburgh
The nature o f Pittsburgh’s economic transformation follows similar patterns as
Buffalo and Cleveland. Table 4.5 below details the change o f employment in different
industries between 1950 and 2012 for the Pittsburgh Metropolitan Statistical Area.
Agriculture and mining employed 72,328 workers in 1950 and dropped sharply by 56.6%
in 1960 to 31,400. After 1960, these industries continued to decline, although with slight
rises in 1990 and 2012. Between 1950 and 2012, agriculture and mining employment fell
nearly 89%. Like Buffalo and Cleveland, as well, construction jobs increased over the
same time period, a rise o f 29.8%. Manufacturing, as can be expected, decreased
significantly and steadily since 1950 with a slight rise in 2012, a 65.7% difference from
336,473 jobs to 115,328. The two industry categories with the greatest differences are
general services and finance, insurance, and real estate. General services saw a steady
increase from 1950 to 2012, a 303% difference from 143,719 to 579,001 jobs. In the
same period, finance, insurance, and real estate rose 181% from 28,322 to 79,678 jobs.
Similarly, total employment rose continuously from 922,522 to 1,139,532, a 23.5% rise.

Table 4.5: Pittsburgh MSA: Change o f Employment in Different Sectors, 1950-2012

PRIMARY

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2012

Agriculture and Mining

42,328

31,400

22,441

18,473

20,192

8,048

9,129

13,177

Construction

49,171

48,295

53,388

62,707

64,436

65,722

62,889

63,827

Manufacturing
Transportation,
Communications, and
Other Public Utilities

336,473 343,268 313,334

254,958

162,169

132,180

108,625

115,328

84,739

72,470

70,428

75,937

87,598

99,783

84,100

85,927

Wholesale Trade

28,287

30,372

37,423

41,787

49,072

38,875

34,606

31,110

Retail Trade
Finance/Insurance/Real
Estate

140,916 138,176 157,074

174,362

203,043

135,533

131,169

134,673

28,322

42,217

52,319

71,561

73,469

78,406

79,678

Services

143,719 175,412 246,386

311,614

379,287

487,054

556,867

579,001

Total Employment

922,522 939,649 985,402 1,008,966 1,069,691 1,074,663 1,102,914 1,139,532

SECONDARY

TERTIARY

34,953

(Source: "Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics," 1950-2010; American Community Survey, "Selected
Characteristics: ACS 1-Year Estimates," U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)
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Table 4.6 below details the sectoral distribution o f employment as a percentage o f
the total for Pittsburgh. Primary sector labor made up a considerably larger proportion o f
employment in 1950 than either Buffalo or Cleveland, at 4.6%. By 2012, it made up only
1.2% o f total employment. Secondary sector employment made up 41.8% o f total
employment and declined steadily until 2010, after which it rose slightly to 15.7%.
Conversely, tertiary sector employment rose from 46.2% in 1950 to 80.3 in 2010, with a
slight drop in 2012.

Table 4.6: Pittsburgh MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage of Total
Employment, 1950-2012
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2012

Primary

4.6

3.3

2.3

1.8

1.9

0.7

0.8

1.2

Secondary

41.8

41.7

37.2

31.5

21.2

18.4

15.6

15.7

Tertiary

46.2

48.0

56.2

65.0

73.9

77.7

80.3

79.9

(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)

Figure 4.3 below gives a graphical representation o f the sectoral distribution o f
employment as a percentage o f the total. The same divergence o f sectoral employment is
seen in the Pittsburgh case. Secondary sector employment declined in importance as
tertiary sector employment increased.
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Figure 4.3: Pittsburgh MSA: Sectoral Distribution as Percentage Change from 1950
Value, 1950-2012
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(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)

The Pittsburgh case, then, fits this first characteristic o f post-industrialism. To
give greater nuance to the divergence in sectoral employment, the next section compares
the patterns o f secondary and tertiary employment.
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Comparing Sectoral Employment
Figure 4.4 below compares the patterns o f secondary and tertiary jobs as a
percentage o f total employment in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. In each case,
tertiary sector jobs already made up a larger proportion o f total employment than
secondary sector jobs in 1950. That year, the graph shows that Pittsburgh had the lowest
proportion o f secondary sector employment o f the three metropolitan areas. Buffalo had
the greatest percentage o f secondary employment. In 2012, as well, Pittsburgh had the
lowest proportion o f secondary sector jobs and Cleveland had the greatest. In 1950,
Pittsburgh had the lowest proportion o f tertiary sector jobs and Cleveland had the greatest.
Just ten years later, Cleveland had the least. In 2012, however, Pittsburgh had the
greatest.
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Figure 4.4: Comparative Patterns of Secondary and Tertiary Sector Jobs as
Percentage of Total Employment in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh MS As
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(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2012)

The above graph shows that, in terms o f the decreasing emphasis on secondary
sector employment and increasing emphasis on tertiary sector employment, Pittsburgh
maintains a greater degree o f post-industrialism. The divergence between the two sectors
is greatest in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area and least in the Cleveland metropolitan
area. The next section analyzes the second characteristic o f the post-industrial economy:
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the importance of human capital.

2. Growing Importance o f Human Capital
The second characteristics o f the post-industrial economy is the growing
importance o f human capital. Human capital can be described as the stock o f knowledge,
habits, and social and personality attributes that contribute to the ability to perform labor,
which creates additional value. Human capital is particularly important in the post
industrial society because o f the role o f creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation
required to develop the tertiary sector. It is difficult, however, to measure. The most
common method is by examining rates o f higher education, which will be done below.
Abel and Gabe demonstrated that a one-percentage point increase in the proportion of
residents with a college degree is associated with about a two percent increase in
metropolitan area GDP per capita.12 The particular types o f degrees are also important,
as different undergraduate majors provide different skills in the labor force. Florida,
Mellander, and Stolarick discovered that knowledge about the subjects o f administration
and management, economics and accounting, mathematics, computers and electronics,
and telecommunications play the largest roles in regional economic development.13
Therefore, after examining aggregate data on bachelor’s degrees, the specific fields o f
study will be compared. These figures offer a general description o f the importance o f
human capital in each metropolitan area.

1 ")

Jaison R. Abel and Todd M. Gabe, "Human Capital and Economic Activity in Urban
America," (New York: Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, 2010), 1.
13 Richard Florida, Charlotta Mellander, and Kevin Stolarick, "Inside the Black Box of
Regional Development - Human Capital, the Creative Class and Tolerance," Journal o f
Economic Geography 8 (2007).
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As economies develop, individuals attain increasingly higher levels o f formal
education. Thus, it makes little sense to examine each case individually for increasing
levels o f educational attainment. Instead, each indicator is displayed comparatively.
Table 4.7 below details the percent o f the total populations aged 25 years and older with a
bachelor’s degree only from 1990 to 2013. This statistic indicates the percentage o f
graduates who either stopped pursuing additional formal degrees or have not yet
graduated with a higher degree. In 1990, Cleveland had the largest proportion o f the 25
years and older population with a bachelor’s degree with 12.3%. Beginning in 2000 and
continuing to the present, Pittsburgh has had the greatest, ending the period with nearly
20%. For the entire 23 year period, Buffalo kept the lowest percentage o f the three.

Table 4.7: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a
Bachelor’s Degree Only
1990

2000

2010

2013

Buffalo

11.3

13.7

16.1

17.4

Cleveland

12.3

14.9

17.2

18.3

Pittsburgh

11.7

15.1

18.4

19.8

{Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1990-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)

Figure 4.5 below charts the pattern o f bachelor’s degree-only recipients as a
percentage o f the 25 and older population in each respective metropolitan area. All areas
show increasing percentages at each decade interval, but Pittsburgh’s rate o f change is
greater than the other cities.
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Figure 4.5: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a
Bachelor’s Degree Only

1990

2000
■ B u ffalo

2010
D Cleveland

2013
■Pittsburgh

(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1990-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)

The higher education trends are further elaborated by looking at the percentage of
the 25 and older population with a graduate or professional degree, detailed in Table 4.8
below. The trend differs from looking strictly at bachelor’s degrees. In this table,
Buffalo maintains the highest percentage o f the total population with a graduate or
professional degree throughout the period between 1990 and 2013. Cleveland held even
with Pittsburgh in 1990 and fell behind for the rest o f the time period. While the above
table indicated that the Buffalo area had the least percentage o f the population with
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bachelor’s degrees than the other two areas, Buffalo has a greater proportion o f
individuals with advanced degrees. Thus, even though Buffalo lags in individuals
achieving only a bachelor’s degree, it excels in individuals seeking graduate and
professional degrees. This advanced degree trend o f metropolitan areas is charted in
Figure 4.6 below.

Table 4.8: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a
Graduate or Professional Degree
1990

2000

2010

2013

Buffalo

7.5

9.5

12.2

13.1

Cleveland

6.7

8.4

10.5

11.5

Pittsburgh

6.7

8.7

10.8

12.5

(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1990-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
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Figure 4.6: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a
Graduate or Professional Degree
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(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1990-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)

Giving greater nuance to the analysis o f higher education in the three cases, Table
4.9 shows the percent o f the 25 years and older population with a bachelor’s degree or
higher. When the two measures from above are combined, it is seen that nearly a full
third o f Pittsburgh’s 25 and older population has a bachelor’s degree or more in 2013,
followed by Buffalo at 30.5% and Cleveland at 29.8%. Prior to 2000 and going back at
least until 1950, Cleveland had the greatest proportion o f metropolitan population with at
least a bachelor’s degree, while Pittsburgh and Buffalo traded places on the list five times
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in the entire period. These trends are graphically represented in Figure 4.7 below.

Table 4.9: Percent of the Total Populations Aged 25 Years and Older with a
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2013

Buffalo

5.8

7.2

9.6

14.5

18.8

23.2

28.3

30.5

Cleveland

7.3

8.4

10.9

15.7

19.0

23.3

27.7

29.8

Pittsburgh

6.0

7.2

9.1

14.6

18.4

23.8

29.2

32.3

(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)
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It has been shown above that in recent decades, Pittsburgh has had the greatest
proportion of the population with bachelor’s degrees. Particularly important for post
industrial economic growth, however, is that these degrees are awarded in the fields o f
Business, Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications. Table 4.10 details
the number of individuals 25 years and older with degrees in each field for the Buffalo
metropolitan area between 2009 and 2013. It also shows the percentage o f the total
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population these degrees represent. The population o f the Buffalo metropolitan area rose
steadily from 771,830 in 2009 to 783,045 in 2013 and, with it, the number o f individuals
in these fields, albeit with a decline from 2009 to 2010. Accordingly, represented as a
percentage o f the 25 and older population, these fields made up 7.8% %in 2009, 7.7% in
2010, and rose to 8.3 in 2013.

Table 4.10: Population 25 Years and Older with a Bachelor’s Degree in Business,
Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications, with Percentage of Total
Population 25 Years and Older for Buffalo MSA
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

44,071

43,533

45,979

46,358

46,818

Computers,
Mathematics, Statistics

8,159

8,170

8,083

8,232

8,512

Communications

8,071

7,648

9,345

9,517

9,314

Total

60,301

59,351

63,407

64,107

64,644

Bus, Comps, Math,
Stats

60,301

59,351

63,407

64,107

64,644

25+ Population

771,830

773,793

777,039

779,253

783,045

7.8

7.7

8.2

8.2

8.3

Business

Percentage of Total

(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)

Table 4.11 below details the same statistic for the Cleveland metropolitan area.
The Cleveland area’s population slid slightly from 1,424,453 in 2009 to 1,421,809 in
2011, then rose to 1,426,443 in 2013. Individuals holding degrees in these particular
fields fell from 123,099 in 2009 to 120,238 in 2010, then rose steadily to 135,636 in 2013.
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The population o f individuals with degrees in Business and Communications followed
this same trend, with dips in 2010 and steady increases after. Likewise, the percentage o f
individuals with these particular degrees dipped from 8.6% in 2009 to 8.4% in 2010 and
rose steadily to 9.5% in 2013.

Table 4.11: Population 25 Years and Older with a Bachelor’s Degree in Business,
Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications, with Percentage of Total
Population 25 Years and Older for Cleveland MSA
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Business

88,899

87,020

92,088

95,887

99,235

Computers,
Mathematics,
Statistics

15,726

15,345

15,969

15,611

14,442

Communications

18,474

17,873

20,597

20,720

21,959

Total

123,099

120,238

128,654

132,218

135,636

Bus, Comps, Math,
Stats

123,099

120,238

128,654

132,218

135,636

1,424,453

1,423,619

1,421,809

1,425,156

1,426,443

8.6

8.4

9.0

9.3

9.5

25+ Population
Percentage of Total

(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)

Table 4.12 below shows the same statistic for the Pittsburgh metropolitan area.
The area’s total 25 years and older population fell slightly from 1,670,624 in 2009 to
1,666,427 in 2010, then rose steadily to 1,690,558 in 2013. The number o f individuals
with business degrees rose steadily and significantly from 97,231 in 2009 to 123,174 in
2013. This trend is likewise seen in the total number o f individuals with degrees in
business, computers, mathematics, statistics, and communications: 142,050 in 2009 to
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175,695 in 2013. The percentage o f the population 25 years and older also rose steadily
from 8.5 in 2009 to 10.4 in 2013.

Table 4.12: Population 25 Years and Older with a Bachelor’s Degree in Business,
Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications, with Percentage of Total
Population 25 Years and Older for Pittsburgh MSA
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Business

97,231

101,237

104,741

108,982

123,174

Computers,
Mathematics, Statistics

24,763

24,964

25,767

26,643

26,394

Communications

20,056

23,955

23,631

26,188

26,127

Total

142,050

150,156

154,139

161,813

175,695

Bus, Comps, Math,
Stats

142,050

150,156

154,139

161,813

175,695

1,670,624

1,666,427

1,676,173

1,682,175

1,690,558

8.5

9.0

9.2

9.6

10.4

25+ Population
Percentage of Total

(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)

The patterns described above for each case are compared below in Figure 4.8,
which graphs the 25 years and older population with bachelor’s degrees in these
specialized fields o f business, computers, mathematics, statistics, and communications
for the Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas. The graph indicates that
Pittsburgh has the greatest total number o f individuals with degrees in these fields and
Buffalo has the least. Pittsburgh also has the highest level o f growth in these degree
fields, and Buffalo has the lowest, far below Cleveland.
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Figure 4.8: Total Population 25 Years and Older with Bachelor’s Degrees in the
Fields of Business, Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications as for
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
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(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)

Even though Pittsburgh has a higher rate o f growth in these degree fields and a
greater overall number, the difference is not as wide when compared to total population
figures. Figure 4.9 shows the percentage o f the 25 years and older population o f each
metropolitan area that has a degree in business, computers, mathematics, statistics, and
communications. As with the above indicators, Pittsburgh has a greater proportion o f
these individuals, but only since 2010. In 2009, Cleveland had a greater percentage.
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Buffalo remains in a distant third. In addition, between 2012 and 2013, the Pittsburgh
trajectory became steeper.

Figure 4.9: Population 25 Years and Older with Bachelor’s Degrees in the Fields of
Business, Computers, Mathematics, Statistics, and Communications as for Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh as a Percentage of Population 25 Years and Over
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(Source: American Community Survey, “Demographic and Housing Estimates: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)

The above indicators describe the importance o f human capital in each o f the
metropolitan areas. While Buffalo has the greatest percentage o f the 25 and older
population with a graduate or professional degree, Pittsburgh leads in the rest o f the
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indicators, including greatest percentage o f individuals with a bachelor’s degree only;
greatest percentage o f individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree; and highest
population and percentage of individuals holding a degree in business, computers,
mathematics, statistics, or communications. Most o f the indicators also place Buffalo a
distant third. Given the above indicators, Pittsburgh possesses the greatest human capital,
and Buffalo has the least. The next section examines the relative importance o f bluecollar and professional labor.

3. Decline in Importance o f Blue-Collar Work and Increase in Importance o f
Professional Labor
The third characteristic o f the post-industrial economy is the decline in
importance o f blue-collar labor and an increase in the importance o f professional labor.
Blue-collar simply refers to a working class person who performs manual labor. The
Census Bureau approximates traditional “blue-collar” jobs as the “construction,
extraction, and maintenance” occupations.14 I included, as well, “production,
transportation, and material moving” occupations and other “laborers” as blue-collar.
Professional labor is characterized by the STEM acronym: science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics. In particular, most organizations in the United States refer
to the National Science Foundation’s definition o f STEM academic subjects, which
include chemistry, computer and information technology science, engineering,
geosciences, life sciences, mathematical sciences, physics and astronomy, social sciences,

14 U.S. Census Bureau, "Occupations: 2000, Census 2000 Brief," (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Census Bureau, 2000), 4.
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and STEM education and learning research.15
To examine the importance o f blue-collar labor, I use the percentage of bluecollar employment to total employment. Table 4.13 below shows this statistic from 1950
to 2013. Buffalo experienced a steady decline from 1950 until 2010 from 47.9% to
18.3%. Cleveland shares the same pattern: 45.4% in 1950 to 19.7% in 2010 and a slight
rise to 19.8% in 2013. Pittsburgh shows a steady decline throughout the period. Buffalo
begins the period with the highest percentage o f blue-collar jobs and ends the period with
the lowest. Conversely, Cleveland in 1950 had the lowest percentage o f blue-collar jobs,
and in 2013, this area had the highest percentage.

Table 4.13: Blue-Collar Jobs as a Percentage of Total Employment
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2013

Buffalo

47.9

41.4

35.3

32.7

27.6

22.6

18.3

18.8

Cleveland

45.4

39.7

34.5

31.8

27.4

24.7

19.7

19.8

Pittsburgh

46.0

42.0

37.1

32.4

27.5

22.8

19.8

19.4

(iSource: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)

Figure 4.10 below graphs blue-collar jobs as a percentage o f total employment.
All three metropolitan areas show steady declines in proportions o f blue-collar work to
total employment until 2010, when the trend line levels off.

15 Heather B. Gonzalez and Jeffrey J. Kuenzi, "Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (STEM) Education: A Primer," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research
Service, August 1, 2012), 2.
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Figure 4.10: Blue-Collar Jobs as a Percentage of Total Employment
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(Source: “Census o f Populations: Social and Economic Characteristics,” 1950-2010;
American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year
Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2013)

The other half o f this post-industrial economic characteristic involves STEM
work. The nuances o f determining STEM employment make it difficult to aggregate
effectively. The Census Bureau and the Bureau o f Labor Statistics have only recently
begun to track specific STEM occupations. The census records occupations which can be
interpreted as either STEM or non-STEM occupations, which makes data collection
difficult. Further, the methods o f the Census Bureau and the Bureau o f Labor Statistics
were designed to keep track o f industrial, rather than post-industrial, progress. These
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records are slowly being updated. Therefore, an alternative, and admittedly imperfect,
measure for STEM jobs is the awarding o f STEM-field bachelor’s degrees. Table 4.14
below details STEM bachelor’s degrees awarded as a percentage o f total bachelor’s
degrees. Throughout the period, Pittsburgh had the greatest proportion o f STEM degrees
awarded but with no general trend. In 2009, Pittsburgh institutions granted STEM
degrees to 44.8% o f graduates. The highest percentage came in 2012 at 45%. Buffalo
had the lowest percentage in 2009 at 42.1%, and in 2013, both Buffalo and Cleveland
were at 42.5%. There is a leveling-off period in the years 2010-2013, which is a trend to
be following in the coming years.

Table 4.14: STEM Bachelor’s Degrees Awarded as Percentage of Total
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Buffalo

42.1

42.7

41.3

40.1

42.5

Cleveland

42.5

42.5

40.8

41.1

42.5

Pittsburgh

44.8

44.7

43.4

45.0

43.4

{Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2009-2013)

Figure 4.11 below graphically represents these STEM degree data. Pittsburgh
stands alone with higher proportions o f STEM graduates, while Buffalo and Cleveland
simply have lower concentrations.
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Figure 4.11: STEM Bachelor’s Degrees Awarded as Percentage of Total
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Even though Buffalo had a lower percentage o f blue-collar jobs through the
period between 2009 and 2013, Pittsburgh had the greatest proportion o f STEMbachelor’s degrees awarded. The employment numbers reflect that there are more
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics graduates per year in Pittsburgh than
in the other areas. The Brookings Institution reported that 9.5% o f Pittsburgh’s
workforce had a STEM bachelor’s degree, while Cleveland’s had 8.8%, and Buffalo’s
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had only 8.6 % .16 These statistics are significant. The percentage o f STEM jobs and
STEM-educated workers affects the ability to innovate, which is explored in the next
section.

4. Centrality o f Ideas in Economic Growth
The fourth and final characteristic o f the post-industrial economy is the centrality
o f ideas in economic growth. To measure the production o f ideas, the analysis uses
number o f patents and university research and development expenditures. These
measurements enable comparisons o f both the private sector as well as higher education
research.
Patents vary greatly in their value, but are significant indicators o f the role o f
ideas in regional innovation and economic growth. Rothwell et al. showed that
metropolitan areas that produce higher numbers o f patents have a $16,000 greater GDP
per worker. Controlling for other factors that affect productivity growth, the authors also
discovered that a low-patenting metropolitan area would add $4,300 per worker to its
economy each decade if it became a high-patenting area.17 Instead o f patenting by bluecollar inventors, as had been the norm during the industrial revolution, most patenting
comes as a result o f training in the STEM fields, as has been detailed in the previous
section. Metropolitan areas with higher proportions o f STEM-educated workers develop
16 "Patenting and Innovation in Metropolitan America," (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, February 2, 2013). Report can be found at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2013/metropatenting
17 Jonathan Rothwell et al., "Patenting Prosperity: Invention and Economic Performance
in the United States and Its Metropolitan Areas," (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, February 1, 2013). Report can be found at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/02/patenting-prosperity-rothwell
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patents at higher rates. Patenting and STEM education, therefore, create the necessary
conditions for post-industrial economic development.
Table 4.15 below details utility patents granted per year for each metropolitan
area in the years 2000-2011, per 100,000 workers. In most o f the years through the
period, Cleveland produced the most patents, and, starting in 2005, Buffalo produced the
least. Through the entire twelve-year period, Buffalo produced 3,258 patents, Cleveland
produced 7,778, and Pittsburgh produced 7,455. On average, Buffalo produced 272
patents per year, Cleveland produced 648, and Pittsburgh produced 621.
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Table 4.15: Utility Patents Granted Per Year, Total and Per 100,000 Workers, 20002011
Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

Total

Per 100,000
Workers

Total

Per 100,000
Workers

Total

Per 100,000
Workers

2000

363

65.0

772

68.0

736

64.2

2001

354

64.4

781

69.9

664

57.5

2002

333

60.9

737

68.1

644

56.4

2003

361

66.3

699

65.1

665

58.6

2004

324

59.2

647

60.3

618

54.5

2005

218

39.9

555

51.8

492

43.4

2006

229

42.0

557

51.8

623

54.8

2007

202

36.9

523

48.8

491

42.8

2008

177

32.1

518

48.9

495

43.1

2009

204

38.0

513

51.3

571

51.0

2010

237

44.1

751

75.8

740

65.8

2011

256

47.2

725

72.4

716

62.5

Total

3258

-

7778

-

7455

-

Average

272

49.7

648

61.0

621

54.6

(Source: “Patenting in Technology Classes Breakout by Origin, Metropolitan and
Micropolitan Areas,” U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2000-2011, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cls_cbsa/allcbsa_gd.htm; State and
Area Employment— Total Non-Farm Employment, Bureau o f Labor Statistics, 20002011)

The pattern o f utility patents granted is graphically represented in Figure 4.12.
The trend for Buffalo metropolitan area lags behind the patent output o f Cleveland and
Pittsburgh and had its highest patent year in 2003. Buffalo’s patent output has trended
upward since 2008, however. Pittsburgh outperformed Cleveland in only one year, 2006.
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The two cities were closely matched in 2009. Pittsburgh’s patent output spiked in 2006
and again in 2010. Cleveland, like Pittsburgh, peaked in 2010 and fell slightly in 2011.
The year o f most recent available data, 2011, shows Cleveland ahead o f Pittsburgh in
patents per 100,000 workers.

Figure 4.12: Utility Patents Granted Per Year, Per 100,000 Workers
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(Source: “Patenting in Technology Classes Breakout by Origin, Metropolitan and
Micropolitan Areas,” U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2000-2011, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cls_cbsa/allcbsa_gd.htm)

In 2011, the Brookings Institution ranked American metropolitan areas by patent
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output. Cleveland was ranked 23rd out o f 358 areas. Pittsburgh was not far behind, at
26th, and Buffalo was ranked 67th.18 Brookings also listed the top patenting companies in
2011 for each metropolitan area. These are listed below in Table 4.16. Buffalo’s top
patenting company in 2011 was Honeywell with 43, and its sixth highest was Delphi
Technologies with 13. Cleveland’s top patenting company was Rockwell Automation
with 90, and its sixth highest was Eveready Battery. Pittsburgh’s top patenting company
was PPG with 69, and its sixth highest was Eaton Corporation. As the top overall
patenting metropolitan area, Cleveland also has the largest range between its top
patenting company and its sixth highest, at 53. Buffalo’s range is 30, and Pittsburgh’s is
39. The next highest patenting company behind Rockwell Automation is General
Electric, with 40 fewer patents in 2011. Creative knowledge seems to be concentrated
and exclusive in Cleveland, whereas in Buffalo and Pittsburgh, patents are more evenly
distributed. This statistic reveals two explanations o f Cleveland’s economy. Cleveland
could be relying on one large company and ignoring the positive effects o f competition.
Or, Rockwell Automation could be leading the way and producing agglomeration effects
as a way to grow the local economy. Either way, Cleveland has been producing more
patents.

1fi

"Patenting and Innovation in Metropolitan America."
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Table 4.16: Top Six Patenting Companies by Metropolitan Area, 2011
Buffalo

#

Cleveland

#

Pittsburgh

#

Honeywell

43

Rockwell
Automation

90

PPG

69

Praxair

38

General Electric

50

Seagate Technology

62

Greatbatch Ltd

31

Cleveland Clinic

44

University o f
Pittsburgh

42

Mattel

21

Spectrum Diversified
Designs

41

Alcoa

31

SUNY Buffalo

20

Diebold

39

Kennametal

30

Delphi
Technologies

13

Eveready Battery

37

Eaton Corporation

29

{Source: “Patenting and Innovation in Metropolitan America,” Brookings Institution,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2013/metropatenting)

Patents are only one indicator o f the role o f ideas in economic expansion.
Another is university research and development. Researchers in major university
research programs innovate, train future inventors, and create companies based on their
own inventions and collaborate with private companies. The National Science
Foundation ranked American universities by total research and development expenditures.
The major universities in the Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas that
made the top 300 were the University o f Pittsburgh (ranked 12th), Case Western Reserve
University in Cleveland (ranked 49th), SUNY Buffalo (ranked 65th), Carnegie Mellon
University in Pittsburgh (ranked 82nd), Cleveland State University (ranked 183rd), and
Duquesne University in Pittsburgh (ranked 293rd). Among other conclusions to draw
from this ranking, it can at least be claimed that Pittsburgh has more major universities
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engaged in more research and development.
Figure 4.13 compares expenditures per tenure and tenure-track faculty member by
these six universities between 2003 and 2012. Between 2009 and 2012, the University o f
Pittsburgh has far outpaced the other major universities in research and development
spending. The only year it decreased was in 2012. Before then, Carnegie Mellon spent
more per faculty member. SUNY Buffalo spent the third most throughout the period.
The rest o f the major universities also have steadily and slowly increasing expenditures.
In the past few years, Cleveland State and Carnegie Mellon have increased research and
development at a greater pace. Before then, Cleveland State and Duquesne spent
relatively little per faculty member. These statistics can be explained partly by their
general institutional focus on research and development. The Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement o f Teaching characterizes Carnegie Mellon, the University o f
Pittsburgh, and Case Western as “very high research activity” institutions. Even though
SUNY Buffalo spends the third most per faculty member, it does not fit in the same
category o f institutions as the previous three, instead being characterized as a primarily
master’s degree-granting institution. The Foundation listed Cleveland State and
Duquesne accordingly as “high research activity” institutions.19

19 See “The Carnegie Classification o f Institutions o f Higher Education,” Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement o f Teaching, at
http://classifications.camegiefoundation.org/.
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Figure 4.13: Higher Education Research and Development Expenditures by Major
University: Spending per Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty Member, 2003-2012
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{Source: “Higher Education R&D Expenditures, Ranked by FY 2012 R&D Expenditures:
FYs 2003-12,” National Science Foundation, February 2014)20

20 Faculty data were found in university fact books: “University o f Pittsburgh Factbook,
2004-2013,” Office o f Institutional Research, University o f Pittsburgh; “Duquesne
University Fact Book, 2004-2013,” Office o f Planning, Budgeting, and Institutional
Research, Duquesne University; Case Western Reserve University Office o f Institutional
Research; University at Buffalo, State University o f New York, Office o f Institutional
Analysis; “Carnegie Mellon Factbook 2004-2013,” Carnegie Mellon University Office o f
Institutional Research and Analysis; “Cleveland State University Book o f Trends, 20052013Cleveland State University Office o f Institutional Research and Analysis
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These expenditures do not necessarily correlate to creative output. But, research
and development expenditures are, if not sufficient, at least necessary conditions for
institutional innovation. The University o f Pittsburgh adds tremendous innovative value
to the greater Pittsburgh economy. The Academic Performance Research Laboratory
ranked the research o f world universities for the 2013-2014 academic year by number o f
articles, citation, total document, journal impact, journal citation impact, and international
collaboration. The University o f Pittsburgh was ranked 22nd globally. The other five
universities were ranked as follows: Case Western, 135th; SUNY Buffalo, 225th; Carnegie
Mellon, 234rd; Cleveland State, 1,209th; and Duquesne, 1,424th.21 The University o f
Pittsburgh, therefore, displays research and developmental value that extends
internationally.
Patenting and research and development spending offer a picture o f the
importance o f ideas in post-industrial development in these three metropolitan areas. The
Cleveland area had produced the most patents o f the three regions. Major university
expenditures on research and development show a more lopsided view. The Pittsburgh
area has three major research universities ranked in the top 300 by the National Science
Foundation. Cleveland has two, and Buffalo has just one. The University o f Pittsburgh,
in addition, outspends the other six universities in research and development and is
ranked far higher on global research performance. This university research and
development spills over into the private sector as well as the population at large as a
positive externality. All three metropolitan areas display an emphasis on ideas as the
basis for economic growth. Given the above statistics, Pittsburgh and Cleveland place
21 University Ranking by Academic Performance, “Current Ranking, 2013-2014,” at
http://www.urapcenter.org/2013/index.php
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greater emphasis on the importance o f ideas than Buffalo.

COMPLETING THE ECONOMIC PICTURE
The data above evaluated the extent to which the three metropolitan areas have
post-industrialized in the purest sense. To gain a greater understanding o f the broader
economic picture o f the regions, this section looks at the basic economic indicators. The
indicators demonstrate that the extent to which a city has post-industrialized generally
correlates with overall economic health. Pittsburgh tops the other cities in unemployment
rate, real gross domestic product, median household income, poverty rates, and general
job growth.
Table 4.18 below lists the average annual unemployment rates for the three
metropolitan areas and the United States. The data show that Pittsburgh had the lowest
unemployment rate between 1990 and 1992, after which Buffalo did until 1995. From
1990 to 1995, Cleveland had higher unemployment rates than the national average. From
1995 until 2003, Cleveland had lower unemployment rates than Buffalo, Cleveland, and
the national average. Between 2003 and the Great Recession figures in 2009, Buffalo
and Cleveland had higher rates than the rest o f the country. From 2007 to the present,
Pittsburgh has had the lowest unemployment rates o f the other two as well as the nation
as a whole. The most recent data, the 2014 monthly average through August, Buffalo and
Cleveland have higher unemployment rates than the national average. Figure 4.15 graphs
these data, showing that despite the spike in unemployment nationally during the most
recent recession, Buffalo, Cleveland, and especially Pittsburgh faired relatively well.
Indeed, Buffalo and Cleveland recovered slower than the national average and Pittsburgh
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from the 2002-2003 recession. Conversely, when the 2008 recession hit, their
unemployment figures did not drop as far as the national average. A plausible
explanation to the relative insulation o f these three cities from the 2008 recession is that
fewer individuals had the money in the first place to buy subprime mortgages.

Table 4.17: Average Annual Unemployment Rate
Cleveland
5.9
6.9
8.0
7.3
6.6
5.4
4.8
4.6
4.1
4.2
3.9
4.4
5.4
6.0
5.9
5.7
5.5
6.1
6.8
8.9
8.9
7.9
7.4
7.5
7.4

Pittsburgh
5.1
6.2
7.2
7.1
6.6
6.0
5.2
4.9
4.6
4.4
4.4
4.7
5.7
5.9
5.7
5.2
4.7
4.4
5.1
7.2
7.8
7.3
7.2
6.8
5.8

US Avg
5.6
6.9
7.5
6.9
6.1
5.6
5.4
4.9
4.5
4.2
4.0
4.7
5.8
6.0
5.5
5.1
4.6
4.6
oo

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014*

Buffalo
5.3
7.2
7.5
6.8
6.0
5.4
5.1
5.3
5.4
5.3
4.3
4.9
5.6
5.9
5.8
5.3
5.1
4.9
5.9
8.4
8.5
8.0
8.3
7.5
6.6

9.3
9.6
8.9
8.1
7.4
6.3

*Average for Year Through August 2014
(Source: “Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment, 1990-2014,” Bureau of
Labor Statistics, U.S. Department o f Labor)
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Figure 4.14: Average Annual Unemployment Rate
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Unemployment rates are often a reflection o f the pattern o f job growth. Table
4.19 below shows the percentage o f job growth from 2006 to 2013 for the Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas as well as the United States as a whole.
Pittsburgh has the greatest total number o f workers, and Buffalo has the lowest. Each
city peaked in 2008 and saw negative job growth in 2009, Buffalo and Pittsburgh at
-3.5% and Cleveland at -5.9% . Cleveland is taking the longest to recover from the
recession in terms o f total employment. Buffalo, Pittsburgh, and the nation as a whole

134
began to see job growth again in 2011, while Cleveland grew slightly in 2010 and lost
jobs again in 2011. In 2013, Cleveland showed the highest rate o f growth, above the
national average, at 1.9%. Buffalo lost 0.3% o f its jobs, and Pittsburgh grew slightly at
0.3%.

Table 4.18: Job Growth, 2006-2013
Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

US

2006

2.1%

2.6%

1.8%

3.7%

2007

0.5%

-0.4%

1.6%

0.7%

2008

3.5%

1.0%

2.4%

2.7%

2009

-3.5%

-5.9%

-3.5%

-3.9%

2010

-0.8%

0.2%

-0.8%

-1.1%

2011

0.5%

-0.8%

0.9%

1.0%

2012

2.2%

0.6%

2.4%

1.8%

2013

-0.3%

1.9%

0.3%

1.5%

{Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2013)

Figure 4.16 shows total employment levels for each o f the metropolitan areas.
Buffalo’s employment showed steady growth until 2008, after which it declined until
2010 and increased to above its 2007 level. Pittsburgh sees a similar pattern o f steady
growth in jobs until its peak in 2008, a decline occurred until 2010, and the level is about
10,000 jobs short o f its 2008 level. Cleveland, on the other hand, is struggling to regain
the jobs lost in the recession. Employment had been relatively stable until the decline
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after 2008. Since then, the employment level has remained stagnant, yet with an
optimistic increase in 2013.

Figure 4.15: Percent Change in Employment Since 2005
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(Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2013)

Another regional economic indicator is real gross domestic product, which is
detailed by metropolitan area for the years 2001 to 2013 in Table 4.20. In all o f the years,
Pittsburgh’s GDP exceeds Cleveland’s and Buffalo’s. A noticeable dip in GDP for
Cleveland and Pittsburgh came in 2009, a recession year. Buffalo did not experience this
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temporary decline, rather it was recovering from one in 2007. There is a healthy upward
trend since then for both metropolitan areas. Figure 4.17 graphs these data. Buffalo is
considerably behind both Pittsburgh and Cleveland. In 2013, Buffalo’s real GDP was
approximately $48.3 million, Cleveland’s was $114.5 million, and Pittsburgh’s was
$122.9 million.

Table 4.19: Real Gross Domestic Product by Metropolitan Area (Millions, Chained
2009 Dollars)
Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

2001

42,774

106,082

109,640

2002

44,601

107,860

110,469

2003

45,243

110,133

112,262

2004

46,141

112,652

113,487

2005

46,054

113,423

113,425

2006

46,568

112,902

114,140

2007

45,990

111,871

114,994

2008

46,073

111,357

114,589

2009

46,539

105,035

110,886

2010

47,124

108,304

114,802

2011

47,722

110,772

117,953

2012

48,076

113,827

120,719

2013

48,257

114,448

122,891

{Source: “Regional Data,” Bureau o f Economic Analysis, Department o f Commerce,
2001-2013)
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Figure 4.16: Real Gross Domestic Product by Metropolitan Area (Millions, Chained
2009 Dollars)
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Pittsburgh leads in terms o f total real GDP. But, this could be a result o f having a
larger population. Table 4.20 details and Figure 4.17 graphs the real GDP per worker for
the three metropolitan areas. This statistic tells a different story. Even though
Cleveland’s unemployment rate was the worst o f the three for much o f this time period, it
has the highest GDP per worker. There exists a significant unemployed population, but
those who are employed, are very productive. Pittsburgh has placed second since 2001,
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when it edged out Cleveland at $95,017 per worker. All three cities declined in 2008 and
showed general upward trends since. Cleveland showed a slight decline in 2013 while
Pittsburgh and Buffalo showed improvements. Still, Cleveland showed a per worker
GDP of more than $10,000 over Pittsburgh in 2013.

Table 4.20: Real GDP Per Worker by Metropolitan Area (Chained 2009 Dollars)
Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

2001

77,870

94,928

95,017

2002

81,523

99,658

96,724

2003

83,045

102,526

98,996

2004

84,291

105,076

100,112

2005

89,035

115,677

104,181

2006

88,197

112,197

102,968

2007

86,711

111,592

102,133

2008

83,948

109,972

99,377

2009

87,909

110,219

99,698

2010

89,756

113,439

104,090

2011

90,466

116,953

106,023

2012

89,145

119,504

105,937

2013

89,784

117,915

107,533

(Source: “Regional Data,” Bureau o f Economic Analysis, Department o f Commerce,
2001-2013; “Total Non-Farm Employment,” Bureau o f Labor Statistics, 2001-2013)
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Figure 4.17: Real GDP Per W orker by Metropolitan Area (Chained 2009 Dollars)
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Similar trends appear in the real GDP per capita figure. At no point during the
2001-2013 period was Pittsburgh ahead o f Cleveland. Buffalo, likewise, had the lowest
GDP per capita throughout the period. Table 4.21 and Figure 4.18 show these trends.
Cleveland’s GDP per capita rose from $49,530 in 2001 to $55,430 in 2013. During the
same period, Pittsburgh’s GDP per capita rose from $45,353 to $52,053 and Buffalo’s
rose from $36,714 to $42,550. The 2008 recession affected Pittsburgh and Cleveland
greater than Buffalo in terms o f GDP per capita. Pittsburgh and Cleveland showed sharp
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declines from 2008 to 2009, but Buffalo’s level was largely undisturbed. In addition,
Pittsburgh’s first peak year was in 2007 and it took until 2011 to surpass this level.
Cleveland’s first peak came in 2006 and slowly fell until the sharp drop in 2009. It did
not surpass its 2006 level until 2012.

Table 4.21: Real GDP Per Capita by Metropolitan Area (Chained 2009 Dollars)
Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

2001

36,714

49,530

45,353

2002

38,393

50,492

45,869

2003

39,006

51,678

46,753

2004

39,912

53,064

47,502

2005

40,097

53,712

47,768

2006

40,788

53,778

48,282

2007

40,425

53,486

48,749

2008

40,544

53,406

48,621

2009

40,990

50,472

47,077

2010

41,497

52,169

48,710

2011

42,027

53,555

49,978

2012

42,387

55,161

51,136

2013

42,550

55,430

52,053

(Source: “Regional Data,” Bureau o f Economic Analysis, Department o f Commerce,
2001-2013)
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Figure 4.18: Real GDP Per Capita by Metropolitan Area (Chained 2009 Dollars)
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Median household income is another way to measure the health o f an economy.
Table 4.21 shows inflation-adjusted median household income for the years 2005-2013.
Figure 4.18 shows the graphical representation o f these data. All three metropolitan areas
had median household incomes lower than the national average for the entire period. In
2005, Pittsburgh was at the bottom o f the group with a median household income o f
$41,719, and Cleveland’s was the highest o f the three at $44,281. All three regions
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showed steady increases until the 2008 recession. Pittsburgh’s median household income
did not decline as much as Buffalo or Cleveland, enabling it to recover quicker and
higher than either Buffalo or Cleveland. Cleveland showed a slight decline in 2011 and is
still behind in this regard. In 2013, Pittsburgh’s median household income was $51,291,
Buffalo’s was $50,5489, and Cleveland’s was $49,358. The national average was
$52,250.

Table 4.22: Median Household Income, (Inflation-Adjusted Dollars)
Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

US Avg

2005

42,315

44,281

41,719

46,242

2006

42,831

45,925

43,260

48,451

2007

44,843

48,227

45,630

50,740

2008

47,897

49,206

47,755

52,029

2009

45,811

45,395

46,349

50,221

2010

46,420

46,231

46,700

50,046

2011

47,081

45,936

48,854

50,502

2012

50,269

46,944

50,489

51,371

2013

50,548

49,358

51,291

52,250

{Source: American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2013)
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Figure 4.19: Median Household Income, (Inflation-Adjusted Dollars)
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Total wealth does not measure everything. Wide disparities in income can be a
factor in economic underdevelopment. Table 4.22 and Figure 4.19 shows the percentage
of families below the poverty level for each metropolitan area between 2005 and 2013.
Throughout the entire period the poverty rate o f the Pittsburgh area remained
significantly lower than Buffalo, Cleveland, and the national average. Currently,
Cleveland’s poverty rate is the highest o f the three cities and even with the national
average at 11.6%. Its pattern dipped in 2006, after which it followed the path o f the
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national average. Buffalo’s poverty rate peaked in 2006, 2009, and 2011, showing a
staggered pattern. It has been below the national average, however, since 2010. Both
Pittsburgh and Buffalo show decreases in poverty rates since 2011. Still, the lowest
poverty levels for Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and the national average came in 2007 at 7.7%,
9.6%, and 9.5%, respectively, while Buffalo’s came the year after in 2008 at 9.5%.
Pittsburgh’s percentage o f families below the poverty level remains the lowest, at 8.5%,
over three percentage points lower than Cleveland and the national average and two
percentage points lower than Buffalo.

Table 4.23: Percentage of Families Below the Poverty Level
Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

US

2005

9.6

11.1

8.1

10.2

2006

10.5

9.6

8.0

9.8

2007

9.6

9.6

7.7

9.5

2008

9.5

9.7

8.6

9.7

2009

10.9

11.1

8.8

10.5

2010

10.4

11.7

8.4

11.3

2011

11.4

11.8

9.0

11.7

2012

10.6

12.0

8.6

11.8

2013

10.5

11.6

8.5

11.6

(Source: “American Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1Year Estimates,” U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2013)
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Figure 4.20: Percentage of Families Below the Poverty Level
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Despite the superior productivity o f Cleveland, the rest o f the above indicators—
unemployment, job growth, total employment, median household income, and poverty
rate— suggest that Pittsburgh has the strongest economy o f the three metropolitan areas.
It has the lowest unemployment rate, which is below the national average, highest total
employment, highest median household income, and lowest, by far, poverty rate. In most
o f the indicators, Buffalo is far behind in economic comparison.
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CONCLUSION
In terms o f post-industrialization as well as general economic growth, Pittsburgh
has generally advanced beyond its rust belt counterparts. Each o f the metropolitan areas
demonstrate their post-industrial nature, but Pittsburgh shows a greater degree o f post
industrialization and Buffalo shows the least. First, Pittsburgh shows the greatest
divergence in emphasis on secondary employment versus tertiary employment, showing
the largest shift from a goods-producing economy to a service economy. Second, even
though Buffalo shows the greatest percentage o f the 25 and older population with a
graduate or professional degree, Pittsburgh leads in the rest o f the human capital
indicators, including greatest percentage o f individuals with a bachelor’s degree only;
greatest percentage o f individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree; and highest
population and percentage of individuals holding a degree in business, computers,
mathematics, statistics, or communications. Third, despite Buffalo having a lower
percentage o f blue-collar jobs in recent years, Pittsburgh has had the greatest proportion
o f STEM-bachelor’s degrees awarded. There are more science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics graduates per year in Pittsburgh than in the other areas, which is
reflected in employment numbers. And fourth, Cleveland has been the leader in
patenting in the past decade, but in terms o f major universities spending money on
research and development, Pittsburgh leads by far, showing greater emphasis on ideas as
a central way to grow the economy.
In comparison, the characteristics o f the post-industrial economy as well as
standard economic indicators show Pittsburgh on top, Cleveland next, and Buffalo at the
bottom. The question remains, then, why is Pittsburgh ahead o f the game? Why are
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there such differences among the three regions, given their similar histories o f decline?
The next three chapters seek to answer at least part o f these questions, testing the
plausibility o f three explanations: effectiveness o f institutions in providing an effective
business climate; size o f service sector at the time o f deindustrialization; and the
availability o f capital.
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CHAPTER V
GOVERNING WITHOUT HAMPERING:
THE INFLUENCE OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY BURDEN

All that good government can do to improve the material
well-being o f the masses is to establish and to preserve an
institutional setting in which there are no obstacles to the
progressive accumulation o f new capital and its utilization
for the improvement o f technical methods o f production.
- Ludwig von M ises1

INTRODUCTION
The ability for local governments to provide an institutional setting in which
market processes can work efficiently is pivotal to economic expansion and post
industrial development. This liberal setting includes the provision o f basic public goods
and the strengthening of property rights. The protection o f property rights presupposes
an environment o f low taxation and few obstacles to engaging in business operations.
Liberal formal institutions open the potential for economic gains. This chapter tests the
hypothesis that levels o f post-industrial development among Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh correlate negatively with institutional regulatory burden. Since Pittsburgh’s
post-industrial economy outperforms Cleveland’s and Buffalo’s, I expect to find that
Pittsburgh has the lowest regulatory burden o f the three. To measure the regulatory
climates in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, I create an index that examines the ease o f
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, and the
1 Ludwig von Mises, Planning fo r Freedom and Twelve Other Essays and Addresses
(South Holland, 111.: Libertarian Press, 1974), 6.
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corporate tax burden. In addition, this chapter evaluates the individual tax burdens and
overall cost of living as reflections o f the economic attractiveness o f each city. These
measures describe the overall regulatory burden in each city. Ultimately, I find that
Cleveland has the best environment for doing business, and Pittsburgh has the second
best. Yet, Pittsburgh has the cheapest cost o f living, and Cleveland has the most
expensive. Thus, the null hypothesis that levels o f post-industrial development among
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh do not correlate negatively with institutional
regulatory burden can be rejected.
Before introducing the regulatory index, tax burden measures, and cost o f living
measure, I discuss the implications o f liberal institutionalism for post-industrial
revitalization as developed by Ludwig von Mises.

GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY
Economies that have suffered shocks benefit from low regulatory burdens.
Regulations distort production and allocate resources to relatively less productive and
inefficient uses. All other things being equal, the lighter the regulatory burden, the better
the allocation o f resources toward productive ends, which have been dictated by the
wants and needs of individuals. Thus, formal institutions must curb the temptation o f
increased government intervention in favor o f market processes. This analysis interprets
government intervention from the perspective o f the political economy o f Ludwig von
Mises.
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On the Consequences o f Government Intervention
Liberal institutionalism holds that effective formal and informal institutions,
lower transaction costs, increase information, and create an environment conducive to
cooperation. The role o f government in the post-industrial economy, for liberal
institutionalists, therefore is limited. From the provision o f public goods to the protection
o f property rights, governmental duties are specifically limited because intervention
produces unforeseen consequences in the economy. Ludwig von Mises saw protection o f
private property, which included protection from violence and aggression, as the only
legitimate function and value o f government. Mises wrote,
The social function o f private ownership in the means o f production is to
put the goods into the hands o f those who know best how to use them, into
the hands, that is, o f the most expert managers. Nothing is more foreign to
the essence o f property than special privileges for special property and
protection for special producers. Any kind o f restraint such as exclusive
rights and other privileges o f producers are apt to obstruct the working o f
the social function o f property.2
Any roles that surpass these limited operations interfere with individuals’ ability to
communicate their preferences in the market. Mises added, “Government is a guarantor
o f liberty and is compatible with liberty only if its range is adequately restricted to the
preservation o f what is called economic freedom. Where there is no market economy, the
best-intentioned provisions o f constitutions and laws remain a dead letter.”3 In M ises’
political economy, government’s only role is to enforce private property rights. In this
way, economic action in the market place is most efficient.

2

Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1981), 277.

3 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1949), 285.
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From the existence o f private property rights follow four elements o f a market
society:
1. Freedom: The ability o f individuals to choose freely their roles in the frame o f
social cooperation.4
2. Peace: In the absence o f violence, individuals are able to apply their minds
routinely to productive activity. In M ises’ words:
Economic action demands stable conditions. The extensive and
lengthy process o f production is the more successful the greater the
periods o f time to which it is adapted. It demands continuity, and
this continuity cannot be disturbed without the most serious
disadvantages. This means that economic action requires peace,
the exclusion o f violence.5
3. Equality: Individuals must have equal personal and political freedom under
the law in order to fully integrate themselves into the division o f labor without
legal restrictions.6
4. Inequality o f Wealth and Income: Material inequality is a byproduct o f each
individual’s success in serving others in the division o f labor. Income
differences reflect the differences in each individual’s relative success in
providing value.7
These elements are dependent upon the institution o f private property and its protection

4 Ludwig von Mises, "Liberty and Property," in Two Essays by Ludwig von Mises
(Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1991 [1958]), 34.
5 Mises, Socialism, 34.
6 Ludwig von Ludwig von Mises, "On Equality and Inequality," in Money, Method, and
the Market Process, ed. Richard M. Ebeling (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1990), 190-201.
7 Mises, Human Action, 287-88.
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through a limited governmental structure. Economic coordination and the efficient
allocation o f resources flow from these preconditions of political economy. With these
institutions in place, the structure o f production is free to operate according to the
subjective valuations o f individuals.
Mises saw government as necessary to protect private property. But, additional
governmental action, especially with regard to the economic structure, necessarily creates
unhealthy distortions in economic activity and the structure o f production. It obscures
communication between consumers and producers.
In an unhampered market, the actions o f individuals in the division o f labor form
prices, which are determined by competition. Likewise, changes in supply and demand
scales are reflections o f consumer preferences for various goods or producers’ ability to
provide certain services or products to the market. Instead o f government officials,
entrepreneurs make the decisions that drive the economy, determining which goods are
made, which factors o f production to employ, and how to use these factors in the
production o f consumer goods.8 These entrepreneurs, however, only act according to
their predictions and anticipations o f consumer demand for various goods in the future.
These projections are met with either profits or losses, given the judgments and
calculations o f the entrepreneur.9
Entrepreneurs are particularly important in the post-industrial economy.
Entrepreneurs offer and pay prices for factors o f production as a reflection o f the profits

8 See Israel M. Kirzner, "Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process:
An Austrian Approach," Journal o f Economic Literature 35, no. 1 (March 1997).
9 Richard M. Ebeling, Austrian Economics and the Political Economy o f Freedom
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Eiger, 2003), 84.
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they think they will gain in the future. Ultimately, competition among entrepreneurs
serves as an instrument that gauges the market value for a given consumer product and
tends toward equaling the prices and wages paid for the purchase or hire o f the factors o f
production o f a consumers’ good.10 Entrepreneurs are in a continuous process o f
competition to offer consumers the products they want and to offer them on better terms
than their competitors. Successful entrepreneurs earn profits, with which they can
expand production. Less successful entrepreneurs suffer losses, or simply less profits,
and are in jeopardy o f losing their ability to influence production processes. Thus, in the
unhampered market, decision making and control over production tends to rest with those
individuals who best produce for the wants and needs o f the consuming public.11 F.A.
Hayek demonstrated that only individuals, rather than government bureaucracies, have
the localized knowledge to make decisions that allocate resources efficiently.12
Mises demonstrated that government intervention interrupts this market process
and obstructs the communication between consumers and producers, hindering
consumption demands from being met. Intervention can be defined as “the intrusion of
aggressive physical force into society; it means the substitution o f coercion for voluntary
actions.” 13 These interventions include production restrictions and taxation.
Governments introduce production restrictions and regulations to channel
10 Ibid., 84-85.
11 Mises, Human Action, 257-397.
17

See F.A. Hayek, "The Use o f Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review 35,
no. 4 (1945).
13 Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles
with Power and Market: Government and the Economy (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises
Institute, 2009), 877.
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production processes away from the path they would ordinarily take if guided by
entrepreneurs’ predictions o f consumer wants and their estimates on the most efficient
allocation o f resources. Mises explained:
Each authoritarian interference with business diverts production, o f course,
from the lines it would take if it were only directed by the demand o f the
consumer as manifested on the market. The characteristic mark o f
restrictive interference with production is that the diversion o f production
is not merely an unavoidable and unintentional secondary effect, but
precisely what the authority wants to bring about... Restrictions o f
production means that the government either forbids or makes more
difficult or more expensive the production, transportation, or distribution
o f definite articles, or the definite modes o f production, transportation, or
distribution... The effect o f the interference is that people are prevented
from using their knowledge and abilities, their labor and their material
means o f production in the way in which they would earn the highest
returns and satisfy their needs as much as possible. Such interference
makes people poorer and less satisfied.14
For example, licenses to practice law or medicine, tax benefits for certain types o f
industries or firms, and labor laws that dictate the certain type o f individuals a firm can
hire are all forms o f production restrictions.15 There are many other types o f ways
governments interfere with the production structure and most, if not all, place higher
costs on production, limitations on innovation and technology, stress on the division o f
labor, and the reallocation o f resources to inefficient uses.16
Taxation, for Mises, may be a necessary evil for the funding o f limited
government functions. But, it should not exceed the minimum levels for the proper
functioning o f government. Otherwise, taxation becomes a means for extortion and

14 Mises, Human Action, 743.
15 Ludwig von Mises, Critique o f Interventionism (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Foundation
for Economic Education, 1996 [1929]), 5-6.
16 Mises, Human Action, 743-48.
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wealth destruction. Taxes can be an attempt for governments to restrict consumption, to
raise revenue, or to expropriate wealth. Import taxes or tariffs, at a modest level, can be
effective in bringing in revenue, but in general they make goods and services more costly,
slow the rate o f capital formation, interfere with technological innovation and
entrepreneurial activity, and reduce the benefits and potential from the international
division o f labor.17
A student o f Mises, Murray Rothbard, further elucidated the Misesian perspective
on intervention and its effect on individual utility:
In the first place, intervention will have direct, immediate consequences
on the utilities o f those participating. On the one hand, when the society is
free and there is no intervention, everyone will always act in the way that
he believes will maximize his utility, i.e., will raise him to the highest
possible position on his value scale. In short, everyone’s utility ex ante
will be “maximized” (provided we take care not to interpret “utility” in a
cardinal manner). Any exchange on the free market, indeed any action in
the free society, occurs because it is expected to benefit each party
concerned. If we may use the term “society” to depict the pattern, the
array, o f all individual exchanges, then we may say that the free market
maximizes social utility, since everyone gains in utility from his free
actions.. .Coercive intervention, on the other hand, signifies,per se that
the individual or individuals coerced would not have voluntarily done
what they are now being fo rced to do by the intervener. The person who
is coerced into saying or not saying something or into making or not
making an exchange with the intervener or with a third party is having his
actions changed by a threat o f violence. The man being coerced, therefore,
always loses in utility as a result o f the intervention, for his action has
1X
been forcibly changed by its impact.
Intervention, accordingly, coercively gives benefits to one set o f individuals at the
expense o f another.19

17 Ibid., 737-42.
IX

Italics are original. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, 878-79.

19 Ibid., 880.
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In sum, it has been demonstrated that, absent coercive intervention, the
unhampered market always maximizes ex ante social utility and always tends to
maximize ex post social utility as well. Governmental and political intervention, on the
other hand, has no mechanism for maximizing individual subjective utility. “The
political process inherently tends to delay and thwart the realization o f expected gains,”
Rothbard explained, “So that the divergence in ex post results between free market and
intervention is greater than in ex ante, anticipated utility.”20 Individuals act when they
subjectively believe they will gain from such action. This anticipation can not be
enforced, said Rothbard, “ ...the free market benefits every participant.”21
For businesses in the post-industrial economy, government intervention creates
unnecessary hurdles to starting and operating a business. This brief look into the effects
o f government intervention sets forth a rationale for evaluating regulatory climate as an
influence on post-industrial revitalization. The next section will compare the regulatory
burden placed on firms within each city to measure the ease o f doing business.

REGULATORY INDEX
Start-ups and small firms form the foundation for employment growth and
economic activity in urban areas. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA)
estimated that small firms employed almost half o f all private-sector employees and
created 64% o f net new jobs from 1993 to 2010.22 Above, I discussed the implications o f

20 Ibid., 891.
21 Ibid.
Brian Headd, "An Analysis o f Small Business and Jobs," (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Small Business Administration, Office o f Advocacy, March 2010), 10.
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government intervention into the economy. Regulations place particular strain, however,
on small businesses because their margins o f return are much smaller than those o f large
corporations. Thus, regulations create disincentives for smaller firms and entrepreneurs.
Where higher regulation abounds, economic activity will tend to be more restrained.
To evaluate the regulatory burden across cities, I create an index that measures
smaller firms’ difficulties associated with different areas o f business regulation. The
index follows the same methodological framework as the U.S. Chamber o f Commerce
Foundation’s 2014 Regulatory Climate Index.

This index, in turn, borrowed its

structure from the World Bank’s 2014 Doing Business report, which examines the ease of
doing business in different countries.24 The shortcoming o f the Regulatory Climate Index
is the omission o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, which opened the opportunity to
apply its methodology to the three cases. The index developed below considers four
areas o f regulation across Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh: starting a business, dealing
with construction permits, registering property, and paying taxes. The index measures
these regulation areas by assessing the number o f procedures, time (in days) to comply
with the requirement, and the costs and required fees paid to the government or providers
o f the service.

23 "Enterprising Cities: Regulatory Climate Index 2014," U.S. Chamber o f Commerce
Foundation, at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/regulatory-climate-index-2014section-i.
24 World Bank Group, "Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small and
Medium-Size Enterprises," at http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doingbusiness-2014.
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Assumptions
Not all firms follow the same regulatory standards and pay the same fees. Thus,
there are a number o f assumptions in the areas o f regulation that the index uses to
calculate fees and requirements.

These are:

Starting a Business
Definition: Required procedures, time, and costs for proprietors to acquire
all mandatory licenses and permits from city and state offices to
begin operations.
Parameters: The firm is an LLC (limited liability company), which has
multiple owners, 20 employees, and provides professional services.
First year revenues were $4 million, and the firm does not qualify
for special economic assistance.
Weights o f Measurement: 15% procedures; 35% time; 50% required fees

Dealing with Construction Permits
Definition: Required procedures, time, and costs for proprietors to acquire
all mandatory permits from city and state offices to begin
construction o f a small commercial building.
Parameters: The building is a commercial office with three floors, an area
of 15,000 square feet, and an estimated construction cost o f $3
million. The location o f the building is such that it does not
The Chamber o f Commerce Foundation’s Regulatory Climate Index used these same
parameters for the representative firm. The characteristics are based on U.S. Small
Business Administration classifications and U.S. Census Bureau data for firms. See
"Enterprising Cities: Regulatory Climate Index 2014."
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present a threat to wetlands, require special environmental
precautions, or entail the rerouting o f waterways.
Weights o f Measurement: 15% procedures; 35% time; 50% required fees

Registering Property
Definition: Required procedures, time, and costs for proprietors to compile
and submit mandatory documents to buy a commercial building
and transfer the property title to the buyer’s name.
Parameters: The building does not have special regulatory requirements or
zoning procedures, and its value is $4 million.
Weights o f Measurement: 15% procedures; 35% time; 50% required fees

Paying Taxes
Definition: Required dollar amounts o f taxes paid and number o f
payments per year for business and employment taxes to local and
state governments.
Parameters: The firm provides professional services, has annual revenues
of $4 million, profits are 15%, and labor share is 20%. O f the 20
employees at the firm, ten are single and ten are married.
Weights o f M easurement: 15% number o f payments per year; 85% the
amount o f tax paid

These assumptions are used to determine the appropriate fees, taxes, and
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procedures in each area o f regulation. The following definitions further elucidate the
framework o f the index:
Procedure: Any mandatory interaction between the owners o f a firm and a
government entity to fulfill a requirement. Interactions between
government entities or between firms are not counted as procedures.
Similarly, interactions between a firm and a third party on the behalf o f the
firm, such as an attorney, are not counted as procedures. An interaction
between a third party and a government entity is counted as one procedure.
Procedures exclusive to particular industries are excluded from this
measure.

Time: Number o f business days it takes to complete a mandatory procedure.
Each procedure counts as at least one business day. Time includes
processing and waiting duration until the firm’s receipt o f final
notification. If there is a choice o f faster-processing, it is assumed that the
firm will choose the quickest option.

Costs: Mandatory fees paid to government entities, in U.S. dollars. Legal,
professional, and other third-party service fees are not included, unless
required by law.

Taxes: Tax amounts in U.S. dollars and number o f payments required by local
and state governments. These taxes include corporate income tax,
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employment tax, operating tax, and license tax.26
The next section outlines the construction o f the regulatory index and normalization o f
the scores.

Calculating the Scores
This regulatory index ultimately seeks to rank the three cities by degree o f
regulatory burden. They are ranked according to the average score o f all four areas of
business regulation in each city. The scores for each area o f business regulation are
determined by weighing the normalized values o f procedures, time, and costs. In each
area, the cities are ranked ordinally in each component, normalized, and averaged 27 To
normalize, each component is measured against the lowest regulatory burden with the
following formula:

100 x

(Maximum - Individual Perform ance )
-------------------. . . ., ----------(Maximum —Minimum)

“Maximum” is the highest value o f the component, “minimum” is the lowest, and
“individual performance” is the value o f the individual city. At least one city will always
receive a score o f 100, and at least one city will receive a score o f zero. The score o f
each o f the four areas o f business regulation is then calculated by weighing the

26 These definitions and assumptions are adopted from the Chamber o f Commerce
Foundation’s Regulatory Climate Index at
http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/regulatory-climate-index-2014-section-i.
27 The World Bank uses this calculation. World Bank Group, "Ease o f Doing Business
and Distance to Frontier," (2014), at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/distance-tofrontier.; "Enterprising Cities: Regulatory Climate Index 2014."
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normalized values o f procedures, time, and costs o f regulation in each city. Next, the
score o f business regulation in each city is calculated by averaging the scores o f each o f
the four areas o f business regulation. Finally, the scores o f business regulation are ranked
ordinally. The higher the ordinal ranking, the lower the regulatory burden is in each city.
An important point to remember about the index is its sole use as an ordinal
ranking device. Because scoring evaluates the percentage distance from highest value,
the index scores can not be added and subtracted as if they are cardinal absolute values.
Suppose, for instance, Pittsburgh’s overall regulatory score is 88.8 and Buffalo’s is 44.4.
The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from these scores is that Pittsburgh has
less o f a regulatory burden than Buffalo. It does not indicate that Pittsburgh is twice as
low as Buffalo’s. The score is meant to be a ranking instrument rather than one that can
scientifically appropriate quantitative values to units o f regulation.
Information about the procedures, time, and costs for the areas o f business
regulation, for the most part, is available on city, county, and state websites. It does,
however, require some searching to determine the exact requirements for business
operations in each municipality. This problem reveals a universal problem for business
owners, that knowledge o f the requirements necessary for doing business is esoteric and
not widely disseminated. A precise quantitative measurement on this general difficulty is
not included in the index, but it reveals the hurdles that firms must go through to do
business.
Table 5.1 details general business characteristics for the cities o f Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in the year o f study, 2013. Buffalo had the lowest population
at 254,945, and Cleveland had the highest population at 390,106. The number o f firms
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followed a similar pattern. Buffalo had 13,674 firms, and Cleveland had 26,208.
Cleveland, conversely, had the lowest per capita income at $17,545, and Pittsburgh had
the highest at $28,176.

Table 5.1: General Business Characteristics, 2013
Population

Per Capita
Income

Number of
Firms

Buffalo

254,945

$20,026

21,800

Cleveland

390,106

$17,545

41,408

Pittsburgh

305,838

$28,176

45,936

City

(Source: “Firm Size Data,” U.S. Small Business Administration, 2011; American
Community Survey, “Selected Economic Characteristics: ACS 1-Year Estimates,” U.S.
Census Bureau, 2013)

These characteristics provide a baseline for the following analysis o f the regulatory index
for these three cities. Next, I will reveal the findings o f the four areas o f regulation for
the cases.

Evaluating the Cities
Starting a Business
The procedures for starting a business are organized into four general categories:
reserve the company’s business name, file the company’s articles o f organization, and
adopt the company’s operating agreement (this also includes checking the availability o f
the firm’s name and incorporating it with the state Secretary o f State); apply for an
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employer identification number (EIN) for tax and employer purposes; register as an
employer with the unemployment insurance division o f the state’s department o f labor;
and comply with any local regulations, including registrations, licenses, and publication
requirements.
Table 5.2 shows the procedures, time, and cost for starting a business in Buffalo.
Seven procedures, eight days, and $1,325 are needed. It takes three procedures that take
four days and $325 to reserve the company’s name, file articles o f organization, and
adopt the operating agreement. The application and confirmation o f an employer
identification number takes an additional two procedures and two days, but is costless.
The biggest hurdle for starting a business in Buffalo is complying with additional
regulations. An outdated law in the State o f New York requires, “Within 120 days,
notice must be published once in each week for six successive weeks, in two newspapers
of the county in which the office o f the limited liability company is located, one
newspaper to be printed weekly and one newspaper to be printed daily.”28 This
burdensome task requires only two procedures and two days to fill out the paperwork for
the newspaper ads, but, it costs around $1,000 to run the ads. This barrier to entry creates
an unnecessary burden on potential and new business owners.

28 New York LLC Law § 206, at
http://www2.erie.gov/clerk/sites/www2.erie.gov.clerk/files/uploads/LEGAL%20PUBLIC
ATIONS%20LIST.pdf
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Table 5.2: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Starting a Business in Buffalo

Phase

Name of Procedure

Procedures

Time

Cost

1.1

Reserve the company's business name,
file the company's articles of
organization, and adopt the company's
operating agreement

3

4

$325

1.2

Apply for EIN for tax and employer
purposes

2

2

$0

1.3

Register as an employer with the
unemployment insurance division o f the
state's department o f labor

0

0

$0

1.4

Comply with any local regulations,
including registrations, licenses, and
publication requirements

2

2

$1,000

7

8

$1,325

TOTALS

(Source: New York State Department o f State, at http://www.dos.ny.gov/index.html)

The next city is Cleveland. Table 5.3 shows the procedures, time, and cost for
starting a business in Cleveland. It takes four procedures, eight days, and $125 to
complete the mandatory steps. To reserve the company’s name, file the company’s
articles o f organization, and adopt the company’s operating agreement, it takes two
procedures, six days, and a $125 fee. To apply for an EIN, two procedures over the
course o f two days are necessary, but the cost is zero. There are no further local and state
requirements, since registering with the unemployment division is bundled in with
registering the firm with the Ohio State Department.
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Table 5.3: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Starting a Business in Cleveland

Phase

1.1

1.2
1.3

1.4

Name of Procedure
Reserve the company's business name,
file the company's articles o f
organization, and adopt the company's
operating agreement
Apply for EIN for tax and employer
purposes
Register as an employer with the
unemployment insurance division o f the
state's department o f labor
Comply with any local regulations,
including registrations, licenses, and
publication requirements

TOTALS

Procedures

Time

Cost

2

6

$125

2

2

$0

0

0

$0

0

0

$0

4

8

$125

{Source: “Filing Forms & Fee Schedule,” Office o f the Ohio Secretary o f State, 2014, at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/business/filingformsfeeschedule.aspx?page=251)

The case o f Pittsburgh is next. Table 5.4 shows the procedures, time, and cost
necessary for starting a business in Pittsburgh. In total, it takes six procedures, six days,
and $140. To reserve the firm’s name, file articles o f organization, and adopt an
operating agreement, two procedures, two days, and $140 are necessary. It takes two
procedures and two days to apply and secure an EIN, but the cost is zero. And it takes
one procedure and one day each to register with the state’s department o f labor and
comply with local regulations. There is no dollar cost o f four o f the six procedures. It is
paid up front in registration fees with the Pennsylvania Secretary o f State.
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Table 5.4: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Starting a Business in Pittsburgh

Phase

1.1

1.2
1.3

1.4

Name of Procedure
Reserve the company's business name,
file the company's articles o f
organization, and adopt the company's
operating agreement
Apply for EIN for tax and employer
purposes
Register as an employer with the
unemployment insurance division o f the
state's department o f labor
Comply with any local regulations,
including registrations, licenses, and
publication requirements

TOTALS

Procedures

Time

Cost

2

2

$140

2

2

$0

1

1

$0

1

1

$0

6

6

$140

(Source: Pennsylvania State Department o f State, at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/department_of_state/12405)

Table 5.5 below compares the procedures, time, cost, and index scores for starting
a business in the three cities. Entrepreneurs have the most difficulty starting a business in
Buffalo. It has the highest number o f procedures, takes the longest time, and is over
$1,000 more expensive than either Cleveland or Pittsburgh. It received a score o f zero
for procedures, time, and cost, which accordingly weighs to zero for the total score in
starting a business. Cleveland, conversely, has the lowest number o f procedures, takes
the shortest time, and is least expensive. It ranks highest in procedures, time, and cost,
thus receiving a score o f 100. Pittsburgh finished in the middle for procedures, time, cost,
and weighted score. Pittsburgh received a score o f 33.3 for procedures, 50.0 for time,
and 98.8 for cost. Its weighted score for starting a business is 71.9.
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Table 5.5: Total Procedures, Time, Cost, and Index Scores for Starting a Business
in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
Procedures (15%)

Time (35%)

Cost (50%)
Score

U of
Procedures

Score

#of
Days

Score

Cost

Score

Buffalo

7

0.0

8

0.0

$1,325

0.0

0.0

Cleveland

4

100.0

4

100.0

$125

100.0

100.0

Pittsburgh

6

33.3

6

50.0

$140

98.8

71.9

In terms o f starting a business, Cleveland has the lowest regulatory burden,
Pittsburgh has the second lowest, and Buffalo has the highest. Buffalo entrepreneurs are
burdened particularly by the state law on publishing an ad in the newspaper about the
firm’s forthcoming opening. The main difference between Cleveland and Pittsburgh are
the number o f procedures and the time it takes to complete them. The next section
evaluates the second area o f regulation: dealing with construction permits.

Dealing with Construction Permits
In building a new place o f business, entrepreneurs must navigate local and state
permit processes. This second area o f regulation evaluates the procedures, time, and cost
o f pre-construction and post-construction requirements. Pre-construction procedures
include submitting zoning plans and environmental protection plans to the city planning
department and submitting building code compliance forms to and requesting and
obtaining building permits from local departments o f buildings. These are typically
lengthy procedures and have hefty per-square-foot fees for permits. The post
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construction procedures include final on-site zoning inspections and approvals by the city
planning department and final electrical, mechanical, plumbing, and grading inspections
from the department o f buildings. As with scoring for starting a business, the procedures,
time, and cost are added and normalized.
Table 5.6 shows the procedures, time, and cost for firms dealing with construction
permits in Buffalo. The pre-construction phase takes seven procedures over the span o f
52 days and costs $21,725. It takes two procedures and 11 days to develop and submit a
zoning plan and an environmental protection form to the city planning department. The
required fees total $1,350. To request and obtain approval and permits from the
department o f buildings, it takes five procedures, 41 days, and $20,375. The post
construction phase takes seven procedures over seven days and $220. There are seven
required procedures for completing post-construction on-site inspections that take seven
days and an inspector’s fee o f $220. In total, there are 14 procedures that take 59 days
and $21,945.
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Table 5.6: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Dealing with Construction Permits
in Buffalo

Phase

Procedures

Time

Cost

Pre-Construction

7

52

$21,725

2.1.1

Department o f Planning

2

11

$1,350

2.1.2

Department o f Buildings: Codes and
Permits

5

41

$20,375

Post-Construction

7

7

$220

2.2.1

Department o f Planning

2

2

$220

2.2.2

Department o f Buildings: Inspections

5

5

$0

14

59

$21,945

2.1

2.2

Name of Procedure

TOTALS

(Source: City o f Buffalo Department o f Permit and Inspection Services, at
http://www.city-buffalo.com/Home/City_Departments/EDPIS)

The procedures, time, and cost for firms dealing with construction permits in
Cleveland are shown below in Table 5.7. Prior to construction, nine procedures, 51 days,
and $33,150 are required. Submitting the zoning plan to the planning department
requires two steps and takes two days. Submitting building code compliance forms and
obtaining permits from the department o f buildings entails seven procedures, 49 days,
and $33,000. The pre-construction fees cover much o f the post-construction procedural
costs. Post-construction inspections take an additional four procedures and eight days.
An additional $125 fee per inspection is also due, totaling $500. In total, entrepreneurs
engaging in new construction in Cleveland must navigate 13 different procedures over 59
days at a cost o f $33,650.
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Table 5.7: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Dealing with Construction Permits
in Cleveland

Phase

Name of Procedure

Procedures

Time

Cost

Pre-Construction

9

51

$33,150

2.1.1

Department o f Planning

2

2

$150

2.1.2

Department of Buildings: Codes and
Permits

7

49

$33,000

Post-Construction

4

8

$500

2.2.1

Department o f Planning

0

0

$0

2.2.2

Department o f Buildings: Inspections

4

8

$500

13

59

$33,650

2.1

2.2

TOTALS

(Source: City o f Cleveland Department o f Building & Housing, at
http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/CityofCleveland/Home/Govemment/CityAgencies/Build
ingHousing)

Table 5.8 below details the procedures, time, and cost for firms dealing with
construction permits in Pittsburgh. The entire pre-construction process entails seven
procedures, 81 days, and a cost o f $11,936. There is only one procedure to submit a
zoning plan, but it takes about 45 days to obtain approval. It also costs $1,750. Further,
obtaining the necessary permits sends entrepreneurs through six more procedures over 32
days at a cost o f $ 10,186. The post-construction phase takes an additional four
procedures over a span o f four days. The fees for this inspection process are incorporated
in the pre-construction cost. In total, entrepreneurs in Pittsburgh are required to fulfill 11
procedures over 81 days at a cost o f $ 11,936.
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Table 5.8: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Dealing with Construction Permits
in Pittsburgh

Procedures

Time

Cost

Pre-Construction

7

81

$11,936

2.1.1

Department o f Planning

1

45

$1,750

2.1.2

Department of Buildings: Codes and
Permits

6

32

$10,186

Post-Construction

4

4

$0

2.2.1

Department o f Planning

1

1

$0

2.2.2

Department o f Buildings: Inspections

3

3

$0

11

81

$11,936

Phase
2.1

2.2

Name of Procedure

TOTALS

(Sources: City of Pittsburgh Bureau o f Building Inspection, at
http ://pittsburghpa. gov/bbi/permits)

The comparison o f the three cities’ procedures, time, cost, and index scores is
detailed in Table 5.9. Pittsburgh has the lowest number o f procedures in dealing with
construction permits, receiving a score o f 100. Buffalo has the highest number of
procedures, receiving a score o f zero. Buffalo and Cleveland share the lowest number of
days, each with 59. They both received a score o f 100, and Pittsburgh, taking an extra 22
days to complete procedures, received a score o f zero. Cleveland has the highest cost in
dealing with permits at $33,650, receiving a score o f zero. Pittsburgh has the lowest cost
at $11,936, receiving a score o f 100. For the final weighted scores in this area o f
regulation, Pittsburgh has the best score at 65.0, Buffalo is next at 62.0, and Cleveland
has the worst at 40.0. Pittsburgh, therefore, has the lowest regulatory burden in dealing
with construction permits.
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Table 5.9: Total Procedures, Time, Cost, and Index Scores for Firms Dealing with
Construction Permits in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
Procedures (15%)

Time (35%)

Cost (50%)
Score

ft of
Procedures

Score

ft of Days

Score

Cost

Score

Buffalo

14

0.0

59

100.0

$21,945

53.9

62.0

Cleveland

13

33.3

59

100.0

$33,650

0.0

40.0

Pittsburgh

11

100.0

81

0.0

$11,936

100.0

65.0

This second area o f regulation has dealt with the permit procedure for building a
structure for a new firm. The third area evaluates the burden associated with obtaining
ownership o f pre-existing structures.

Registering Property
While the requirements associated with new construction can be onerous, buying
and registering pre-existing physical structures and property can be just as difficult. The
procedures involved in registering property include requesting and obtaining a title report,
which often includes the requirement to purchase title insurance policies; transferring the
title to the business owner, which often includes paying a sizable real estate transfer tax;
title recording; and additional procedures such as paying supplementary fees and taxes
and filing auxiliary forms. The procedures and time for registering property are often not
as burdensome as the dollar cost o f doing so.
Table 5.10 below details the procedures, time, and cost for firms registering
property in Buffalo. Obtaining a title report in Buffalo entails two procedures, three days,
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and $14,094. The large cost is associated with purchasing a title insurance policy. The
title transfer takes only one procedure and one day, but it costs $16,000. Further, there
are two procedures for title recording over a period o f two days at a cost o f $30,125. In
total, registering property in Buffalo entails five procedures, six days, and a cost o f
$60,219.

Table 5.10: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Registering Property in Buffalo
Phase

Name of Procedure

Procedures

Time

Cost

3.1

Obtain a Title Report

2

3

$14,094

3.2

Title Transferring

1

1

$16,000

3.3

Title Recording

2

2

$30,125

5

6

$60,219

TOTALS
{Source: Erie County Clerk’s Office, at
http ://www2.erie. go v/clerk/index.php?q-fees#notar)

Table 5.11 below shows the procedures, time, and cost for firms registering
property in Cleveland. Obtaining a title report in Cleveland requires three procedures,
two days, and $5,850. To transfer the title, there is one procedure that takes one day and
a title transfer fee o f $16,000. For title recording, there is one procedure over one day
and a recordation fee o f $60. In total, Cleveland entrepreneurs must navigate through
five procedures over a span o f four days at a cost o f $21,910.
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Table 5.11: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Registering Property in
Cleveland
Phase

Name of Procedure

Procedures

Time

Cost

3.1

Obtain a Title Report

3

2

$5,850

3.2

Title Transferring

1

1

$16,000

3.3

Title Recording

1

1

$60

5

4

$21,910

TOTALS
{Source: Cuyahoga County Office o f the Fiscal Officer, at
http://fiscalofficer.cuyahogacounty.us/)

Finally, Table 5.12 details the procedures, time, and cost for firms registering
property in Pittsburgh. Obtaining a title report takes two procedures, one day, and a fee
o f $162. Transferring the title takes only one procedure and one day, but the title transfer
tax is $120,000. Title recording entails one procedure, one day, and another $162 fee. In
total, the process o f registering property in Pittsburgh takes four procedures, three days,
and $120,324.
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Table 5.12: Procedures, Time, and Cost for Firms Registering Property in
Pittsburgh
Phase

Name of Procedure

Procedures

Time

Cost

3.1

Obtain a Title Report

2

1

$162

3.2

Title Transferring

1

1

$120,000

3.3

Title Recording

1

1

$162

4

3

$120,324

TOTALS
{Source: Allegheny County Department o f Real Estate, at
http://www.alleghenycounty.us/re/realtax.aspx)

The differences in procedures, time, cost, and index scores for firms registering
property in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh are detailed in Table 5.13 below. It shows
the relative uniformity o f procedures and time compared to the wide differences in cost.
Pittsburgh has the lowest procedural burden at four, receiving a score o f 100. Meanwhile,
Buffalo and Cleveland both entail five procedures in registering property, each receiving
scores o f zero. The time it takes to register property in the three cities varies to a greater
degree than the number o f procedures. It takes the longest in Buffalo at six days.
Likewise, it received a score o f zero. Pittsburgh has the shortest time span in which to
register at three days, receiving a score o f 100. The costs varied widely. Cleveland has
the lowest cost at $21,910. Registering property in Pittsburgh is the most expensive,
nearly $100,000 more than Cleveland at $120,324. Accordingly, it received a score o f
zero. Buffalo falls in the middle at $60,219 with a score o f 61.2. The wide margins in
cost largely explain Cleveland’s position as least burdensome for registering property at
73.3. Pittsburgh came next with 50.0, and Buffalo maintains the greatest regulatory
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burden for registering property with 30.6.

Table 5.13: Total Procedures, Time, Cost, and Index Scores for Firms Registering
Property in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh
Procedures (15%)

Time (35%)

Cost (50%)
Score

Score

U of
Days

Score

Cost

Score

5

0.0

6

0.0

$60,219

61.2

30.6

Cleveland

5

0.0

4

66.7

$21,910

100.0

73.3

Pittsburgh

4

100.0

3

100.0

$120,324

0.0

50.0

#of
Procedures
Buffalo

The previous three areas o f regulation evaluated required procedures in starting a
business and acquiring the physical property out o f which the firm will operate, whether
constructing a new building or purchasing it. The next section evaluates the final area o f
regulation, which assesses operational burdens in the form o f taxation.

Paying Taxes
The final area o f regulation in the measure is paying taxes. Three general
categories o f taxes affect local businesses: corporate income taxes at the local and state
levels; employer-paid state unemployment and commuter transportation mobility taxes;
and additional local taxes such as license, disability, employee expense, or franchise
taxes, depending on the state and municipality.
In Buffalo, corporate income, unemployment, and disability taxes affect local
businesses. Corporate taxes are paid each quarter for a total o f $42,600 per year. Firms
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pay employment taxes monthly for an annual total o f $32,800. And, a yearly payment o f
$624 is paid for a state disability insurance tax. Annually, firms make 17 total payments
toward a tax obligation o f $76,024 in Buffalo.

Table 5.14: Procedures, Payments, and Cost for Firms Paying Taxes in Buffalo
Phase

Name of Procedure

Payments/
Year

Statutory
Tax

4.1

Corporate Tax

4

$42,600

4.2

Employment Tax

12

$32,800

4.3

Additional Local Regulations & Procedures

1

$624

TOTALS

17

$76,024

(Source: New York State Department o f Taxation and Finance, at
http://www.tax.ny.gov/; City o f Buffalo Department o f Assessment and Taxation, at
https ://www.ci .buffalo.ny .us/home/c ity d ep artm en ts/assessm en tan d tax atio n d ep artm e
nt)

Table 5.15 details the procedures, payments, and cost for firms paying taxes in
Cleveland. In Cleveland, only two taxes are o f significant relevance for firms: a
commercial activity tax and an employment tax. Cleveland benefits from the absence o f
a corporate income tax in the State o f Ohio. Instead, a much more minimal commercial
activity tax o f $ 1,800 per year replaces it. In addition, the employment tax o f $21,600 is
divided across 12 payments. The annual tax obligation in Cleveland involves 16
payments for a total o f $23,400.
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Table 5.15: Procedures, Payments, and Cost for Firms Paying Taxes in Cleveland
Phase

Name of Procedure

Payments/
Year

Statutory
Tax

4.1

Corporate Tax

4

$1,800

4.2

Employment Tax

12

$21,600

4.3

Additional Local Regulations & Procedures

0

$0

TOTALS

16

$23,400

(Source: Ohio State Department o f Taxation, at http://www.tax.ohio.gov/; City o f
Cleveland Central Collection Agency, at http://www.ccatax.ci.cleveland.oh.us/)

Like Cleveland, firms in Pittsburgh have two significant tax burdens: corporate
income tax and employment tax. Table 5.16 below shows the procedures, payments, and
cost for firms paying taxes in Pittsburgh. The corporate income tax burden is $64,540
annually, divided into four quarterly payments. Like the other cities, the employment tax
is monthly, totaling $29,428. Over the course o f the year, there are 16 payments totaling
$92,968 in tax obligations.
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Table 5.16: Procedures, Payments, and Cost for Firms Paying Taxes in Pittsburgh

Phase

Name of Procedure

Payments/
Year

Statutory
Tax

4.1

Corporate Tax

4

$63,540

4.2

Employment Tax

12

$29,428

4.3

Additional Local Regulations & Procedures

0

$0

TOTALS

16

$92,968

{Source: Pennsylvania State Department o f Labor & Industry, at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?open=512& objID=5278& mode-2; City of
Pittsburgh Department o f Finance, at http://pittsburghpa.gov/finance/home)

Table 5.17 below details the total cost, payments, and index scores for firms
paying taxes in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. O f the three cities, Cleveland has the
lowest tax obligation at $23,400, receiving a score o f 100. Buffalo has the second lowest
at $76,024. And, Pittsburgh has the highest tax obligation at $92,968, receiving a score
o f zero. Firms in both Cleveland and Pittsburgh have 16 payments throughout the year,
tied for the lowest. These cities received scores o f 100. Buffalo, with 17 payments,
received a score o f zero. Overall, Cleveland has the lowest tax burden for businesses
with a score o f 100.0, and Pittsburgh has the greatest with a score o f 15.0. Buffalo falls
in the middle with a score o f 20.7.
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Table 5.17: Total Cost, Payments, and Index Scores for Firms Paying Taxes in
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh

Total Tax (85%)

Time (15%)
Score

Taxes Paid

Score

U of
Payments

Score

Buffalo

$76,024

24.4

17

0

20.7

Cleveland

$23,400

100

16

100

100.0

Pittsburgh

$92,968

0

16

100

15.0

Tax regulations can be seen as the most burdensome intervention for the simple
reason that they are ongoing, rather than single expenses. That Cleveland firms pay
nearly $70,000 less per year in taxes than Pittsburgh makes higher taxation a significant
barrier to entry. The next section will compare overall regulatory procedures, time, cost,
and index scores to generate a ranking o f regulatory climate.

Regulatory Climate
The overall regulatory climate in each city is the average o f the index scores from
each area o f regulation. Before evaluating the averaged index scores and to gain a clearer
picture o f the costs o f doing business in each city, the next three tables below compare
the areas o f regulation and determine the total burden in real figures for each city. Table
5.18 details the total procedures, time, and dollar cost o f doing business in Buffalo.
Paying taxes requires the most procedures at 17, while registering property requires the
least at five. Further, it takes nearly two months to advance through the permit process
and less than a week to register property. In terms o f dollar cost, starting a business is the
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least expensive area o f regulation at $1,325 and paying taxes is the most expensive at
$76,024. Among the four areas o f business regulation, firms must perform 44 procedures
over a span o f 74 days at a total cost o f $ 159,513.

Table 5.18: Regulatory Climate: Total Procedures, Time, and Cost of Doing
Business in Buffalo
Number of
Procedures

Time (Days)

Cost

Starting a Business

7

8

$1,325

Dealing with Construction
Permits

14

59

$21,945

Registering Property

5

6

$60,219

Paying Taxes

17

-

$76,024

43

73

$159,513

Area of Business
Regulation

TOTALS

Table 5.19 below shows the total procedures, time, and dollar cost o f doing
business in Cleveland. Like Buffalo, the most procedures come in paying taxes (16) and
dealing with construction permits (14). Starting a business, however, requires the least
number o f procedures at five. Dealing with construction permits, again like Buffalo,
takes nearly two months, but registering property takes only four days. Unlike Buffalo,
though, the highest dollar cost o f doing business is in dealing with construction permits
($33,650), not paying taxes ($23,400). Overall, in the first year it takes firms in
Cleveland 38 procedures, 71 days, and $79,085.
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Table 5.19: Regulatory Climate: Total Procedures, Time, and Cost o f Doing
Business in Cleveland

Area of Business
Regulation

Number of
Procedures

Time (Days)

Cost

4

8

$125

13

59

$33,650

Registering Property

5

4

$21,910

Paying Taxes

16

-

$23,400

38

71

$79,085

Starting a Business
Dealing with Construction
Permits

'

TOTALS

Finally, Table 5.20 below details the total procedures, time, and cost o f doing
business in Pittsburgh. Like Buffalo and Cleveland, paying taxes requires the most
procedures (16). And like Buffalo, registering property requires the least (4). As with
both cities above, dealing with construction permits requires the most time (81 days), and
registering property requires the least (3). Unlike the other two cities, however, the
greatest cost comes in registering property ($120,324), primarily because o f the high real
estate transfer tax. Starting a business, accordingly, requires the least amount o f expenses
($140). Overall, Pittsburgh firms need to navigate through 37 procedures over a period
o f 90 days at a cost o f $225,368.
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Table 5.20: Regulatory Climate: Total Procedures, Time, and Cost of Doing
Business in Pittsburgh

Area of Business
Regulation

Number of
Procedures

Time (Days)

Cost

Starting a Business

6

6

$140

Dealing with Construction
Permits

11

81

$11,936

Registering Property

4

3

$120,324

Paying Taxes

16

-

$92,968

37

90

$225,368

TOTALS

Among the three cities, all require the most procedures in paying taxes and the
most time in dealing with construction permits. The least number o f procedures for
Cleveland and Pittsburgh comes in registering property, but for Buffalo it comes in
starting a business. For all o f the cities, the least number o f days comes in registering
property. The greatest cost for each, however, differs. The greatest cost for Buffalo
comes in paying taxes, while for Cleveland it is in dealing with construction permits. For
Pittsburgh, the greatest cost comes in registering for property. For all o f the cities, the
lowest dollar cost is in starting a business.
Table 5.21 below summarizes the total procedures, time, and cost o f doing
business in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Overall, the number o f procedures in
doing business is lowest in Pittsburgh at 37 and highest in Buffalo at 44. In terms o f days
spent fulfilling regulatory requirements, Pittsburgh is highest at 90 and Cleveland is
lowest at 71. Finally, in terms o f dollar value o f regulatory cost, Cleveland has the
lowest at $79,085, and Pittsburgh has the highest at $225,368.
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Table 5.21: Regulatory Climate: Total Procedures, Time, and Cost o f Doing
Business in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh

Number of
Procedures

Time (Days)

Cost

Buffalo

44

74

$159,513

Cleveland

38

71

$79,085

Pittsburgh

37

90

$225,368

City

Table 5.22 below compares the total index scores among Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh. These numbers are the average o f the regulation area scores and represent the
overall regulatory climate for each city. Cleveland has the top score in starting a business,
registering property, and paying taxes, while Pittsburgh has the top score in dealing with
construction permits. Buffalo has the second highest score in only one o f the areas o f
regulation: paying taxes. In the other three areas, it has the lowest score. The overall
regulatory climate ranking has Cleveland at the top with a score o f 75.0 and Pittsburgh
second with a score o f 61.0.

Table 5.22: Regulatory Climate: Total Index Scores
Starting a
Business

Dealing with
Construction
Permits

Registering
Property

Paying
Taxes

Overall

Cleveland

100.0

40.0

73.3

100.0

78.3

Pittsburgh

71.9

65.0

50.0

15.0

50.5

Buffalo

0.0

62.0

30.6

20.7

28.3

As a note on clarity, it is worth mentioning that the real estate transfer tax
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measurement presents a limitation to the methodology o f the index. That Pittsburgh has
the highest real estate transfer tax rates than Buffalo and Cleveland may simply reflect
general market demand for property. Thus, the greater the demand for business real
estate the higher the rates o f taxation on that property and on transferring it to new
proprietors. High real estate tax rates may, then, represent a burden, when they may
signal a robust market for property. To account for this bias, I can remove the cost
category from the measure “registering property.” Even when this is done, there is still no
change in city ranking. Cleveland remains the lowest regulatory-burdened city.
Moreover, this section evaluates each city using data on current regulations. The
absence o f a longitudinal look at the patterns o f regulatory burden over the past ten years
is another limitation to the regulatory index. Data simply do not exist to calculate index
scores for this time period. But, the nature o f the procedures examined bear an
unchanging nature. For example, under “starting a business,” it takes Pittsburgh two
separate procedures to register a firm name with the Secretary o f State. In Buffalo and
Cleveland, this process is combined into one procedure. This difference is based on
internal administrative procedure which is unlikely to change drastically from year to
year. As an educated assumption, we can use this index measure as a relative constant
for at least the past ten years.
The previous chapter demonstrated the post-industrial and economic superiority
o f Pittsburgh, and this chapter has thus far shown the importance o f institutions and
prudent, liberal public economic policy. Why then does Pittsburgh have the most
advanced post-industrial economy despite Cleveland’s better regulatory climate? The
answer may lie in other forms o f public policy. Regulatory burden for firms is one side
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o f the story. The other side evaluates the extent to which individuals as consumers find it
easy to live in a particular city. The next section assesses the tax burden placed on
individuals as well as the overall cost o f living in each city.

TAX BURDEN AND COST OF LIVING
Public policies that make doing business easy in a city certainly aid economic
development. But, it is not the whole picture o f governmental intervention. Individuals
must have the disposable income to enjoy the goods and services produced in a particular
locale. This section assesses the tax burden applied to individuals as well as the cost of
living in each city. This measure explains the attraction or disincentive to live in a
particular city.
The most significant tax burdens on individuals are income, property, and sales
taxes. To calculate the total tax obligations, I make a few assumptions about income,
property, and sales purchases. These assumptions are based on the annual Bureau o f
Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Report.29 Household income is $75,000, property
value is $250,000, and purchases subject to sales tax are $55,000 for Cleveland and
Buffalo at $40,000 for Pittsburgh. The purchases subject to sales tax for Pittsburgh are
lower because sales tax is not applied to general food, clothing, and shelter. Items
exempt from the tax include “food (not ready-to-eat); candy and gum; most clothing;
textbooks; computer services; pharmaceutical drugs; sales for resale; and residential

"Economic News Release: Consumer Expenditures—2013," U.S. Department o f Labor,
Bureau o f Labor Statistics, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cesan.nrO.htm.

188
heating fuels such as oil, electricity, gas, coal, and firewood.”
applied to all other purchases as in New York

and Ohio,

ID

Otherwise, sales tax is

such as tangible personal

property and services. The taxes listed below do not include federal income taxes or
deductions.
Table 5.23 below details the income, property, and sales taxes in Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Buffalo and Cleveland have similar income tax obligations at
5.6% and 5.7%, respectively. Pittsburgh has a much lower income tax at 3.07%. Given
the assumptions, households in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh are subject to annual
tax obligations o f $4,185, $4,275, and $2,303, respectively. For property taxes, Buffalo
has the lowest at 2.19% with an annual obligation o f $5,475. Pittsburgh has the next
lowest at 2.219% with a burden o f $5,548. Cleveland has the highest property tax rate o f
2.8%, making the tax obligation $7,000 for the year. Pittsburgh has the lowest sales tax
rate at 7.0%. By law, the Pennsylvania sales tax rate is actually six percent, but an extra
one percent is added to purchases made in Allegheny County.33 Thus, the yearly
obligation is $2,800. Cleveland’s sales tax is 8.0% and Buffalo’s is 8.8%, each owing
$4,400 and $4,813, respectively. Annually, Pittsburgh households pay the least in taxes,
$10,650 for a 14.2% burden. Buffalo households pay the next lowest amount at $14,473

30 "Sales, Use and Hotel Occupancy Tax," Pennsylvania Department o f Revenue, at
http://www.revenue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/Tax%20Types%20and%20Informati
on/Pages/Sales-Use-and-Hotel-Occupancy-Tax.aspx#.VEZtv4vDVbN.
31 "Sales and Use Tax," New York State Department o f Taxation and Finance, at
http://www.tax.ny.gov/bus/st/stidx.htm.
32 "Sales & Use Tax," Ohio Department o f Taxation, at
http://www.tax.ohio.gov/sales_and_use.aspx.
33 "Sales, Use and Hotel Occupancy Tax."
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for a 19.3% burden. Cleveland has the highest total burden at $15,675, paying 20.9% o f
total annual income.

Table 5.23: Individual Tax Burden: Income, Property, and Sales Taxes in Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh

Income

Property

Sales

City

Percent Total
Burden Burden

Rate

Burden

Rate

Burden

Rate

Burden

Buffalo

5.6%

$4,185

2.19%

$5,475

8.8%

$4,813

19.3%

$14,473

Cleveland

5.7%

$4,275

2.8%

$7,000

8.0%

$4,400

20.9%

$15,675

Pittsburgh

3.07%

$2,303

2.219%

$5,548

7.0%

$2,800

14.2%

$10,650

(Sources: “ Sales & Use Tax,” Ohio Department o f Taxation, at
http://www.tax.ohio.gov/sales_and_use.aspx; “Community Tax Rates,” Cuyahoga
County Treasurer, at http://treasurer.cuyahogacounty.us/en-US/community-taxrates.aspx; “Village Tax Rates,” Erie County Real Property Tax Services, at
http://www2.erie.gov/ecrpts/; “Property Tax Worksheet,” Office o f the Mayor, City o f
Pittsburgh, at http://pittsburghpa.gov/property-tax-worksheet/; “Current Tax Rates,”
Pennsylvania Department o f Revenue, at
http://www.revenue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/Current%20Tax%20Rates/Pages/def
ault.aspx#.VEZrzIvDVbN; “State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2014,” Tax Foundation,
at http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2014)

These tax rates offer at least a partial explanation for the dichotomy between
economic development and regulatory burden. Pittsburgh has a 32.1% lower tax burden
than Cleveland, indicating a less interventionist local government on individuals. The
lower tax burden enables households to use more o f their incomes in ways they
subjectively see fit.
Another measure that can offer a picture o f the attraction o f residing in either
Buffalo, Cleveland, or Pittsburgh is cost o f living. It does not directly evaluate
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governmental intervention or institutional capacity, but it does buttress the ease-of-living
argument above. The cost o f living measure used below is the Cost o f Living Index
published each quarter by the Council for Community and Economic Research. It
measures relative price levels for consumer goods and services. The index is read as a
percentage o f the average o f all 302 metropolitan areas evaluated. Table 5.24 below
shows the cost o f living index for the second quarter o f 2014, which is the most recent
data available. The top row shows the weights given to each item. The heaviest weights
go to miscellaneous goods and services and housing at 33.01% and 26.05%, respectively.
The index shows Pittsburgh with the lowest cost o f living and Cleveland with the highest.
Grocery items in Cleveland are well above the national average at 106.6, and grocery
items in Buffalo are well below at 94.9. Further, housing is relatively expensive in
Buffalo at 107.7 and relatively cheap in Pittsburgh at 84.7. Unfortunate for Cleveland
and Pittsburgh is the high cost o f utilities at 105.9 and 107.7, respectively. Utilities in
Buffalo, however, are well below the national average. Transportation is more expensive
than the national average across the cities, Pittsburgh having the highest at 106.1. Health
care expenses are notably inexpensive in Buffalo and Pittsburgh at 90.8 and 94.9,
respectively, but exceptionally high in Cleveland at 111.3. For miscellaneous goods and
services, Cleveland has slightly higher than average prices at 102.7, and Buffalo has
slightly lower than average prices at 98.4. Pittsburgh is well below at 95.9. Overall, the
Pittsburgh’s cost o f living index score is well below the national average at 95.6,
Buffalo’s is just below at 97.2, and Cleveland’s is just above at 102.2.
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Table 5.24: Cost of Living Index, Second Quarter 2014

100%

13.48%

Index

Grocery
Items

Buffalo

97.2

Cleveland
Pittsburgh

MSA

26.05%

9.95%

12.63%

4.89%

33.01%

Housing

Utilities

Trans
portation

Health
Care

Misc.
Goods
and
Services

94.9

107.7

95.8

102.1

90.8

98.4

102.2

106.6

95.8

105.9

102.7

111.3

102.7

95.6

97.0

84.7

107.7

106.1

94.9

95.9

(Source: “Cost o f Living Index: Comparative Data for 302 Urban Areas, Second Quarter
2014,” Council for Community and Economic Research)

These price indices, however, are only for the most recent quarter. To gain an
understanding o f the long term changes in prices and cost o f living, Table 5.25 shows the
average cost of living index per year from 2000 to 2014 for Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh. Figure 5.1 below gives a graphical representation o f the patterns o f cost of
living changes. In 2000 and 2001, Cleveland had the highest cost o f living at 109.9 and
109.3 and Buffalo had the lowest at 100.2 and 103.7. Buffalo had the second lowest cost
o f living between 2002 and 2004 and had the highest cost o f living from 2005 to 2008.
Since 2009, Buffalo has had the second lowest cost o f living, with Cleveland having the
highest. Buffalo’s average index score for the past five years is 98.5, and its ten-year
average is 98.9, just below the national average.
With the exception o f 2005-2008, Cleveland has had the highest cost o f living. It
fell from 109.9 in 2000 to 97.9 in 2006, rose slightly in 2007 to 98.9, and fell to a 14-year
low in 2008 at 96.2. Since then, Cleveland’s cost o f living rose to 101.1 in 2010 and has
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remained at that general level since. Cleveland’s average for the past five years is 101.0,
and its ten-year average is 99.6, just below the national average.
Since 2002, Pittsburgh has had the lowest cost o f living, tying Cleveland at 98.9
in one year, 2007. There was a sharp drop in Pittsburgh’s cost o f living from 2000 to
2005, from 107.7 to 93.0. From 2005 to 2007, Pittsburgh’s cost o f living rose in
accordance with the housing boom from 93.0 to 98.9. It fell afterward until 2010, when it
hit a 14-year low at 91.6. It rose slightly in 2011 to 94.8 and has hovered around this
level since. Pittsburgh’s cost o f living has remained below the national average since
2002. Its average for the past five years is 94.0, and the ten-year average is 94.2, both
well below the national average.
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Table 5.25: Cost o f Living Index, Average Per Year, 2000-2014

Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

2000

100.2

109.9

107.7

2001

103.7

109.3

105.1

2002

100.2

104.8

98.0

2003

101.3

102.8

96.9

2004

98.8

105.6

96.7

2005

100.1

99.2

93.0

2006

102.2

97.9

96.0

2007

101.4

98.9

98.9

2008

96.4

96.2

92.6

2009

96.5

98.7

92.1

2010

96.6

101.1

91.6

2011

98.6

101.4

94.8

2012

98.5

101.6

94.5

2013

99.5

100.1

93.9

2014*

99.4

100.7

95.0

Avg 5 Yrs

98.5

101.0

94.0

Avg 10 Yrs

98.9

99.6

94.2

(Source: “Cost o f Living Index: Comparative Data for 302 Urban Areas, 2000-2014,”
Council for Community and Economic Research)
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Figure 5.1: Cost of Living Index, Average Per Year, 2000-2014
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(Source: “Cost o f Living Index: Comparative Data for 302 Urban Areas, 2000-2014,”
Council for Community and Economic Research)

The above tax rates and cost o f living patterns demonstrate the financial benefits
o f residing in Pittsburgh relative to Cleveland and Buffalo. The overall tax rates and
overall cost o f living are significantly lower in Pittsburgh, even as the costs o f utilities
and transportation remain well above the national average. The next section will explain
the implications o f the tax burden and cost o f living in relation to the findings o f the
regulatory burden analysis above.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter began by hypothesizing that levels o f post-industrial development
among Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh correlate positively with institutional
regulatory burden. The null hypothesis, then, is that there is no positive correlation
between levels o f post industrial development and institutional regulatory burden. Since
Pittsburgh’s economy has been the greatest performing economy, outpacing Cleveland
and Buffalo, I expected to find that the regulatory burden would be lowest in Pittsburgh
and highest in Buffalo. The results were mixed. The regulatory index reveals Cleveland
with the lowest regulatory burden, yet an analysis o f taxation and prices for goods and
services for individuals reveals Pittsburgh as having the lowest cost o f living.
The analysis first discussed the liberal institutionalist interpretation o f the proper
role o f government. The only legitimate and economically optimal functions of
government are those absolutely necessary to protect private property rights.
Government intervention beyond this minimal requirement necessarily distorts
production processes away from efficiency and serving the wants and needs o f
individuals. Two o f the prominent ways in which local governments impede the market
process are through regulation and taxation. Thus, the chapter has focused on examining
the regulatory and tax burden that disincentivize doing business and living in the cities o f
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh.
The regulatory index measured the number o f procedures, time, and cost o f
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, and paying
taxes. Cleveland received the highest score in starting a business, entailing the lowest
number o f procedures, shortest time, and lowest cost. Buffalo had the lowest score.
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Under dealing with permits, Pittsburgh received the highest score. Even though dealing
with permits takes the longest amount o f time in Pittsburgh, it entails the fewest number
o f procedures and cost. Cleveland received the lowest score in this regulatory category.
Pittsburgh had the second best score in registering property, as well, entailing the fewest
procedures and days, but it proved to be much more expensive than either Buffalo or
Cleveland. Cleveland had the best score, and Buffalo had the worst. Finally, under
paying taxes, Cleveland has the lowest tax obligations, and Pittsburgh has the highest.
Overall, the first year o f doing business for a firm is most expensive in Pittsburgh and
least expensive in Cleveland. Cleveland also has the best regulatory index score, Buffalo
has the worst, and Pittsburgh lies in the middle. According to the regulatory index, it is
easiest doing business in Cleveland.
The regulatory index provides a useful framework for present burdens on
businesses. In a world o f full and perfect information, data would be available to conduct
a longitudinal study o f index scores from 1990 until the present. Unfortunately, data
limitations preclude this attempt. Instead, it can be reasonably assumed that these
regulatory polices and levels o f regulatory burden remained relatively steady in the past
ten years.
The other side o f the story involves ease o f living. To balance the study, I
examined individual tax rates and overall cost o f living. When considering income,
property, and sales taxes in each city, I found that Pittsburgh has the best individual tax
environment and Cleveland has the worst. This same pattern exists in the cost o f living
measure: Pittsburgh has the lowest cost o f living, and Cleveland has the highest. If the
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historical patterns remain constant, the cost o f living ranking will remain the same in the
near future.
Given this evidence, the null hypothesis that there is no negative correlation
between levels o f post-industrial development and institutional regulatory burden can be
rejected. Even though it seems Cleveland has the lowest regulatory burden for firms,
Pittsburgh has the lowest regulatory burden for individuals. Since there is no definitive
evidence that rules out the hypothesis, the hypothesis that there is a negative correlation
between levels o f post-industrial development and institutional regulatory burden remains
plausible.
Despite the ambiguous results o f this analysis, it remains clear that formal
institutions play a role in development. Local governments enact policies that either
attract or discourage entrepreneurial activity. In one sense, local and state governments
make Cleveland a more lucrative place to do business. In another sense, it is relatively
difficult to live there. Pittsburgh displays the opposite characteristics. That Pittsburgh
has the greatest development than Cleveland points to alternative explanations than
formal institutions. The next chapter posits the plausibility o f path dependence and prior
diversification as explanations for the differences in post-industrialization among
metropolitan areas.
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CHAPTER VI
PATH DEPENDENCE AND POST-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION
Each o f the three metropolitan areas suffered industrial decline in the 1970s and
1980s, characterized by a significant drop in manufacturing employment. Prior to decline,
manufacturing employment made up a large proportion o f each region’s total
employment. Deindustrialization caused labor dislocation and a decrease in total
employment. Not all cities, however, had the same dependence on industrial
manufacturing. This chapter hypothesizes that a sizeable service sector serves as a
foundation for post-industrialization and may mitigate the negative effects o f shocks to
local economies in a path dependent way. If so, one should observe a positive correlation
between the level o f post-industrial redevelopment and the robustness o f the service
sector prior to deindustrialization. Unemployed workers may be able to find jobs in the
service sector and contribute to its growth. Given that Pittsburgh has the highest levels o f
post-industrialization and Buffalo has the lowest, I expect to find that Pittsburgh had the
largest tertiary sector prior to deindustrialization and Buffalo had the smallest.
This expectation expresses the idea o f path dependence. This chapter begins with
a short discussion o f path dependency. Next, to identify the period o f industrial decline, I
analyze the manufacturing employment decline among the three cities. I then present the
patterns o f tertiary employment as a percentage o f total employment to determine the
relationship between the size o f the service sector before deindustrialization and the
intensity and trajectory o f economic recovery. Finally, total employment and tertiary
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employment growth is evaluated to display the paths and trajectories o f post
industrialism among the three cases. The analysis shows that a strong tertiary sector prior
to deindustrialization coincides with relatively shallow dips, smoother recoveries, and
higher tertiary sector employment growth. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the null
hypothesis— there is no correlation between the size o f the service sector prior to
deindustrialization and levels o f post-industrial redevelopment— can be rejected.

PATH DEPENDENCE
The reasoning behind the hypothesis that the size o f the service sector prior to
deindustrialization will be correlated with a better post-industrial recovery takes its logic
from the insights o f path dependency. Path dependence can explain how a set o f
circumstances has come about because o f decisions made in the past. In other words,
history matters. Margaret Levi put forth a more precise definition than the broad
conception that in some undefined and vague sense that “history matters”:
Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country
or region has started down a track, the costs o f reversal are very high.
There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments o f certain
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal o f the initial choice.
Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same
trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although
it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other— and
essential if the chosen branch dies— the branch on which a climber begins
is the one she tends to follow.1
One pays special attention to five characteristics o f path dependence:

1 Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and
Historical Analysis," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, eds.
Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 28.
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1. Lock-in: One choice or action becomes better than any other because a
sufficient number o f people have already made that choice.
2. High switching costs: Once a pattern o f behavior begins on a path, changing
to another pattern or path entails increasing costs.
3. Positive returns: The more a choice is made or an action is taken, the greater
its benefits.2
4. Asset/labor specificity: Capital goods, including labor, is produced for a
narrow purpose. Transitioning capital to another purpose is difficult and
costly.
5. Sequencing: Initial events cause temporally-linked and causally-tight
deterministic chains o f events that are nearly uninterruptible.
Using path dependence as a causal explanation requires the presence o f at least some o f
these processes in the rise o f the tertiary sector in Pittsburgh and their relative absence in
Cleveland and Buffalo.3
There are also different degrees o f path dependence. The first and most simple
form o f path dependence exists when there is a basic assertion o f an intertemporal
relationship between present conditions and past actions. Margolis and Liebowitz term
this “first degree path dependence:
For example, an individual does not alter his consumption o f housing
services every day in response to changes income or relative prices. Since
one’s exact consumption o f housing is largely determined by a rental or
purchase decision made some time in the past, an observer could not
expect to determine the values o f a consumer's housing consumption today
•y

Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, 112-13.

3 Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study o f Politics,"
American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 253.
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even with full knowledge o f the current values that enter that consumer's
optimization problem. So here we have something that could be called
path dependence. What we have today depends critically on conditions
that prevailed and decisions taken at some time in the past. The
observation that the consumer’s bundle is narrowly wrong, given today’s
income and prices, would not, however, prompt anyone to claim that the
consumer is irrational, nor would it prompt us to discard consumer
rationality as a basis for analysis. In any practical approach to modeling
the consumer’s choice problem, we would recognize the presence o f some
fixed or quasi-fixed factors and the presence o f transaction costs, and
examine the consumer’s action as a rational pursuit o f his interests. Here
we have persistence and perhaps nothing else. The consumer may well
have properly predicted all future prices, incomes, family size
developments, and so on. If so, there is no error or inefficiency.4
The second form details a path dependent process rooted in some imperfect prediction at
some time in the past that resulted in a regrettable state o f affairs in the present. This
“second degree path dependence” occurs when
individuals fail to predict the future perfectly, it is likely that ex
ante efficient decisions may not turn out to be efficient in retrospect. You
may build a house without knowing that five years hence a sewage
treatment plant will be built nearby, lowering property values and the
neighbourhood amenities available. Here the inferiority o f a chosen path is
unknowable at the time a choice is made, but we later recognize that some
alternative path would have yielded greater wealth. In such a situation,
which we have termed second-degree path dependence, there is a
dependence on past conditions that leads to outcomes that are regrettable
and costly to change. We would not have built the house had we known
what was going to transpire. This dependence is not, however, inefficient
in any meaningful sense, given the assumed limitations on knowledge.5
The third form makes the strongest claims. It posits an intertemporal process with
inefficiencies in the path chosen. These inefficiencies could have been remedied by
choosing another path. For example, “You know a sewage plant is going to be built but
build a house nearby anyway since all o f your friends are buying houses there and you
4 Stephen E. Margolis and S.J. Liebowitz, "Path Dependence," University o f Texas
Dallas, at https://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/palgrave/palpd.html.
5 Ibid.

202

value being part o f that neighbourhood. You would rather buy a house away from the
sewage plant, and so would your friends, but you and your friends are somehow unable to
coordinate your actions.”6
The form o f path dependence examined in this chapter is the first and most basic
one, claiming broadly that “history matters.” The data below represent a certain
durability in the patterns o f tertiary sector employment since deindustrialization.

MANUFACTURING AND TERTIARY EMPLOYMENT BEFORE AND AFTER
INDUSTRIAL DECLINE
To evaluate the correlation between the size o f pre-decline tertiary sector and
post-industrial revitalization, I analyze the data on sectoral full- and part-time
employment in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. This section will determine the status
o f tertiary and manufacturing employment prior to and after industrial decline. Figure
6.1 below shows manufacturing jobs as a percentage o f total employment for the three
metropolitan areas and metropolitan United States from 1969 to 2012. Throughout the
period, Pittsburgh had the lowest percentage o f manufacturing employment, and
Cleveland had the highest. In 1969, Pittsburgh manufacturing jobs made up 28.4% of
total employment. That same year, Buffalo’s manufacturing employment made up 31.3%,
and Cleveland’s made up 32.6%. The US average was 23.0%. While manufacturing fell
throughout the period, substantial drops for all three cities began in 1979. The figure
shows a general trend common among the three cases. From 1979 to 1987 a sharp
decline o f manufacturing employment occurred. A slight leveling off occurred in 1987,

6 Ibid.
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followed by a slower decline. After 2000, manufacturing employment dropped
significantly again. In 2012, Pittsburgh’s manufacturing sector made up 6.5% o f total
full- and part-time employment, matching the national metropolitan average. Buffalo’s
was 8.1% and Cleveland’s was 10.0%.
The slight drop between 2000 and 2012 may reflect changes in the ways industrial
employment was calculated and sorted. Beginning in 2001, the Bureau o f Economic
Analysis began classifying industrial sectors using the North American Industrial
Classification System (NAICS) to replace the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
system before 2001. Whereas SIC “manufacturing” roughly translates into the same
NAICS “manufacturing” occupations and industries, not all SIC service-sector
classifications translate precisely. Thus, the statistical evidence between 2000 and 2012
must be interpreted loosely to reflect changes in the bureaucratic management o f labor
statistics. The table in Appendix I details the translations between SIC divisions and
NAICS sectors.
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Figure 6.1: Manufacturing Jobs as Percentage of Total Employment for Buffalo,
Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Metropolitan US, 1969-2012
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(<Source: “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by SIC Industry,
1969-2000” and “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS
Industry, 2001-2012” Bureau o f Economic Analysis)

Figure 6.1 above placed the beginning o f rapid industrial decline in 1979. Figure
6.2 below shows tertiary jobs as a percentage o f total employment before and after 1979.
Throughout both periods, Pittsburgh had the highest percentage o f total employment in
the tertiary sector. For most o f the period prior to 1979, Buffalo had the lowest
proportion o f tertiary jobs. In 1979, Buffalo’s tertiary sector made up 55.3% o f total
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employment and Cleveland’s made up 55.5%. That same year, Pittsburgh’s tertiary
sector was 56.7% o f the total. After 1979, Pittsburgh’s tertiary sector soared to well
above the national average, while Buffalo and Cleveland followed it closely. Another
surge in 2000 saw Cleveland’s tertiary sector rise above the national average and then
even out by 2002. Again, this surge after 2000 may be a result o f the change from SIC to
NAICS industrial classifications. But notably, Buffalo’s increase from 2000 to 2012 was
not as pronounced as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, or the national average. Table 6.2 shows,
then, Pittsburgh’s tertiary sector strength relative to the other cities prior to
deindustrialization and the blossoming o f it after 1979. Cleveland and Buffalo traded
positions numerous times after 1979. But from 2000 to 2012, Cleveland’s tertiary sector
made up a greater proportion o f total employment than Buffalo’s, which is in line with
levels o f post-industrialization. In 2012, Pittsburgh’s tertiary sector made up 77.4% o f
total full- and part-time employment. Cleveland’s was 73.8%, and Buffalo’s was 73.4%.
These proportions are compared to the national metropolitan average o f 74.0%.
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Figure 6.2: Tertiary Jobs as Percentage of Total Employment for Buffalo, Cleveland,
Pittsburgh, and Metropolitan US, 1969-2012
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1969-2000” and “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS
Industry, 2001-2012” Bureau o f Economic Analysis)

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 above showed that Pittsburgh had the lowest proportion of
manufacturing full- and part-time employment prior to deindustrialization and maintained
that trend throughout the post-industrial period. While Cleveland has maintained the
largest proportion o f manufacturing jobs, it had a larger tertiary sector than Buffalo in
1979 and has retained that position since 2000. This cursory connection between tertiary
sector robustness and post-industrial development invites further analysis on the
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cushioning effect o f a large tertiary sector on the eve o f industrial decline. The next
section will explore the effects o f a burgeoning tertiary sector on post-industrial
employment recovery.

TERTIARY SECTOR EFFECTS ON POST-INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY
The size o f each region’s tertiary sector prior to industrial decline served as a
foundation for the trajectory of post-industrial development. Figure 6.3 below shows the
percent employment change since 1969 for Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. Two
patterns are noticeable in this graph. First, the size o f tertiary sectors prior to
deindustrialization is correlated with employment growth. From 1969 to 2012,
Pittsburgh’s employment grew 26.25%, whereas Cleveland’s grew 17.28%, and
Buffalo’s grew 13.27%. The figure also shows generally the highest peaks for Pittsburgh
and the lowest for Buffalo. Second, a correlation exists between the size o f tertiary
sectors prior to deindustrialization and the severity o f economic downturns. All three
cities saw employment plummet from 1979 to 1983. Pittsburgh’s employment fell to
-1.44% o f the 1969 level. Cleveland’s fell to -3.01%. And Buffalo’s fell to -5.79% in
1983. Pittsburgh shows a slower recovery after 1983, but it was smoother and less
interrupted. Buffalo’s recovery was steady from 1986 until around 1989, in line with
Pittsburgh’s. Buffalo’s employment level, however, relatively stagnated from 1990 until
2012. Cleveland had the most robust recovery from 1983 to 1990. In the early 1990s,
however, the figure shows a relatively minor decline for Pittsburgh and a more
pronounced one for Cleveland. This same trend occurs in the early 2000s and from 2008
to 2010. Cleveland’s employment figures throughout the period show rapid growth but
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sharp declines during economic downturns. Pittsburgh’s employment pattern is
characterized by relatively slower but steadier growth and greater insulation from
employment declines. Buffalo’s post-industrial recovery from 1983 to 1990 showed
strong growth in line with Pittsburgh’s and Cleveland’s, but from 1990 to 2012, job
growth was only 3.82%. Figure 6.3 therefore displays the correlation between size of
tertiary sectors in 1969 among the cities and the measures o f employment growth and
economic shock insulation.
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Figure 6.3: Percent Employment Change Since 1969 for Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh
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1969-2000” and “Regional Statistics: Full-Time and Part-Time Employment by NAICS
Industry, 2001-2012” Bureau o f Economic Analysis)

The size o f tertiary sectors in 1969 also initiated a path dependent positive
feedback mechanism. The tertiary sector assumes a higher trajectory the larger the sector
is prior to deindustrialization, and a lower trajectory characterizes the smaller the sector
in 1969. Figure 6.4 below shows the change in total tertiary employment since 1969 for
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. From 1969 until 1979, tertiary sectors across the
cities grew at similar intensities. During this time, Pittsburgh’s tertiary sector grew

210
18.36%, Cleveland’s grew 17.53%, and Buffalo’s grew 18.65%. Pittsburgh, however,
was the only city to grow its tertiary sector during the sharp manufacturing decline in
1979-1983. Pittsburgh’s tertiary employment grew 1.77% during this time. Buffalo and
Cleveland had tertiary job growth o f -2.22% and -1.83%, respectively. From 1979 until
2012, Pittsburgh maintained the highest rates o f tertiary job growth. From 1979 until
1995, Cleveland had the lowest rates o f tertiary job growth. Buffalo maintained the
lowest from 1995 until 2012, with the exceptions o f 2010 and 2011. Like the total
employment figures above in Figure 6.3, Buffalo experienced steady tertiary job growth
from 1983 until 1990, when it began to slow. Cleveland’s tertiary job growth stagnated
beginning in 2001, continuing until 2012 and allowing Buffalo’s trend to catch up.
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Figure 6.4: Change in Total Tertiary Employment Since 1969 for Buffalo, Cleveland,
and Pittsburgh
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To gain a clearer understanding o f the path dependent trajectory o f tertiary sector
growth, Figure 6.5 below shows the same tertiary patterns with linear regression lines.
Even though Buffalo’s and Cleveland’s tertiary growth patterns interweave throughout
the period, the figure shows Cleveland on a higher trajectory o f growth than Buffalo. On
average Cleveland’s yearly tertiary job growth throughout the period is 1.9%, and
Buffalo’s is 1.7%. Pittsburgh’s average annual tertiary job growth since 1969 is the
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highest at 2.2%. These trajectories o f tertiary job growth correlate with the size o f
tertiary sectors prior to manufacturing decline.

Figure 6.5: Percent of Total Tertiary Employment Change Since 1969 for Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh with Trend Lines
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
At least one causal explanation for the resilience o f the Pittsburgh economy in the
post-industrial era is its ability to maintain its steel-making expertise despite losing its
steel-making capacity. Treado (2010) demonstrated that this expertise formed the
foundation o f Pittsburgh’s post-industrial role as a prime participant in the global steel
value chain. Treado argued, “Pittsburgh’s ability to maintain a key position within the
global steel industry, without maintaining a sizeable base o f steel productive capacity,
provides a valuable case study o f the complex relationship between path dependence and
regional resilience.”7 Where as Chinitz suggested that Pittsburgh’s lock-in path
dependence o f steel-making would spell disaster o f steel left the region,8 Martin and
Sunley demonstrated that a traditional regional industrial path can be beneficial and serve
as a basis for successful economic transformation.9 Thus, an industrial past can create
conditions for regional resilience.
Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh shared in their dependencies on the steel
industry, but Pittsburgh was more successful in rescuing “several key elements o f its
traditional industrial base in order to become a global player in technology-based industry.
The case o f the Pittsburgh region represents a particularly striking example o f regional
resilience in that Pittsburgh has been able to maintain its participation in the global steel
value chain despite suffering the most dramatic losses o f steel-making capacity in the

7 Carey Durkin Treado, "Pittsburgh's Evolving Steel Legacy and the Steel Technology
Cluster," Cambridge Journal o f Regions, Economy and Society 3 (2010): 105.
8 Benjamin Chinitz, "Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and Pittsburgh," Papers and
Proceedings o f the American Economic Association (1961).
9 Martin and Sunley, "Path Dependence and Regional Economic Evolution."
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United States.” 10 In addition, Pittsburgh excels at producing steel technology and is the
center o f steel technology supply. Treado observed the largest concentration o f
intermediate supplier firms in Pittsburgh. The metropolitan area even has more suppliers
to the steel industry than the Chicago-Gary and Cleveland regions combined.11 The
products and services offered include production machinery and equipment; engineering
and consulting services that assist mills in the selection, design, and upgrading o f that
equipment; operating supplies and services needed to maintain production; and,
minimally, the raw material inputs o f steel production. The knowledge necessary to
produce steel carried over into the post-industrial era.
Co-location also plays a role in post-industrial resilience. Treado notes,
the Mitsubishi-Hitachi join venture established its America[n]
headquarters (and only overseas headquarters) in the Pittsburgh region in
2004, despite having North American headquarters for both Mitsubishi
Heavy Industry and Hitachi, Ltd. in New York City and numerous other
divisions scattered throughout the United States. Company
representatives explained that the Pittsburgh location was chosen to access
secondary supplies and to co-locate with other major mill builders.12
Pittsburgh, as a centralized source o f steel technology, provides two important
advantages to firms:
First, the mill builders serve a coordinating function for other cluster
participants by organizing several different types o f firms in order to
complete large-scale projects for steel producers. Second, the US steel
producers are also able to collect bids for a project with a visit to one US
location. In this way, access to customers through the steel value chain is
part o f the advantage of Pittsburgh’s cluster, even though the majority o f
steel production occurs elsewhere.13
10 Treado, "Pittsburgh's Evolving Steel Legacy and the Steel Technology Cluster," 106.
11 Ibid., 109.
12 Ibid., 110.
13 Ibid., 111.
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The combination of industrial expertise, university knowledge in materials engineering,
and corporate research and development reinforces the cluster o f steel technological
knowledge.
In the broad sense o f path dependence, Treado demonstrates, “the presence o f the
steel technology cluster is more consistent with its legacy.” 14 The preeminence o f the
steel industry in Pittsburgh, in other words, formed the foundation for post-industrial
specialization in industrial technological expertise. Positive returns through clustering
and labor specificity in steel expertise account for this path dependent process.
The chapter began by hypothesizing a positive correlation between level o f post
industrial development and size o f tertiary sector before deindustrialization. Given the
ranking o f post-industrial economies detailed in chapter four, I expected to find that
Pittsburgh had the most robust tertiary sector prior to industrial decline, and Buffalo had
the least.
Path dependence theory informs this hypothesis. At the most basic level, path
dependence processes reflect the idea that history matters. Path dependency scholars
posit different definitions o f what constitutes a path dependent process. The first and
most popular claim details an intertemporal durability between past actions and present
conditions. The second construction emphasizes a path that is eventually regrettable but
not necessarily inefficient. The third conception underscores a path that propagates error,
but also that the error is avoidable. This hypothesis uses the most basic and broad
formation o f path dependence, which is characterized by positive returns and labor
specificity.
14 Ibid., 113.

The analysis above showed that Pittsburgh had the lowest percentage o f full- and
part-time manufacturing employment prior to industrial decline and maintained that trend
until 2012. Cleveland has maintained the largest percentage o f manufacturing jobs from
1969 to 2012, and it had a larger tertiary sector than Buffalo prior to deindustrialization
and since 2000. Additional figures showed that Pittsburgh exhibited the highest rates o f
overall employment growth from 1969 to 2012, and Buffalo showed the lowest. Further,
Pittsburgh’s overall employment levels were highest in the crisis years o f 1979-1983, and
Buffalo’s were the lowest. This pattern o f relative insulation from economic downturns
exists throughout the 1969-2012 period. In addition, Pittsburgh had the greatest
trajectory o f tertiary sector growth over the same period, and Buffalo had the lowest.
Overall, this chapter reveals that a strong tertiary sector prior to deindustrialization
coincides with relatively shallow dips, smoother recoveries, and higher tertiary sector
employment growth. One reason for this pattern is the maintenance o f steel expertise in
the post-industrial era. The null hypothesis that there is no positive correlation between
level o f post-industrial redevelopment and size o f tertiary sector prior to industrial decline
thus can be rejected.
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CHAPTER VII
CAPITAL AND DEVELOPMENT

[T]here will almost always exist potential but unused
resources which could be made to yield a useful return, but
only after some time; and that the exploitation o f such
resources will usually require that [other] resources, which
could yield a return immediately or in the near future, have
to be used in order to make these other resources yield any
return at all. This simple fact fully suffices to explain why
there will always be possibilities o f increasing the output
obtained from the available resources by investing some o f
them for longer periods.
- F.A. Hayek1

INTRODUCTION
Capital accumulation is especially important in post-industrial development. At
the most basic level, individual saving allocates resources for the structure o f production,
for future consumption. Without individuals foregoing consumption to save, no
production is possible. It is only with production that innovation, entrepreneurship, and
economic expansion occurs. The greater the availability o f capital, the more productive
an economy can become. Accordingly, this chapter hypothesizes the highest capital
accumulation occurred in Pittsburgh and the lowest in Buffalo. Thus, I expect to find a
positive correlation between levels o f capital accumulation and post-industrial
revitalization. Ultimately, I find the highest levels o f capital accumulation and
investment income in Pittsburgh, while Buffalo and Cleveland have mixed results.

1 F.A. Hayek, The Pure Theory o f Capital (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009
[1941]), 332.
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Buffalo has had the lowest levels o f venture capital and higher levels o f investment
income than Cleveland. Cleveland, however, has had the lowest investment income and
higher levels o f investment income than Buffalo. The null hypothesis that there is no
positive correlation between levels o f capital accumulation and post-industrial
revitalization, however, can be rejected.
This chapter first describes the importance o f savings in the structure o f
production and economic expansion. It then analyzes two available measures o f capital
in metropolitan areas: PwC-MoneyTree data on venture capital and Bureau o f Economic
Analysis data on dividends, interest, and rent. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion
on the inferences this data offers for the cities in this study.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN PRODUCTION
Investment capital is at the center o f post-industrial production.2 Even though
there has been a fundamental shift from manufacturing to service-oriented labor in these
three metropolitan areas, the analytical framework for describing capital in the structure
o f production is no different than in the production o f physical goods. In producing both
goods and services, producers transform scarce elements o f nature using capital goods.
To accumulate capital and capital goods, individuals must restrict consumption in the
present to save for consumption in the future. This saving can involve physical resources
or currency, which serves as a proxy for resources. Capital goods are not immediately
useful in satisfying consumer desires. They must be transformed into consumer goods
using labor. With few capital goods, only the most immediate goods and services and
2 For purposes o f this chapter, the term “capital” refers to capital investment. When
referring to capital goods, I use the term “capital goods.”
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those in the lowest stages o f production can be available for consumption. Production,
then, must precede consumption.3
Individuals cannot consume what has not been produced on some level. Even in
the most basic example, such as picking berries, the production process involves manual
labor prior to eating the berries. In more complex, intricate, and time consuming
processes, such as semiconductor innovation, greater amounts o f capital are necessary.
With greater amounts o f capital come longer and more complex processes o f production.
There are two ways in which these longer processes o f production increase productivity:
by providing a greater production o f the same good per unit o f time or by producing
consumer goods and services that are not at all available with shorter processes of
production.4 Thus, with longer processes, productivity either becomes more efficient or
creates new goods or services for consumption.
Longer processes and higher stages o f production require greater amounts o f
capital. Murray Rothbard explained:
Allowing for the relative urgency o f wants, m an.. .tends to invest first in
those consumers’ goods with the shortest processes o f production.
Therefore, any given saving will be invested either in maintaining the
present capital structure or in adding to it capital in more and more remote
stages o f production, i.e., in longer processes o f production. Thus, any
new saving (beyond maintaining the structure) will tend to lengthen
production processes and invest in higher and higher orders o f capital
goods. In a modem economy, the capital structure contains goods o f
almost infinite remoteness from the eventual consumers’ goods.5

3 Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, 47.
4 Ibid., 48.
5 Italics are original. Ibid., 57.
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In a regional post-industrial economy, especially, greater capital availability creates
increasing stages o f production to increase efficiency and productivity.
With greater capital accumulation comes greater saving and less relative
consumption. A common criticism o f savings is the “paradox o f thrift” theory, developed
by John Maynard Keynes.6 This theory implies that a reduction o f consumption leads to
less revenues and can be deleterious to the macroeconomy. Spending and consumption,
in other words, drive the economy. Other economists, including F.A. Hayek, have
disputed this claim.7 The answer to the Keynesian assertion that a reduction in
consumption cannot support an increase in investment in production lies in
shifting investment further up the ladder to the higher-order production
stages. Simple investigation will reveal that the only way that so much
investment can be shifted from the lower to the higher stages, while
preserving uniform (lowered) interest differentials (cumulative price
spreads) at each stage, is to increase the number o f productive stages in
the economy, i.e., to lengthen the structure o f production. The impact o f
net saving on the economy, i.e., o f increased total savings, is to lengthen
and narrow the structure o f production, and this procedure is viable and
self-supporting, since it preserves essential price spreads from stage to
stage.8
Instead o f the Keynesian assumption that spending drives the economy, it is actually
savings that increase productivity and provides for the expansion o f production processes.
Because o f uncertainty, investment in capital goods and the production o f future
consumers goods involve risk. Entrepreneurs must manipulate capital toward producing
goods or services that are speculated to be demanded. The longer the production process,

6 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest, and Money
(London: Macmillan, 1936).
7 F.A. Hayek, "The "Paradox" o f Saving," Economica 32 (May 1931).
8 Italics are original. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, 519.
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the more risk that is entailed, because future conditions cannot be precisely known.
Individuals provide capital to entrepreneurs in hopes o f greater return.9
The benefits o f capital investment can fall to investors, new employees o f startups,
and the entrepreneurs themselves. The main benefits to investors are entrepreneurial
profits in the short term. Profits are
earned by investors who see a profit to be gained by investing in a certain
area. After a while, the profits tend to disappear as more investors enter
this field, although changing data are always presenting new profit
opportunities to enterprising investors. But the short-run benefits earned
by the workers and landowners are more certain. The entrepreneurcapitalists take the risks o f speculating on the uncertain market; their
investment may result in profits, in breaking even with no profits at all, or
in suffering outright losses. No one can guarantee profits to them.
Aggregate new investment will result in aggregate net profits, to be sure,
but no one can predict with certainty in what areas the profits will appear.
On the other hand, the workers and landowners in the fields o f new
investment gain immediately, as new investment bids up wages and rents
in the longer processes. They gain even if the investment turns out to have
been uneconomic and unprofitable. For in that case, the error in satisfying
consumers is borne by the heavy losses of the capitalist-entrepreneurs. In
the meanwhile, the workers and landowners have reaped a gain. This is
hardly a clear gain, however, since consumers have, as a whole, suffered
in real income through entrepreneurial error in producing the wrong kind
o f goods. Yet it is obvious that the brunt o f the loss from making the error
is suffered by the entrepreneurs.10
Thus, entrepreneurs must accurately predict future conditions to make efficient
and productive use o f capital.
Capital forms the bases o f productive activity and the growth o f
economies, especially post-industrial ones. This brief discussion has
demonstrated the interaction among capital, productivity, and economic
expansion. Capital is difficult to measure. The two indicators used below to
9 Ibid., 60.
10 Italics are original. Ibid., 548-49.
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evaluate the availability o f capital are venture capital and return on investment.
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers collaborates with MoneyTree to provide quarterly data
on venture capital investment activity in major metropolitan areas and regions in
the United States. The Bureau o f Economic Analysis provides data on
“Dividends, Interest, and Rent,” which describes individual investment income.
These two indicators approximate the availability and efficiency o f capital in each
metropolitan area.

VENTURE CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT INCOME

Venture Capital
To measure capital accumulation in each metropolitan area, venture capital and
returns on investment are analyzed. Patterns o f the availability o f venture capital are
evaluated first. Included in Pricewaterhouse-Coopers-MoneyTree data are
[qjualifying transactions [that] include cash investments by these entities
either directly or by participation in various forms o f private placement.
All recipient companies are private, and may have been newly-created or
spun-out o f existing companies... The report excludes debt, buyouts,
recapitalizations, secondary purchases, IPOs, investments in public
companies such as PIPES (private investments in public entities),
investments for which the proceeds are primarily intended for acquisition
such as roll-ups, change o f ownership, and other forms o f private equity
that do not involve cash such as services-in-kind and venture leasing.11
Accordingly, venture capital is aimed at start-ups and reflects the desire and risk
individuals take on in hopes of supporting a profitable enterprise.

11 PwC-MoneyTree, "MoneyTree Definitions," at
https://www.pwcmoneytree.eom/Definitions/Definitions#Report.
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The available data show the patterns o f venture capital in the past decade and a
half. Table 7.1 below shows the total annual venture capital investment for Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh from 1997 to 2013. Figure 7.1 gives a graphical representation
o f the data. From 1999 until 2012, Pittsburgh had the greatest aggregate venture capital
accumulation, surpassed by Cleveland in 2013. Except for 1997, 1998, and 2013,
Cleveland had lower venture capital investment than Pittsburgh, but higher than Buffalo.
In every year during this period, Buffalo had the lowest. Venture capital peaked for all
cities in 2000, immediately preceding the burst o f the dot-com bubble. In 2000, venture
capital in Pittsburgh was $877.53 million. Cleveland had $329.37 million, and Buffalo
had $157.35 million. A minor peak for Pittsburgh occurred in 2006, when $242.72
million o f venture capital was available. Whereas Pittsburgh fell in 2013 below its 2011
level by over $4 million, Cleveland’s venture capital accumulation more than doubled to
$190.77 million. It remains to be seen how 2014 will fair for the two metropolitan areas.
But, in the past decade and a half, venture capital in Pittsburgh, as an aggregate total, has
surpassed Cleveland and Buffalo.
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Table 7.1: Total Annual Venture Capital Investment for Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh in Real Dollars (millions), 1997-2013

Buffalo12

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

1997

50.30

43.17

33.40

1998

103.52

122.50

83.81

1999

88.64

141.42

249.34

2000

157.35

329.37

877.53

2001

32.90

56.89

312.27

2002

61.25

112.84

251.74

2003

52.43

126.06

224.00

2004

25.46

33.74

155.41

2005

31.89

71.98

127.85

2006

39.02

40.02

242.72

2007

67.42

127.46

206.89

2008

62.46

125.55

156.98

2009

26.88

75.27

94.15

2010

44.77

130.50

160.78

2011

47.72

94.51

142.50

2012

47.44

143.36

163.64

2013

54.79

190.77

138.28

{Source: “Venture Capital, 1997-2013,” PwC MoneyTree)

12 Buffalo venture capital is estimated. The closest measure for Buffalo metropolitan area
is for Upstate New York as an aggregate.
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Figure 7.1: Total Annual Venture Capital Investment for Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Pittsburgh in Real Dollars (millions), 1997-2013
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(Source: “Venture Capital, 1997-2013,” PwC MoneyTree)

To provide a more accurate comparison, Table 7.2 shows the annual per capita
venture capital investment for the three metropolitan areas from 1997 to 2013. Figure 7.2
graphs these data. Like the aggregate measure, the per capita pattern shows Pittsburgh
with the highest venture capital throughout the period and Buffalo with the least. In
1997 and 1998, however, the ranking was reversed, with Buffalo having the highest.
From 1999 to 2011, Pittsburgh had the highest per capita venture capital investment.
Buffalo and Cleveland shared similar paths o f investment during this same period. After
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2011, Cleveland’s pattern o f investment grew, surpassing Pittsburgh in 2012 and 2013.
Again, the data show peaks for all metropolitan areas in 2000. From 1998 to 2000,
Pittsburgh’s venture capital investment rose 956% from $34.21 to $361.38 per capita.
During that same period, Cleveland’s rose 169% from $56.94 to $153.37. Buffalo’s
declined from 1998 to 1999 to $75.56 then rose 78% in 2000 from $75.56 to $134.60.
These regions also saw precipitous drops after 2000, and the patterns for Buffalo and
Cleveland relatively leveled off for the rest o f the period. Pittsburgh had another small
peak in 2006 at $102.67, rising to just above the 1999 value. The aggregate data show
similar trends, with Pittsburgh displaying the highest venture capital investment for most
o f the period between 1997 and 2013.
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Table 7.2: Annual Per Capita Venture Capital Investment for Buffalo, Cleveland,
and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1997-2013

Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

1997

42.41

20.05

13.58

1998

87.84

56.94

34.21

1999

75.56

65.78

102.25

2000

134.60

153.37

361.38

2001

28.24

26.56

129.17

2002

52.73

52.82

104.53

2003

45.20

59.15

93.29

2004

22.02

15.89

65.05

2005

27.77

34.09

53.84

2006

34.18

19.06

102.67

2007

59.26

60.94

87.71

2008

54.96

60.21

66.61

2009

23.67

36.17

39.97

2010

39.43

62.87

68.22

2011

42.05

45.69

60.39

2012

41.84

69.43

69.31

2013

48.31

92.39

58.57

{Source: “Venture Capital, 1997-2013,” PwC MoneyTree)
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Figure 7.2: Annual Per Capita Venture Capital Investment for Buffalo, Cleveland,
and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1997-2013
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{Source; “Venture Capital, 1997-2013,” PwC MoneyTree)

In line with the rankings o f post-industrial revitalization, the above patterns show
the Pittsburgh metropolitan area with the highest venture capital investment, Cleveland
with the second highest, and Buffalo with the lowest. Given the measure on venture
capital, one sees a preliminary correlation between capital and post-industrial
revitalization. To gain greater insight into these patterns, the next section will look at the
returns o f capital investment: investment income.
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Investment Income
Another way to measure capital investment is the success o f investment,
measured by investment income. The Bureau o f Economic Analysis data measure
personal dividend income, personal interest income, and rental income. This dividends,
interest, and rent (DIR) measure is a primary category o f personal income from
investments. These include stocks, savings accounts, income from rental properties, and
other income such as royalties from patents. The BEA’s definitions for the three terms
are:
Dividends: This component o f personal income consists o f the payments
in cash or other assets, excluding the corporation’s own stock, made by
corporations located in the United States or abroad to persons who are U.S.
residents. It excludes that portion o f dividends paid by regulated
investment companies (mutual funds) related to capital gains distributions.
Interest: This component o f personal income is the interest income
(monetary and imputed) o f persons from all sources.
Rent: Rental income is the net income o f persons from the rental o f real
property except for the income o f persons primarily engaged in the real
estate business; the imputed net rental income o f the owner-occupants of
nonfarm dwellings; and the royalties received from patents, copyrights,
and the right to natural resources.13
The DIR data serve as a reflection o f the efficiency o f capital use in the production o f
goods and services. The higher the returns are, the greater the profits, and the more
useful the original capital investment.
A drawback in using the DIR data comes in the form o f an ecological inference
problem. Whereas the venture capital data above measures investment from various
locations into a specific metropolitan area, the DIR data reflects investment from specific

13 B.E.A., "V. Dividends, Interest, and Rent," Bureau o f Economic Analysis, at
https://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/lapi2004/divintrr.pdf.
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metropolitan areas into various locations. Capital accumulation for individual locations
is difficult to measure because capital markets are national and international, not regional
and metropolitan. Nonetheless, the DIR data is important for describing the success o f
investments o f the populations o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh.
Data for DIR exist for the years 1969-2013. Table 7.3 shows the annual per
capita dividends, interest, and rent for Buffalo, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and U.S.
metropolitan areas in real dollars from 1970 to 2013. The data shown from 1970 to 2000
are quinquennial. Figure 7.3 graphs the annual data from 1969 to 2013. From 1969 to
2002, Cleveland had the highest per capita DIR and followed the US metro average.
From 2003 to 2013, Pittsburgh had the highest, only relinquishing the top spot in 2005.
From 1969 to 1987, Buffalo and Pittsburgh shared a similar pattern o f returns, after
which Buffalo slowed. From 2009 to 2013, however, Buffalo surpassed Cleveland in
DIR income. Notable spikes in the patterns for all three cities occurred immediately
preceding economic downturns: 1990, 2000, and 2007-2008. The 2013 DIR income for
each metropolitan area remained below the US average. Pittsburgh’s per capita DIR
income was $8,326. Buffalo’s was $8,176, Cleveland’s was $7,441, and the US average
was $8,734. For a more focused view o f the data, Figure 7.4 below shows the patterns of
DIR investment from 1983 to 2013.
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Table 7.3: Annual Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent for US Metro, Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1970-2013

1970

US
Metro
684

1975

1,048

870

1,023

824

1980

1,842

1,556

1,802

1,572

1985

3,220

2,803

3,176

2,940

1990

4,272

3,452

4,365

4,017

1995

4,872

3,846

4,784

4,413

2000

6,066

4,652

5,966

5,666

2001

5,998

4,863

5,837

5,617

2002

5,811

4,568

5,692

5,487

2003

5,944

4,874

5,366

5,563

2004

6,260

4,925

5,562

5,685

2005

6,764

5,235

5,990

5,700

2006
2007

7,588

5,593

6,620

6,680

8,211

6,495

7,110

7,369

2008

8,322

6,721

7,099

7,368

2009

7,263

6,084

6,125

6,530

2010

7,171

6,151

5,894

6,495

2011

7,965

6,902

6,600

7,248

2012

8,634

7,983

7,328

8,163

2013

8,734

8,176

7,441

8,326

Buffalo

Cleveland

Pittsburgh

578

665

541

{Source: “Regional Economic Profiles: Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent, 19702013,” Bureau o f Economic Analysis)
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Figure 7.3: Annual Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent for US Metro, Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1970-2013
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{Source: “Regional Economic Profiles: Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent, 19792013,” Bureau o f Economic Analysis)
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Figure 7.4: Annual Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent for US Metro, Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in Real Dollars, 1983-2013
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(Source: “Regional Economic Profiles: Per Capita Dividends, Interest, and Rent, 19792013,” Bureau o f Economic Analysis)

The data show Pittsburgh with the highest per capita DIR income in the past
decade and Cleveland recently falling below Buffalo. Buffalo had been far behind until
2010, when it surpassed Cleveland. Nevertheless, all three cities remain below the
national metropolitan average.

234
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Capital is necessary for production. Higher amounts o f capital expand the
structure o f production and enable longer and more complex production processes.
Venture capital, in particular, increases entrepreneurial activity and leads to more start
ups. One difficulty in analyzing the relationship between capital and economic activity is
the endogeneity in the causation. Entrepreneurs see the increases in the availability o f
capital and engage in productive activity as a result. The causation, however, can also be
reversed. Current and potential investors see increased productivity and profit-making,
which further attracts more capital. The agglomeration effects o f capital accumulation
create positive expectations for both entrepreneurs and investors in a reciprocal pattern o f
causation.
This process informs the cases o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh in venture
capital and investment income. The data above show Pittsburgh with the highest levels
o f capital accumulation in the past ten years. In this same period, Cleveland has had
higher levels o f venture capital than Buffalo, but Buffalo more recently has had higher
levels o f per capita investment income. Investors in Pittsburgh see greater returns, which
begets greater investment in the future. In Cleveland, investors have not seen as high o f
returns on investment, which signals to entrepreneurs that productive ventures are not as
profitable. In Buffalo, higher returns do not seem to be leading to higher levels o f
venture capital. Pittsburgh sees a reciprocal causation between capital investment and
returns, while Buffalo and Cleveland do not.
This chapter has described the importance o f savings in the structure of
production and economic expansion and analyzed the two available measures o f capital
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in metropolitan areas: venture capital and investment income. I hypothesized the highest
capital accumulation in Pittsburgh and the lowest in Buffalo. Thus, I expected to find a
positive correlation between levels o f capital accumulation and post-industrial
revitalization. While Pittsburgh had the highest levels o f both venture capital and
investment income in the past ten years, Cleveland and Buffalo had mixed results.
Cleveland had the lowest levels o f investment income and Buffalo had the lowest levels
of venture capital. The null hypothesis that there is no positive correlation between levels
o f capital accumulation and post-industrial revitalization can be rejected.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

This study sought to understand the differences in post-industrial revitalization
among Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh. These three cities, located in the “rust belt” o f
the United States, experienced industrial decline from the 1960s through the 1980s,
largely as a result o f the economic globalization o f the steel industry. Intensive
manufacturing and output declined quickly and harshly. Unemployment spiked,
outmigration ensued, and the cities fought for survival. The past twenty years saw these
regions attempt to redevelop. This occurred unevenly, with Pittsburgh appearing to be
more successful than its rust belt counterparts.
Comparing the cities using insights from previous studies as well as politicaleconomic theory, this study was inherently interdisciplinary. The literature review
explored the wide range o f themes that interconnect and underlie the study o f post
industrialism in metropolitan areas. It addressed the key empirical investigations and
theoretical discourses o f the market-driven phenomena o f post-industrialism and
globalization; local and regional development; economic geography; endogenous growth
and entrepreneurship; and institutions and economic growth. Studies on public policy
and the role o f local governments in urban development followed these works. The
literature review discovered the dearth o f research on post-industrial metropolitan
redevelopment.
The first step was to examine the degree o f post-industrial transformation each
metropolitan area experienced. To do this, I compared the cities in each o f the four

characteristics o f post-industrialism: change from a goods-producing to service economy;
the growing importance o f human capital; decline in importance o f blue-collar work and
increase in importance o f professional labor; and the centrality o f ideas in economic
growth. Numerous indicators were examined for each characteristic, ultimately revealing
that Pittsburgh has performed best in most areas o f analysis, and Buffalo performed worst
in most. In addition, the Pittsburgh metropolitan area shows the healthiest economy
when looking at standard economic indicators, and Buffalo shows the worst. First,
Pittsburgh shows the greatest divergence in emphasis on secondary employment versus
tertiary employment, showing the largest shift from a goods-producing economy to a
service economy. Second, even though Buffalo shows the greatest percentage o f the 25
and older population with a graduate or professional degree, Pittsburgh leads on the rest
o f the human capital indicators, including greatest percentage o f individuals with a
bachelor’s degree only; greatest percentage o f individuals with at least a bachelor’s
degree; and highest population and percentage o f individuals holding a degree in business,
computers, mathematics, statistics, or communications. Third, despite Buffalo having a
lower percentage of blue-collar jobs in recent years, Pittsburgh has had the greatest
proportion o f STEM-bachelor’s degrees awarded. There are more science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics graduates per year in Pittsburgh than in the other areas,
which is reflected in employment numbers. And fourth, Cleveland has been the leader in
patenting in the past decade, but in terms o f major universities spending money on
research and development, Pittsburgh leads by far, showing greater emphasis on ideas as
a central way to grow the economy.
In comparison, the characteristics o f the post-industrial economy as well as
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standard economic indicators show Pittsburgh on top, Cleveland next, and Buffalo at the
bottom. The next step was to determine why Pittsburgh is ahead o f the game. Why are
there such differences among the three regions, given their similar histories o f decline?
To partly explain this phenomenon, I posited three hypotheses, which were then
individually tested. The first hypothesized a negative correlation between the level of
post-industrial redevelopment and regulatory burden. Differences in post-industrial
revitalization can be explained by favorable policies that attract firms and allow them to
thrive. A more developed post-industrial city will have a better reputation for ease o f
doing business. The second hypothesized a positive correlation between the level of
post-industrial redevelopment and the robustness o f the service sector prior to
deindustrialization. If a region had a substantial service sector before the decline o f
heavy industry, the brunt o f deindustrialization would not be as bad and the foundation
for post-industrialization would have already been laid. The larger the service sector is in
an economy, the easier it is to recover from industrial decline. The third hypothesized a
positive correlation between post-industrial redevelopment and capital accumulation.
Capital is necessary for production, which must precede consumption. Increased levels
o f capital accumulation lead to more complex production processes and economic
expansion.
I tested these hypotheses in the framework o f liberal institutionalism. This school
o f thought posits that production can only be a driver o f economic expansion if it
correctly reflects consumer desires. This is possible through limited coercive
intervention into the market economy. Otherwise, the price signals which tell producers
what to produce and how much o f it become distorted, inefficiencies result, and some
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groups o f individuals benefit at the expense o f others. This framework concludes that
growth is a phenomenon that is driven by individuals acting in their own subjective
interests. It occurs in an environment free o f government interference, yet with
protection o f private property.
I tested the first hypothesis in specific reference to the institutional regulatory
burden governments place on particular locales. The ability for local governments to
provide an institutional setting in which market processes can work efficiently is pivotal
to economic expansion and post-industrial development. This liberal setting includes the
provision o f basic public goods and the strengthening o f property rights. The protection
o f property rights presupposes an environment o f low taxation and few obstacles to
engaging in business operations. Liberal formal institutions open the potential for
economic gains. Since Pittsburgh’s post-industrial economy outperforms Cleveland’s
and Buffalo’s, I expected to find that Pittsburgh has the lowest regulatory burden o f the
three. To measure the regulatory climates in Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, I
created an index that examined the ease o f starting a business, dealing with construction
permits, registering property, and the corporate tax burden. In addition, I evaluated the
individual tax burdens and overall cost o f living as reflections o f the economic
attractiveness o f each city. These measures describe the overall regulatory burden in
each city.
The results were mixed. The regulatory index measured the number o f
procedures, time, and cost o f starting a business, dealing with construction permits,
registering property, and paying taxes. Cleveland receives the highest score in starting a
business, entailing the lowest number o f procedures, shortest time, and lowest cost.
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Buffalo has the lowest score. Under dealing with permits, Pittsburgh receives the highest
score. Even though dealing with permits takes the longest amount o f time in Pittsburgh,
it entails the fewest number o f procedures and cost. Cleveland receives the lowest score
in this regulatory category. Pittsburgh has the second best score in registering property as
well as entailing the fewest procedures and days, but it proves to be much more
expensive than either Buffalo or Cleveland. Cleveland had the best score, and Buffalo
had the worst. Finally, under paying taxes, Cleveland has the lowest tax obligations, and
Pittsburgh has the highest. Overall, the first year o f doing business for a firm is most
expensive in Pittsburgh and least expensive in Cleveland. Cleveland also has the best
regulatory index score, Buffalo has the worst, and Pittsburgh lies in the middle.
According to the regulatory index, it is easiest doing business in Cleveland.
The other side o f the story involves ease o f living. To balance the study, I
examined individual tax rates and overall cost o f living. When considering income,
property, and sales taxes in each city, I found that Pittsburgh has the best individual tax
environment and Cleveland has the worst. This same pattern exists in the cost o f living
measure: Pittsburgh has the lowest cost o f living, and Cleveland has the highest. If the
historical patterns remain constant, the cost o f living ranking will remain the same in the
near future.
Given this evidence, the null hypothesis that there is no negative correlation
between levels o f post-industrial development and institutional regulatory burden can be
rejected. Even though it seems that Cleveland has the lowest regulatory burden for firms,
Pittsburgh has the lowest regulatory burden for individuals. Since there is no definitive
evidence that rules out the hypothesis, the hypothesis that there is a negative correlation
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between levels o f post-industrial development and institutional regulatory burden holds
weight.
The second hypothesis tested path dependence as a factor in post-industrialization.
Each o f the three metropolitan areas suffered industrial decline in the 1970s and 1980s,
characterized by a significant drop in manufacturing employment. Prior to decline,
manufacturing employment made up a large proportion o f each region’s total
employment. Deindustrialization caused labor dislocation and a decrease in total
employment. Not all cities, however, had the same dependence on industrial
manufacturing. Unemployed workers may have been able to find jobs in the service
sector and contribute to its growth. Given that Pittsburgh has the highest levels o f post
industrialization and Buffalo has the lowest, I expected to find that Pittsburgh had the
largest tertiary sector prior to deindustrialization and Buffalo had the smallest. I expected
to observe a positive correlation between the level o f post-industrial redevelopment and
the robustness o f the service sector prior to deindustrialization.
Path dependence theory informs this hypothesis. At the most basic level, path
dependence processes reflect the idea that history matters. Path dependency scholars
posit different definitions o f what constitutes a path dependent process. The first and
most popular claim details an intertemporal durability between past actions and present
conditions. The second construction emphasizes a path that is eventually regrettable but
not necessarily inefficient. The third conception underscores a path that propagates error,
but also that the error is avoidable. This hypothesis used the most basic and broad
formation o f path dependence, which is characterized by positive returns and labor
specificity.
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This analysis showed that Pittsburgh had the lowest percentage o f lull- and parttime manufacturing employment prior to industrial decline and maintained that trend
until 2012. Cleveland has maintained the largest percentage o f manufacturing jobs from
1969 to 2012, and it had a larger tertiary sector than Buffalo prior to deindustrialization
and since 2000. Additional figures showed that Pittsburgh exhibited the highest rates o f
overall employment growth from 1969 to 2012, and Buffalo showed the lowest. Further,
Pittsburgh’s overall employment levels were highest in the crisis years o f 1979-1983, and
Buffalo’s were the lowest. This pattern o f relative insulation from economic downturns
exists throughout the 1969-2012 period. In addition, Pittsburgh had the greatest
trajectory o f tertiary sector growth over the same period, and Buffalo had the lowest.
Overall, this chapter reveals that a strong tertiary sector prior to deindustrialization
coincides with relatively shallow dips, smoother recoveries, and higher tertiary sector
employment growth. One reason for this pattern is the maintenance o f steel expertise in
the post-industrial era. The null hypothesis that there is no positive correlation between
level o f post-industrial redevelopment and size o f tertiary sector prior to industrial decline
was rejected.
The third hypothesis dealt with capital accumulation, which is especially
important in post-industrial development. At the most basic level, individual saving
allocates resources for the structure o f production, for future consumption. Without
individuals foregoing consumption to save, no production is possible. It is only with
production that innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic expansion occurs. The
greater the availability o f capital, the more productive an economy can become.
Accordingly, I hypothesized the highest capital accumulation in Pittsburgh and the lowest
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in Buffalo. Thus, I expected to find a positive correlation between levels o f capital
accumulation and post-industrial revitalization.
The data showed Pittsburgh with the highest levels o f capital accumulation in the
past ten years. In this same period, Cleveland has had higher levels o f venture capital
than Buffalo, but Buffalo more recently has had higher levels o f per capita investment
income. Investors in Pittsburgh see greater returns, which begets greater investment in
the future. In Cleveland, investors have not seen as high o f returns on investment, which
signals to entrepreneurs that productive ventures are not as profitable. In Buffalo, higher
returns do not seem to be leading to higher levels o f venture capital. Pittsburgh sees a
reciprocal causation between capital investment and returns, while Buffalo and Cleveland
do not. The null hypothesis that there is no positive correlation between levels o f capital
accumulation and post-industrial revitalization was rejected.
These results provide important insights for city managers and development
directors in urban areas. First, capital accumulation is important. The ability for
entrepreneurs to find investment funds for startups and continuing projects is a necessary
condition for the expansion o f production. Second, a low regulatory burden attracts
capital, individuals, and firms to a particular region, creating a competitive advantage
over other cities. Urban municipalities must create an atmosphere which is fertile for
economic growth. In conditions o f low regulatory burden, firms are better able to adjust
to competition and the demands o f consumers as well as create knowledge clusters where
productive spillovers can occur.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
These three cities were chosen because they form an important core o f the rust
belt region, which had once driven the American, and arguably the global, economy.
They have differing levels o f economic redevelopment yet are similar in several respects.
First, their heavy industrial bases began to see a steady decline after World War II, which
coincided with population drain. Second, their proximities to water resources and
resource endowments helped them industrialize, but their geographic locations are not as
important as they once were. Third, they have similar European immigrant backgrounds,
which weigh heavily on their local cultures. And fourth, one o f the most beneficial
aspects o f these three cities is institutional and governmental uniformity. While they
have different municipal ordinances and state laws, they are all subject to federal laws
and are, for the most part, equally affected by national legislation or monetary changes.
While their respective histories are not uniform, their similarities help identify the general
patterns o f post-industrial redevelopment. It is more difficult to analyze cities that have
completely divergent historical paths. By choosing more similar cities that face similar
problems, yet with differing economic results, it is easier to identify causal factors
without having to control for cultural or institutional differences. Thus, I am able to
control for certain variables.
That the three cities are medium-sized cities is also significant. The global cities
literature tends to focus exclusively on large cities such as Tokyo, New York, Paris, and
London. There is a presumption that only large cities play significant roles in
international governance and provide useful cases for the study o f political economy. But,
large cities do not provide the appropriate historical cases for post-industrial studies that
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small- and medium-sized cities do. Whereas larger cities such as Chicago have gone
through a post-industrial transition, its commercial diversification insulated the region
from the devastating o f effects o f deindustrialization that were experienced in Buffalo,
Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, which had been reliant on heavy industry. Best practices for
post-industrial redevelopment can only be discovered, then, through the examination o f
cases like these types o f metropolitan areas. In this sense, these cities became “global”
because o f the examples they provide for international cases with similar economic
histories.
This study focused on three independent variables, which account for an
incomplete explanation for the differences in post-industrial development. In addition to
testing the effects o f the independent variables regulatory burden, path dependence, and
capital accumulation, future research can evaluate the roles o f the following variables:

Brownfield revitalization: Brownfields are visual reminders o f economic
prosperity that once was. Abandoned factories, slag dumps, and other former
industrial sites contribute little to local economies and serve as eye-sores to
residents and visitors. Converting these locations into wealth-creating or urban
heritage sites adds value and aesthetic attraction to the region.

Diversification: Although the agglomeration effects o f economic concentration
can spur economic expansion, having multiple types o f industry in a particular
geographic area may be more sustainable in the long-term than cities with a single
type o f industry. This variable can also be a predictor o f the stability o f each
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region against future shocks. One o f the reasons these cities declined so rapidly
was the absence o f a diversified economy. Multiple healthy sectors are necessary
for a local economy to survive and withstand outside shocks.

Social capital: Preferential treatment and cooperation among individuals and
groups within a geographic area can increase productivity among the social
networks. Greater levels o f social capital in metropolitan areas can then be a
determinant o f post-industrial redevelopment. Indeed, simple observation reveals
differences in levels o f social capital among the cities. These social bonds
increase cooperation among urban residents, lessening free rider problems
associated with the public good which is city survival.

I focused on American cities to eventually extrapolate the findings to international
cases o f post-industrial redevelopment. Similar non-American metropolitan areas include
Sheffield, England; Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia; and Hamilton, Ontario,
Canada. The conclusions drawn from this study imply that regulatory burden, size o f
service sector, and capital accumulation have played significant roles in the post
industrialization o f these three cities.
Like the examples o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh, Sheffield became a
center for steel production in the nineteenth century and faced industrial decline in the
1970s and 1980s. Since 1997, however, the gross value-added o f Sheffield’s economy
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increased by nearly 60%. The local economy averages 5% growth annually.1 At one
point, it became the fastest-growing British city outside o f London for office and
residential space and rents.2 Sheffield’s post-industrial economy is characterized by steel
technology research, banking, health care, and retail.
Newcastle’s steel industry suffered a similar fate. The downfall o f heavy industry
began in the 1970s and continued until 1999, when the Newcastle steelworks closed.3
Coincidentally, the steelworks closure occurred during a period o f economic
diversification and expansion in Australia. The region’s post-industrial economy is based
on health care, education, and finance: it hosts the National Stock Exchange o f Australia.
Hamilton is an outlier in the group. While the region’s economy has shifted more
toward service sectors such as transportation, education, and health services, Hamilton is
still heavily industrialized and produces 60% o f Canada’s steel.4 The city also has a 30year growth plan, which includes the development o f its airport into an aerotropolis
industrial park. This case o f post-industrial development combines the move toward
service sector employment as well as the ability to maintain a manufacturing presence.
One non-American case plausibly challenges some o f the findings o f this study:
Birmingham, England. In contrast to my findings, that post-industrialism has been aided

1 City Council o f Sheffield, "Income & Wealth: Gross Value Added (GVA) in Sheffield,"
at http://web.archive.org/web/20100521085049/http://www.sheffield.gov.uk/your-citycouncil/sheffield-facts-figures/sheffield-economy/income-wealth.
2 BBC News, "Sheffield 'Hotbed' For Investment," at
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/south_yorkshire/4314628.stm.
3 ABC Online, "Steel City Without the Big Australian," at
http://www.abc.net.aU/7.30/stories/s55787.htm.
4 Canada's Digital Collections, Industrial Hamilton: A Trail to the Future (2011).
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by liberal institutions, Birmingham has recuperated from its 1970s industrial downfall
with heavy public spending at both the civic and national levels. Many initiatives were
undertaken to diversify the local economy and make the city more appealing to tourists.
Public works also substantially regenerated housing slums and initiated massive publicuse projects. The role o f government intervention has gone beyond infrastructure
planning and seems to have been integral to post-industrial revival in the city. Whether
heavy government involvement in development is sustainable in the region is the subject
o f future research.5
This study has demonstrated the importance o f formal institutions in restraining
intervention in the market to provide a setting in which entrepreneurs and individuals can
act freely and engage in economic exchange. At the same time, it has underscored the
influence o f history in the development o f local economies. Post-industrial recovery is
often a function o f the size o f the service sector at the time o f deindustrialization. Finally,
capital accumulation is crucial. As capital becomes more available, the production
structure expands, and the economy grows. At the very least, these three variables
affected the revitalization o f Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh.
This study has also underscored the process o f post-industrialism in developed
countries as a result o f the processes o f globalization. Increased and intensified economic,
social, and cultural flows across borders relocate industry and supply chains to more
efficient locations. As lesser developed countries industrialize, many industrialized
economies post-industrialize. This process does not always occur smoothly. Cities either
find a way to thrive or they fail. These cases demonstrate local economies which have

5 See Liam Kennedy, ed. Remaking Birmingham: The Visual Culture o f Urban
Regeneration (New York: Routledge,2013).
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transitioned into the post-industrial model at differing rates and have used lessons from
economic geography to varying extents. Cities are always evolving and in a state o f
becoming as the processes o f globalization increasingly interact with urban locales.
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APPENDIX
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION (SIC) TO NORTH AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (NAICS) TRANSLATION

NAICS Sectors

SIC Divisions

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting

Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing

Mining

Mining

Construction

Construction

Manufacturing

Manufacturing

Utilities
Transportation & Warehousing

Transportation, Communications &
Public Utilities
Transportation, Communications &
Public Utilities

Wholesale Trade

Wholesale Trade

Retail Trade

Retail Trade

Accommodation & Food Services

Retail Trade

Finance & Insurance

Finance, Insurance & Real Estate

Real Estate & Rental & Leasing

Finance, Insurance & Real Estate

Information

Services

Professional, Scientific & Technical
Services
Administrative & Support & Waste
Management & Remediation Services

Services
Services

Education Services

Services

Health Care & Social Assistance

Services

Arts, Entertainment & Recreation

Services

Other Services (except Public
Administration)

Services

Public Administration

Public Administration

Management o f Companies & Enterprises

(parts o f all divisions)
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